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This dissertation traces the development of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s attempts to 
find solutions to what he perceived to be the crisis of meaning in his time. I focus 
primarily on Hofmannsthal’s fictional letters and poetological reflections from the post-
lyrical phase of his career, also touching on his final drama and political speeches. In the 
1990s semiotic, structuralist, and poststructuralist studies of Hofmannsthal’s texts 
allowed critics to uncover the more radically modern dimension of his creative process 
and work, making possible a poetological turn in the scholarship, with critics becoming 
far more interested in the poetics and aesthetics of Hofmannsthal’s writings. Thanks to 
this work, a very different image of Hofmannsthal has appeared – one that attempts to 
overcome the common prejudice against the author as an elitist and cultural conservative 
who was out of step with his time. This dissertation participates in the latest approach to 
Hofmannsthal’s work inasmuch as it largely focuses on Hofmannsthal’s self-reflexive 
poetological writings from the Erfundene Gespräche und Briefe and on the author’s 
intermedial search for a language that can counteract the reification of language in a 
positivistic age. The central argument of this dissertation is that the crises of language, of 
perception, of experience and of identity that Hofmannsthal repeatedly represents in his 
work fundamentally express a crisis of authorship. Hofmannsthal’s preoccupation with 
 iv 
these crises reflects his increasing uncertainty about the role of the poet in a modern 
democratic age, in which not only the social hierarchies but also the hierarchies of 
knowledge are leveled. I argue that Hofmannsthal radically destabilizes the role of the 
poet by questioning whether the poet has a necessary role in interpreting experience for 
the many. But I conclude by suggesting that in an effort to keep this question alive in an 
age of democratic skepticism about the poet’s vocation, Hofmannsthal sees the need to 
reassert at a rhetorical level the poet’s privileged position. 
 v 
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“Hier auf dem Tisch, links und rechts, stauen sich immer Bücher auf. Es ist nicht zu übersehen, 
wo sie herkommen. Man räumt sie weg, verteilt sie in den Regalen, macht sie in den Reihen ihrer Brüder 
verschwinden, und gleich sind ihrer neue aufgestaut. Und so ist in den Zimmern fast aller Menschen. Man 
muß immer ihrer einige wegschieben, wo sonst nichts umherliegt, in den Eisenbahnen, in den Vorhallen 
der Hotels. Sie sind in Kürze: überall. Jenes unrealste aller Reiche, unheimlichste aller Phantasmata, die 
sogenannte Wirklichkeit, ist vollgepfropft mit ihnen. Unser Dasein starrt von Büchern.“1 
 
The above-cited passage is from Hofmannsthal’s 1905 essay “Der Tisch mit den 
Büchern,” in which he reflects upon the uncanny presence of books in the modern literate 
age. Books, Hofmannsthal observes, pile up on our desks and shelves at home; they lie 
around in train stations and hotel lobbies and clutter up our public spaces; they are simply 
everywhere. By calling reality “[j]enes unrealste aller Reiche, unheimlichste aller 
Phantasmata” stuffed with books, he emphasizes how in a positivistic culture of 
knowledge, the abstract realm of books has gained a greater reality than the sensory 
world we inhabit. Books have distanced us from the immediate experience of reality. 
They seem like an eminently personal or private means of accessing ideas, but also one 
that cuts the readers off from the concrete world around them, threatening to imprison 
them in their subjectivity. This separation from the world sends the readers on a quest to 
understand how they can reconnect. They ironically seek the answer in more books. The 
question for Hofmannsthal becomes: How can the writer, using his words, forge an 
immediate relationship with his or her audience?  
This dissertation traces the development of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s attempts to 
find solutions to what he perceived to be the crisis of meaning in his time. I focus 
                                                
1 Hugo von Hofmannsthal, “Der Tisch mit den Büchern,” in GWRA I, 337. 
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primarily on Hofmannsthal’s fictional letters and poetological reflections from the post-
lyrical phase of his career, also touching on his final drama and political speeches. The 
earliest scholarship on Hofmannsthal tends to be concentrated on the content, and less on 
the formal aspects of Hofmannsthal’s work, with an emphasis on Hofmannsthal’s critique 
of the aesthetic life in his early writing;2 however, the direction of Hofmannsthal 
scholarship changed significantly in the 1970s, when Carl E. Schorske spearheaded a 
cultural studies approach to the study of fin-de-siècle Viennese art and literature, 
providing psycho-historical insights into the politics and culture of Vienna around 1900, 
which Schorske regarded as the birthplace of modernism.3 In the 1970s and 80s, 
psychoanalytical studies of Hofmannsthal’s work became dominant, opening up avenues 
of research into the structure of gender relations in Hofmannsthal’s texts.4 In addition, 
with the rise of reader-oriented literary criticism, the focus of Hofmannsthal scholarship 
shifted from the analysis of its substance to the study of how its reception has changed 
over time.5  
                                                
2 Richard Alewyn, Über Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958). See 
for example, Hinrich C. Seeba, Kritik des ästhetischen Menschen. Hermeneutik und Moral in 
Hofmannsthals ‘Der Tor und der Tod’ (Tübingen: Bad Homburg, 1970); Rolf Tarot, Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal. Daseinsformen und dichterische Struktur (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1970). 
3 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de.-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1981). 
4 Michael Worbs, Nervenkunst: Literatur und Psychoanalyse im Wien der Jahrhundertwende 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1983); Marlies Janz, Marmorbilder: Weiblichkeit und 
Tod bei Clemens Brentano und Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Königstein: Athäneum Verlag, 1986); Waltraud 
Wiethölter, Hofmannsthal oder Die Geometrie des Subjekts: Psychostrukturelle und ikonographische 
Studien zum Prosawerk (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1990); Gotthart Wunberg, Der frühe Hofmannsthal: 
Schizophrenie als dichterische Struktur (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1972). 
5 Gotthart Wunberg, Hofmannsthal im Urteil seiner Kritiker: Dokumente zur Wirkungsgeschichte 
Hugo von Hofmannsthals in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1972). 
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In the 1990s semiotic, structuralist and poststructuralist studies of Hofmannsthal’s 
texts allowed critics to uncover the more radically modern dimension of his creative 
process and work, making possible a poetological turn in the scholarship, with critics 
becoming far more interested in the poetics and aesthetics of Hofmannsthal’s writings. 
Since the 1990s a very different image of Hofmannsthal has appeared – one that attempts 
to overcome the common prejudice against the author as an elitist and cultural 
conservative who was out of step with his time. Dangel-Pelloquin characterizes the 
scholarship of recent years in the following manner: Nicht mehr die existentiellen 
Themen seines Werkes, nicht die biographischen Bezüge, die psychohistorischen 
Konstellationen und schon gar nicht die kanonische Abgeschlossenheit der Werke 
interessieren, sondern Hofmannsthal wird in seiner pointiert modernen Ästhetik neu 
entdeckt und bewertet.6 These poetological studies examine the transitions in 
Hofmannsthal’s work from his lyrical poetry to prose and drama, exploring the author’s 
attempts to transcend the limits of literary form. The scholarship is principally devoted to 
the study of Hofmannsthal’s efforts to transcend the boundaries of language, through the 
medium of language itself, for the purpose of arriving at a language of the body, of 
gestures, and of colors and images, using opera, pantomime, dance, and film.7 Recent 
studies examine how the author takes the language of signs from other media and arts and 
applies them to his work; with this shift in focus, it is no longer the early works by 
Hofmannsthal that are privileged, but rather the prose works from Erfundende Gespräche 
                                                
6 Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Neue Wege der Forschung, ed. Elsbeth Dangel-Pelloquin (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007), 9. 
7 Ursula Renner, “Die Zauberschrift der Bilder”: Bildende Kunst in Hofmannsthals Texten (Freiburg: 
Rombach Druck- und Verlagshaus, 2000); Sabine Schneider, Verheißung der Bilder: Das andere Medium 
in der Literatur um 1900 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 2006); Heinz Hiebler, Hugo von Hofmannsthal und die 
Medienkultur der Moderne (Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, 2003). 
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und Briefe that are of central interest today, because they are highly self-reflexive and 
overtly articulate Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic position.  
This dissertation participates in the latest approach to Hofmannsthal’s work 
inasmuch as it largely focuses on Hofmannsthal’s self-reflexive poetological writings 
from the Erfundene Gespräche und Briefe and on the author’s intermedial search for a 
language that can counteract the reification of language in a positivistic age. The central 
argument of this dissertation is that the crises of language, of perception, of experience 
and of identity that Hofmannsthal repeatedly represents in his work fundamentally 
express a crisis of authorship. Hofmannsthal’s preoccupation with these crises reflects his 
increasing uncertainty about the role of the poet in a modern democratic age, in which not 
only the social hierarchies but also the hierarchies of knowledge are leveled. I argue that 
in an effort to bolster the importance of the poet’s role in society, Hofmannsthal 
conceptualizes language not as the writer’s tool, but rather as the master of the poet; that 
is, he conceives of language not as a medium of the poet’s self-expression, but rather the 
poet as the medium for the expression of language. He is thereby able to justify the 
privileged position of the writer as someone who has a higher awareness of the fact that it 
is not the subject that speaks language, but rather language that speaks the subject; the 
privilege of the poet thus lies in his ability to serve language by acting as its voice. 
Hofmannsthal, I suggest, was in search of a form that not only speaks to the people, but 
speaks the people. In this way, he can on the one hand ascribe a cultural leadership role to 
the poet, while at the same time presenting the poet as the servant of both language and 
the people that language speaks.  
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Hofmannsthal is faced here with a difficult problem, however: Can the privileged 
position of the poet ultimately be justified? In other words, if language speaks the poet, 
why does it not speak everyone? Why is the poet necessary at all? In this dissertation, I 
trace out Hofmannsthal’s struggle with precisely this question. Hofmannsthal was driven 
by the desire to overcome the gulf between the writer and his society. I demonstrate how 
this concern is already present in his prewar texts and becomes more pronounced in his 
politically charged writing from the postwar years. I suggest that in his attempt to bridge 
this gap, Hofmannsthal turns to a quasi-religious conception of language, according to 
which language has the power to reveal being. I show that while Hofmannsthal’s quasi-
religious understanding of language is accompanied by doubt and ambivalence, as when 
he suppresses his doubt in his role as a public speaker in “Das Schrifttum als geistiger 
Raum der Nation,” his insistence on the democratic unity between the poet and society 
paradoxically amounts to an authoritarian assertion. In my final chapter I show how this 
translates into a form of direct cultural-political speech that at once strives for more 
democratic dialogue, while taking the form of messianic prognostication. 
Over the course of five chapters, I explore how the crisis of authorship is 
intrinsically connected to crises of language, of perception, and of both individual and 
collective identity. In the first chapter I analyze how the crisis of authorship is 
represented in “Ein Brief” as a search for the language of nature. I show how the 
Chandos Letter marks the beginning of a new poetic vision; in response to the language 
crisis, this text illustrates the idea that the writer’s way out of the linguistic impasse is to 
assume a passive receptivity to the world of mute things. I argue that Hofmannsthal 
inverts the power relationship between the subject and nature: no longer is it the writer 
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who gives coherence and shape to the world through his work; rather, it is the world that 
speaks to the writer.  
In my second chapter I analyze “Die Briefe des Zurückgekehrten,” which I read 
as providing an elaboration and deepening of the problem introduced in the Chandos 
Letter. I assert that the crisis experienced at the turn of the seventeenth century by one 
privileged individual, Lord Chandos, is portrayed in “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” as a 
more pervasive generational – and distinctly European – problem at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In this text Hofmannsthal tries to bridge the gap between the poet and 
the ordinary person by making the narrator of this fictional letter a businessman who 
explicitly claims that he is not a cultured person. Hofmannsthal presents a letter writer 
whose return to his homeland triggers a crisis of perception. Once again, the path out of 
this crisis cannot be willed by the narrator, but presents itself through epiphanic moments. 
However, these privileged moments do not take place in nature as they did for Chandos, 
but rather, for the twentieth century individual, are triggered by indirect contact with 
nature, namely through the memory of nature experienced in childhood or abroad, or 
through the depiction of nature in modernist visual art. In this last category of experience, 
Hofmannsthal focuses specifically on the art of Van Gogh, which emphasizes the 
subjectivity of perception. Something that has not been acknowledged in the existing 
analyses of this text is that Hofmannsthal presents these epiphanic moments in an ironic 
light. The revitalizing effects of Van Gogh’s art allows the protagonist to carry out his 
most successful business negotiation, and thus the encounter with art helps the narrator be 
of even more effective service to capitalism, which is one of the main causes of the 
alienation and rootlessness from which the narrator suffers. Thus, modernist art is 
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presented as that which allows the ordinary person to become aware of his presence in 
the world as a creative agent, but it is powerless to actually reverse the historical process 
that has led to the atomization of the individual.  
Chapter three is an analysis of “Das Gespräch über Gedichte,” Hofmannsthal’s 
most explicit theoretical reflection on the power of poetic language, in particular the 
power of what he regards as the central element of poetry, namely the symbol. This 
fictional conversation is motivated by the following questions: What is the origin and 
function of poetic language? Does it have a special status distinguishing it from 
conceptual and everyday language? What does it communicate? The dominant argument 
in this text is that poetic language has a revelatory power that neither Begriffssprache nor 
Alltagssprache has. What it reveals is that the self is not an inner realm that is sealed to 
the outside world, but rather that it is permeable. What remains unanswered in this text is 
where poetic language comes from. I argue that in considering the content and the literary 
form of this text together, we can see that Hofmannsthal sheds doubt on his fictional 
character’s claim that poetic language is perfectly distinct from both conceptual and 
everyday language. I contend that the dialogue form draws attention to the power 
differential between the two interlocutors, bringing to light how the claims made by the 
dominant voice about the purity and revelatory power of poetic language also represent, 
at an important yet less obvious level, an exercise in the art of persuasion.  
Chapter four takes up Hofmannsthal’s speech “Der Dichter und diese Zeit,” in 
which he reflects upon the role of the poet in the age of rising media competition. 
Hofmannsthal observes two conspicuous trends in the reading culture of his time that 
reflect the widening gap between the poet and his society: While, on the one hand, public 
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regard and consumer demand for poetry and highbrow literature appear to be ever 
diminishing, on the other, the general public is gripped by an insatiable appetite for 
reading material. Hofmannsthal makes the strained argument that the mass consumption 
of reading material expresses the masses’ unconscious yearning for poetry. Hofmannsthal 
argues that the poet exercises a secret “Führerschaft” because the literary writer is the 
only one who can truly satisfy the general public’s unconscious thirst for poetic truths. 
While many critics acknowledge the importance of this text in Hofmannsthal’s work, 
there are very few close readings of the text. In this chapter I analyze the various 
metaphors Hofmannsthal uses to convey the poet’s secret cultural leadership. The poet is 
presented as someone who exercises leadership by acting as a servant to society; he is 
likened by turns to a beggar, to a chameleon, and to the perceptual organs of his time. I 
argue that Hofmannsthal reaches an impasse in his attempt to bridge the gulf between the 
poet and his time. In this speech he ultimately fails to provide a satisfying answer to the 
question of how it is that the anonymous poet and the anonymous reader can somehow 
find each other.  
In chapter five I analyze two texts from Hofmannsthal’s late work. In “Das 
Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation” he offers a “solution” to the problem of 
anonymity that distances the poet from society. He reconceives the anonymous mass of 
readers as das Volk and the poet as the voice of the people. Hofmannsthal presents what 
he terms the seekers (the writers and thinkers of his time) as exercising their cultural 
leadership by searching for the unifying Geist of the German people. I examine the 
contradiction between the thesis he presents in “Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der 
Nation,” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the skepticism of his last play, Der 
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Turm, in which he expresses doubt in an inherent spiritual connection between the poet 
and “the people.” I argue that the discrepancy between the certainty expressed in the 
public speech and the doubt expressed in the drama suggests that Hofmannsthal 
suppressed his doubts in the public speech. By suppressing his doubts in this way, 
Hofmannsthal risks playing the role of a false prophet. 
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Chapter 1: Nature and Language in Hofmannsthal’s “Ein Brief”   
Hofmannsthal’s image of words disintegrating in one’s mouth like moldy 
mushrooms has become emblematic for the linguistic turn8 that began to take shape in the 
early twentieth century, both in literary modernism and western philosophy, primarily 
through the reception of the ideas developed in the 1920s and beyond by Wittgenstein 
and Heidegger. However, as Wolfgang Riedel points out, when Hofmannsthal published 
“Brief des Lord Chandos” in the Berlin Newspaper Der Tag, it was not apparent that it 
would one day be regarded as the poetic Magna Carta of twentieth-century German 
literature.9 While Hofmannsthal’s contemporaries recognized it as a prose work of 
outstanding quality, it was not until after 1945 – when German literary critics began to 
rediscover literature from the turn of the century, i.e. from a time before the cultural 
catastrophe of the Third Reich – that it gained the status of a “Stiftungsurkunde” of 
literary modernism.10 Since then, “Ein Brief” has been predominantly interpreted as 
capturing the essential “Sprachproblematik” of literary modernism, which Riedel 
describes as “der Sturz der Dichter aus dem Haus der Sprache.”11 However, he argues 
                                                
8 The term “linguistic turn” gained popular currency through Richard Rorty’s 1967 anthology The 
Linguistic Turn in which the term is used to describe the turn toward linguistic philosophy. Rorty himself 
identified the Jewish Austrian philosopher Gustav Bergmann as the one who coined the phrase, “linguistic 
turn.” See “Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language,” in Essays on Heidegger and Others 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). I use the term in a general sense to refer to the turn away 
from a correspondence theory of language toward the idea that language is constitutive of thought and of 
our perception of reality. Within the German tradition, this idea was already taking shape in the writings of 
figures like Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) and Wilhelm 
von Humboldt (1767-1835). For an informative summary see Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in 
Hermeneutic Philosophy, translated by José Medina (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). 
9 Wolfgang Riedel, “Homo Natura,” in Literarische Anthropologie um 1900 (New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1996), 1. 
10 Riedel, “Homo Natura,” 1.  
11 Riedel, “Homo Natura,” 1-2. 
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that this dominant interpretation, which was prefigured by Fritz Mauthner and Gustav 
Landauer’s reception of “Ein Brief,” obscures Hofmannsthal’s more important 
preoccupation in this text, namely the question of what constitutes life. Riedel contends, 
“Nicht die Sprache, beziehungsweise eine Sprachkrise, ist das Thema des Chandos-
Briefes, sondern das Leben. […] Und man geht nicht zu weit, wenn man in Hofmannsthal 
selbst einen Schlüsselautor für die Konjunktion von Lebensphilosophie und Dichtung um 
1900 erkennt.”12  
Riedel presents this interpretation of the Chandos Letter in the context of his 
broader investigation into literary conceptions of nature in a scientistic and technological 
age around the turn of the century. In a scientistic age, he observes, it is assumed that the 
literary writer cannot contribute to our knowledge of nature. However, he points out that 
this has not always been the assumption: Around 1800, literature, as the language of 
feeling, was also thought of as the language of nature. Schiller’s theory of 
“sentimentalische Dichtung” was one of the most influential expressions of the idea that 
literature presents a utopian realm in which nature is not divided. That is, because 
literature speaks in the name of sensation (aisthesis), it also speaks in the name of nature. 
Conceived in such aesthetic terms, nature functions as a synonym for totality, and for the 
unity of subject and object, in a tradition stretching from Schiller to Joachim Ritter.13 
Joachim Ritter, for example, argues that nature emerges as landscape when it is perceived 
aesthetically. He promotes the view that the arts provide a counter-balance to the natural 
                                                
12 Riedel, “Homo Natura,” 21. 
13 Riedel, “Homo Natura,” XI-XII.  
 12 
sciences by communicating the wholeness of nature rather than by breaking it down into 
its component parts.14  
In this chapter I argue that Hofmannsthal does not strictly oppose the scientific 
and aesthetic perspectives, but instead presents them as dialectically linked. My argument 
consists of two main points: First, I argue that the first part of “Ein Brief” demonstrates 
how the artistic endeavor can be motivated by a drive for total comprehensibility, which 
is remarkably similar to the motivation of the natural sciences. I contend that this drive is 
the basis of the hubris for which Chandos is punished through the crisis of language and 
identity, leading him to the brink of nihilism. Second, I demonstrate that in the second 
half of “Ein Brief,” Hofmannsthal offers a way out of a nihilistic existence through a 
different kind of aesthetic-poetic relationship to nature, which could be described as 
mystical. By portraying a writer who becomes utterly alienated from his craft, 
Hofmannsthal inverts Chandos’ relationship to nature. No longer can the poet dominate 
nature by reducing it to a transparent system of symbolic meaning; instead he finds 
himself at the mercy of nature’s sheer contingent force, which, in a manner of speaking, 
reveals the poet’s aesthetic practice as itself a manifestation of that contingency. This 
portrait, I argue, poses a far-reaching challenge to the subject-centered understanding of 
the human being’s relationship to nature. 
I. Crisis as a Mythological Form of Punishment 
The letter writer, Lord Chandos, is a 17th century English lord, and in this letter he 
responds to his friend Francis Bacon, who has been worried about the protagonist’s two-
                                                
14 Joachim Ritter, “Landschaft: Zur Funktion des Ästhetischen in der modernen Gesellschaft”, in 
Schriften der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (Münster: 
Verlag Aschendorff, 1963), 7-32. 
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year-long silence. The Chandos Letter can be roughly divided into two parts: into 
Chandos’ autobiographical portrayal of his life before and during his crisis. In the first 
part of “Ein Brief”, Chandos describes his pre-crisis life as one marked by artistic 
productivity and he portrays himself as a genius, who was once able to reveal nature’s 
true forms by articulating them in his literary works. In the second part of the letter, 
Chandos describes how his crisis has left him unable to think and speak coherently, 
which, in turn, causes him to feel confused and alienated from his daily life. He explains 
for the first time what his present condition actually is, stating, “Mein Fall ist in Kürze, 
dieser: Es ist mir völlig die Fähigkeit abhanden gekommen, über irgend etwas 
zusammenhängend zu denken oder zu sprechen.”15 This inability to think and speak 
coherently has left him feeling confused and alienated from his daily life. It is as though 
he has been banished from the fullness of his former life, and more disturbingly, his 
former self. However, his life of crisis and alienation is punctuated by the occasional and 
fleeting mystical sense of a cosmic unity that is sometimes revealed to him not in 
language, but in actual, imagined, or recalled visions of the most mundane, everyday 
objects that Chandos encounters in an agrarian landscape. Finally, he declares that he will 
abandon his former writing career.  
Lord Chandos explains that he is suffering from a “geistige Starrnis,”16 the 
unknown cause of which takes the form of an invisible virus. Its malignant presence can 
only be detected through its effects, lack of vitality being one of the primary symptoms. 
Chandos feels depleted of energy; he says that his perpetual inner state since the 
                                                
15 GWE, 465. 
16 GWE, 461. 
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beginning of his crisis is one of “Kleinmut” and “Kraftlosigkeit.”17 Whereas Chandos, 
with his ambitious scholarly and artistic plans, had previously been an outwardly oriented 
person, he has now been reduced to the husk of the person he was before. He laments that 
he lives “ein Leben von kaum glaublicher Leere.”18 A general sense of meaninglessness 
appears to have spread “wie ein um sich fressender Rost.”19  
What is the cause of this crisis, this sudden feeling of emptiness? David Wellbery, 
offering one of the strongest interpretations of this aspect of the text, suggests that 
Chandos’ “geistige Qualen”20 have a mythological quality. He points out that the 
description of Chandos’ inexplicable condition alludes to the divine punishment that 
Tantalus suffered,21 and indeed, Hofmannsthal does draw a fairly explicit parallel 
between Tantalus’ fate and that of Chandos.22 However, there is nothing in Chandos’ 
biography to suggest that he deserves a punishment as severe as the one Tantalus endured, 
which leads Wellbery to believe that Hofmannsthal was not only referring to the 
mythological figure, but also alluding to Schopenhauer’s description, in the third book of 
his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, of our normal life as the experience of a perpetual 
                                                
17 GWE, 464. 
18 GWE, 470. 
19 GWE, 465. 
20 GWE, 461. 
21 David E. Wellbery, “Die Opfer-Vorstellung als Quelle der Faszination: Anmerkungen zum 
Chandos-Brief und zur frühen Poetik Hofmannsthals,” in Hofmannsthal-Jahrbuch zur europäischen 
Moderne 11, eds. Gerhard Neumann, Ursula Renner, Günther Schnitzler, and Gotthart Wunberg (Freiburg 
im Breisgau: Rombach, 2003), 281-310.  
22 “Aber, mein verehrter Freund, auch die irdischen Begriffe entziehen sich mir in der gleichen 
Weise. Wie soll ich es versuchen, Ihnen diese seltsamen geistigen Qualen zu schildern, dies 
Emporschnellen der Fruchtzweige über meinem ausgereckten Händen, dies Zurückweichen des 
murmelnden Wassers vor meinen dürstenden Lippen.” GWE, 465. 
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unfulfillment akin to Tantalus’ interminable yearning.23 Schopenhauer evokes Tantalus’ 
suffering for the rhetorical purpose of presenting it as a foil to the aesthetic state, in 
which the intellect is temporarily liberated from the “Zuchthausarbeit des Wollens.”24 
Relieved from our attachment to the will, we are then able to contemplate our relation to 
the world as a will-less subject of knowledge. As Gregory Maertz explains, for 
Schopenhauer “knowledge then becomes pure perception, pure objectivity, pure 
repose.”25 Schopenhauer’s description of the relationship between our normal state of 
unfulfilled yearning, on the one hand, and the temporary liberation from our miserable 
will through the experience of beauty, on the other, largely maps onto the depicted 
dynamics of Chandos’ life.  
Wellbery argues that the narrative logic of the movement from Chandos’ 
blissfully productive life to his condition of “geistige Starrnis” does not suggest that 
Chandos is guilty of any moral transgressions, for which he would deserve to be punished. 
However, he suggests that if we are to attempt to make sense of Chandos’ crisis in light 
of the parallel that Hofmannsthal draws between his protagonist and Tanatalus, then we 
have to seriously consider the possibility that Chandos’ crisis might indeed be a form of 
punishment. Wellbery asserts that Chandos’ transgression cannot be traced back to a 
                                                
23 “Darum nun, solange unser Bewußtsein von unserem Willen erfüllt ist, solange wir dem Drange 
der Wünsche, mit seinem steten Hoffen und Fürchten, hingegeben sind, solange wir Subjekte des Willens 
sind, wird uns nimmermehr dauerndes Glück, noch Ruhe. […] So liegt das Subjekt des Wollens beständig 
auf dem drehenden Rad des Ixion, schöpft immer im Siebe der Danaiden, ist der ewig schmachtende 
Tantalus.” Arthur Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Wolfgang Freiherr von Lötneysen, vol. 2 (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 280. 
24 Schopenhauer, 280. 
25 Gregory Maertz, “Romanticism and the idealization of the artist,” in Romantic Prose Fiction, eds. 
Gerald Gillespie, Manfred Engel, and Bernard Dieterle (Philadephia: J. Benjamins Publishing Company, 
2008), 51. 
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particular misdeed, but that when we examine the letter writer’s description of his 
brilliant literary accomplishments and plans before his crisis, we find that he has in fact 
committed a poetological transgression. Chandos’ poetic approach to the world was 
hubristically “ichbezogen,” in the sense that he was attempting to incorporate all of 
nature into himself.26 That he should then be struck by a crisis of language is consistent 
with mythological logic:  
die spezifische Form des Sprachverlustes wird durch die narratologische 
Hypothese erklärbar. Es ist nämlich ein Gesetz des mythisch-poetischen Rechts, 
daß die Strafe den Bestraften dort trifft, wo das Vergehen entstand. Mit Bezug auf 
Chandos kann das nur heißen: in der Zone des Oralen.27  
 
Furthermore, Chandos’ language crisis is not to be primarily understood as an 
expression of the turn-of-the-century Sprach- and Begriffsskepsis that can be traced back 
to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Mauthner, but that this crisis is to be seen in light of 
what Wellbery calls Hofmannsthal’s “Poetik des Milchstroms” or “Laktopoetik.”28 
Chandos commits the hubris of trying to recuperate an orally transmitted unity with 
nature (mother figure) in a post-infantile state, which renders this attempt incestuous: 
“Aber dieses Projekt ist als postinfantile Rekuperation des Phantasmas oral vermittelter 
Einheit mit der Mutter inzestuös, womit wir uns in einer Tradition tragischer 
Verschuldung befinden, die bekanntermaßen auf Tantalus zurückreicht.”29 
                                                
26 Wellbery, 291. 
27 Wellbery, 292.  
28 Wellbery, 291. 
29 Wellbery, 291. 
 17 
Wellbery makes a compelling case for the idea that there is an element of 
punishment in Chandos’ crisis, and I also agree that this punishment is not in response to 
any individual moral transgression on the part of Chandos. However, to deny that there is 
an individual element to Chandos’ punishment is not to immediately conclude that his 
punishment belongs completely in the realm of an ahistorical mytho-poetic experience, 
especially as there is an undeniable historical aspect to the narrative of “Ein Brief,” which 
should not be overlooked here. As Timo Günther points out, Hofmannsthal’s fictional 
letter is addressed to the historical figure, Francis Bacon, who is considered to be the 
father of empiricism. By presenting Bacon as the addressee of Chandos’ letter, 
Hofmannsthal presents an implicit critique of the positivistic, concept-driven approach to 
the world that developed through the emergence and dominance of the natural sciences in 
the modern era.30 Bacon’s science sought knowledge by making man the measure of all 
things. It forced nature to speak in a language of concepts that was comprehensible to 
human beings – a language that was intelligible precisely because human beings 
themselves created it. Günther argues that the Chandos Letter criticizes the scientific 
mania for the comprehensibility of the world – a mania that disenchants the world by 
eroding the sense of wonder and admiration that Hofmannsthal believed to be the key to 
truly understanding it.31  
II. Chandos’ Hubris: Reducing Nature to a Symbolic Language 
Through the portrayal of Chandos’ pre-crisis life, I argue, Hofmannsthal 
demonstrates that art, too, can be motivated by a mania for encyclopedic knowledge and 
                                                
30 Timo Günther, Hofmannsthal: Ein Brief (Berlin: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), 31. 
31 Günther, 31.  
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drive for domination, which is expressed through the reduction of nature to a symbolic 
language. In other words, Chandos’ aesthetic approach to nature before his crisis is as 
subject-centered as Bacon’s scientific method. I suggest that a close examination of 
Chandos’ recollection of his blissful life before the onset of his crisis reflects his formerly 
narcissistic relationship to the world, which should lead us to ask whether his perpetual 
state of cosmic unity was perhaps illusory. I argue that the seed of the subject-object 
division, i.e. the cause of the feeling of alienation from which he suffers during his crisis, 
is already present in his pre-crisis life.    
When Chandos gives an account of his existence before the onset of his crisis, he 
depicts himself as unselfconsciously integrated into nature and feeling at one with it:  
Mir erschien damals in einer Art von andauernder Trunkenheit das ganze Dasein 
als eine große Einheit: geistige und körperliche Welt schien mir keinen Gegensatz 
zu bilden, ebensowenig höfisches und tierisches Wesen, Kunst und Unkunst, 
Einsamkeit und Gesellschaft; in allem fühlte ich Natur, [...] und in aller Natur 
fühlte ich mich selber; wenn ich auf meiner Jagdhütte die schäumende laue Milch 
in mich hineintrank, die ein struppiger Mensch einer schönen, sanftäugigen Kuh 
aus dem Euter in einen Holzeimer niedermolk, so war mir das nichts anderes, als 
wenn ich, in der dem Fenster eingebauten Bank meines Studio sitzend, aus einem 
Folianten süße und schäumende Nahrung des Geistes in mich sog.32  
 
Chandos presents nature as something that appeared to him as an all-encompassing unity, 
in which both the lowest and the highest expressions of life, both the physical and 
intellectual realms, cohere as an organic whole. In order to illustrate his Edenic 
relationship to nature, Chandos evokes a pastoral image of a peasant milking a gentle-
eyed cow, and he equates his drinking of the fresh milk with the act of him sucking 
intellectual sustenance out of his books. This image of him drinking milk, in both literal 
and figurative senses, conveys the impression that he enjoyed a primal intimacy with 
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nature. However, it should be noted that this bucolic portrait already includes an image of 
the subject-object division: Chandos is positioned by the window inside the hunter’s 
lodge with a book, while the unkempt peasant and the cow are outside.  
Furthermore, Chandos’ description of his pre-crisis life is told from the 
perspective of his current state of crisis, and therefore we must take into account that this 
portrait of his former life is undoubtedly colored by this crisis. Indeed, there are a number 
of indications in the above-cited passage that betray Chandos’ own doubt in the blissful 
cosmic unity of his recalled past. For instance, he explicitly describes his experience of 
this unity with the cosmos as an experience of “andauernder Trunkenheit,” an ecstatic 
state in which everything is experienced in a heightened way. And the image of the 
beautiful, docile cow being milked by the peasant evokes the pastoral literary genre, in 
which nature is aestheticized and presented in an idealized manner for a privileged 
audience that does not know, or care to know, the grittier realities of actual rural life. 
Furthermore, Chandos repeatedly uses the expressions “mir erschien”, “[es] schien mir”, 
and “so war mir, als wenn”; the subjunctive mode points to an underlying uncertainty 
about whether or not the letter writer is accurately recalling the past. The recalled 
experiences seemed true to him at the time, but the very seeming represents a possible 
projection of an immediate, unalienated relationship to the world, which Chandos realizes 
that he lacks in the present. The question arises as to whether his past experience of 
cosmic unity was a reality or an illusion supported by a lack of self-consciousness about 
the otherness of nature. The “als wenn,” then, points to the wedge that has been driven by 
his crisis not just between Chandos’ past and present life, but also between his self 
(subject) and the world (object), as well as between language and meaning.    
 20 
The deep inner division that Chandos feels in his life of crisis is not altogether 
absent in his pre-crisis life. Even while Chandos emphasizes that he felt no separation 
between the higher and lower realms of life, his description of the world in the passage 
cited above is still one that relies on the pairing of binary opposites: “geistige und 
körperliche Welt,” “höfisches und tierisches Wesen,” “Kunst und Unkunst,” and 
“Einsamkeit und Gesellschaft.” This list of oppositions is not arbitrary; instead, it points 
to the central tensions in Chandos’ own life. When we consider the letter as a whole, we 
can see that Chandos describes his pre-crisis life as intellectual (geistig), courtly (höfisch), 
artistic (Kunst), and social (Gesellschaft), while his post-crisis life is portrayed as bodily 
(körperlich), almost bestial (tierisch) in the absence of an intellectual life, lacking in art 
(Unkunst), and marked by loneliness (Einsamkeit). Moreover, while Chandos describes 
his former cosmic unity with the world as though there had been no subject-object 
division, only a few lines below the above-cited passage, he portrays himself as the 
subject that seizes the world and gives it meaning: 
Das eine war wie das andere; keines gab dem andern weder an traumhafter 
überirdischer Natur, noch an leiblicher Gewalt nach, und so gings fort durch die 
ganze Breite des Lebens, rechter und linker Hand; überall war ich mitten drinnen, 
wurde nie ein Scheinhaftes gewahr: Oder es ahnte mir, alles wäre Gleichnis und 
jede Kreatur ein Schlüssel der andern, und ich fühlte mich wohl den, der imstande 
wäre, eine nach der andern bei der Krone zu packen und mit ihr so viele der 
andern aufzusperren, als sie aufsperren könnte.33  
 
Chandos claims that he had an entirely organic, unselfconscious relationship to 
nature; nothing appeared as illusory or dreamlike to him. He portrays a world in which 
everything is in a harmonious, “natural” relationship with everything else. But by saying 
that he was everywhere “mitten drinnen,” he actually underlines the fact that he perceived 
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himself to be at the center of this harmonious order. This passage underlines the fact that 
Chandos drew narcissistic pleasure from his position of power as the subject who can 
unlock the secrets of nature (the object). As Günther points out, through the image of a 
key that can open the secrets of nature, Hofmannsthal takes up a common metaphor from 
western philosophical discourse. He observes that one can trace this image back to Bacon 
– and even further, to Parmenides; for the philosophers this key must be a conceptual, 
analytical key that can make the entire world comprehensible.34 That Chandos’ view of 
the world is essentially a conceptual one is reflected in his understanding of the natural 
order as a symbolic order, on the basis of which he can see all creatures as metaphors 
within this greater order. This passage, I argue, thus points to the seed of Chandos’ crisis, 
which lies in the fact that he has been mistaking the system of symbols for nature itself – 
that is, assuming that the sign, which flows from the subject, is identical to the signified, 
or the object which it is meant to designate. His crisis arises, then, when he becomes 
conscious of this mistake: he realizes that human beings themselves are the originators of 
this symbolic order and he comes to recognize the arbitrariness and ungroundedness of 
this self-referential web of meaning. 
In Chandos’ description of his earlier literary projects it is apparent that he 
believed himself to be in communion with nature. He perceived the world as consisting 
of Platonic forms and structures to which he had direct access: 
Und aus dem Sallust floß in jenen glücklichen Tagen wie durch nie verstopfte 
Röhren die Erkenntnis der Form in mich herüber, jener tiefen, wahren, inneren 
Form, die jenseits des Geheges der rhetorischen Kunststücke erst geahnt werden 
kann, die, von welcher man nicht mehr sagen kann, daß sie das Stoffliche 
anordne, denn sie durchdringt es, sie hebt es auf und schafft Dichtung und 
                                                
34 Günther, 26-7. 
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Wahrheit zugleich, ein Widerspiel ewiger Kräfte, ein Ding, herrlich wie Musik 
und Algebra.35 
 
Chandos describes his pre-crisis life as a period in which learning came to him with ease, 
which is emphasized by the image of fluidity. He asserts that knowledge of the true forms 
flowed into him as through unclogged channels. In fact, this image resembles the one of 
Chandos drinking in his books like milk. The ease and fluidity that characterize Chandos’ 
pre-crisis life stand in stark contrast to the “geistige Starrnis” that marks his life of crisis. 
However, I find that Chandos’ former disposition toward life reveals a nihilistic tendency 
because the Dasein of the material world (“das Stoffliche”) could only be meaningful to 
him because it was permeated and elevated by the eternal, super-sensible forms of the 
Jenseits that he believed to recognize in it. Furthermore, Chandos’ description of his 
ambitious but unfinished literary projects, which included a portrayal of the early years of 
Henry VIII’s reign, an interpretation of the fables and mythical tales of the ancients, and 
a collection of the brilliant maxims and reflections from classical and Italian works, 
reflects that he was once convinced that it was his task as a genius to reveal nature’s 
beautiful inner forms by articulating them through humanist high culture.  
Chandos indicates that his many literary accomplishments and plans were made in 
pursuit of self-knowledge. Before his crisis, Chandos had intended to put together an 
encyclopedic collection of classical and folk wisdom, which he would entitle “Nosce te 
ipsum.”36 In a sense, the title of the unfinished plan points to the irony of Chandos’ 
predicament: in attempting to know himself, he reduced the world around him to the 
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referent of his self; in other words, the world around him was regarded as a reflection of 
his own power to assign meaning to it. His plan for the encyclopedic collection of stories 
would then act as a reflective surface for himself, and the unfinished nature of his project 
seems to point to the impossibility of fulfilling the dictum, nosce te ipsum. I do not mean 
to suggest, however, that Hofmannsthal completely rejects the possibility of attaining 
self-knowledge; instead of rejecting this possibility outright, he shows that this quest can 
give rise to a self-interested, solipsistic relation to the world, and he depicts a protagonist 
who is forced, via his crisis, into a new, altered understanding of his earlier pursuit.  
In fact, in trying to explain his crisis to Bacon, Chandos takes up the very task of 
self-knowledge that he claims to have abandoned. It is telling that he writes at the 
beginning of his letter, “Ich möchte Ihnen so antworten, wie Sie es um mich verdienen, 
möchte mich Ihnen ganz aufschließen und weiß nicht, wie ich mich dazu nehmen soll.”37 
With the word “aufschließen” Chandos evokes the image of the key, the metaphor for 
knowledge that was discussed briefly above. Chandos is aware, however, that he cannot 
provide Bacon with a clear scientific diagnosis of his condition; instead, in his attempts to 
describe his crisis, he repeatedly resorts to evocative images, which offer a merely poetic 
grasp of his condition. Günther explains that the historical Bacon saw poetry and ancient 
fables as byproducts of a pre-rational inability to express thoughts and worldviews in 
abstract philosophical terms. Moreover, Bacon saw the Bildhaftigkeit of poetic language 
as primitive, accidental, or ornamental.38 Günther contends that Hofmannsthal criticizes 
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this Baconian view by presenting the reader with a figure who experiences the resistance 
of both the world and the self to conceptual understanding. 
III. Chandos’ Epiphanies 
The second part of the Chandos Letter, I suggest, gestures at Chandos’ new 
understanding of the quest for self-knowledge as one which leads to the humble 
recognition that life (including his own) is “flüssiger, glühender”39 than words and 
concepts. After the onset of his crisis, Chandos feels completely estranged from his past 
literary accomplishments and the above-mentioned literary projects. He describes this 
alienation from his former life in topographical terms as a “brückenloser Abgrund”40 that 
has opened up between his past and future work. In addition, he seems to have lost even a 
passive appreciation of high culture. For instance, when he attempts to find spiritual 
refuge in the works of the ancients, he cannot find comfort in their words; instead, they 
merely exacerbate his feeling of alienation and isolation. Chandos interestingly finds 
Plato’s writing too poetic to offer him the sense of stability provided by the “Harmonie 
begrenzter und geordneter Begriffe”41 found in the writings of Seneca and Cicero. 
However, even their thought fails to touch “das Tiefste, das Persönliche meines 
Denkens.”42 Chandos describes his sense of alienation in the following passage: 
ich sah ihr wundervolles Verhältnisspiel vor mir aufsteigen wie herrliche 
Wasserkünste, die mit goldenen Bällen spielen. Ich konnte sie umschweben und 
sehen, wie sie zueinander spielten; aber sie hatten es nur miteinander zu tun, und 
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das Tiefste, das Persönliche meines Denkens, blieb von ihrem Reigen 
ausgeschlossen. Es überkam mich unter ihnen das Gefühl furchtbarer Einsamkeit; 
mir war zumut wie einem, der in einem Garten mit lauter augenlosen Statuen 
eingesperrt wäre; ich flüchtete wieder ins Freie.43 
 
What is particularly striking about this description of his alienation from the 
abstract play of classical thought is that he again uses water imagery; this time, however, 
the fluidity is not a symbol of life, but rather is used to underscore the lifeless 
abstractness of the classical wisdom. He likens their thought to the playful movement of 
water in a decorative water fountain. The water in this fountain is disconnected from its 
natural source and redirected to produce a self-enclosed system of aesthetically pleasing 
movements.44 Chandos further underscores the lifelessness he perceives in the thought of 
Cicero and Seneca by likening their philosophical ideas to a suffocating garden filled 
with “lauter augenlosen Statuen” that cannot return his gaze.  
The last line in the above-cited passage, “ich flüchtete wieder ins Freie,” is like a 
refrain in the second part of “Ein Brief.” Repeatedly Chandos gets on his horse and rides 
out into the open. “Das Freie” is meant in the double sense of the open air outside and the 
sense of a space in which Chandos can feel liberated from his former life, which has 
become suffocating and lifeless to him. The potentially liberating space of “das Freie” is, 
however, also a threatening place. What is significant about “das Freie,” outside the 
confines of Chandos’ house, is that it is marked by a threatening sense of arbitrariness. 
That is, outside, Chandos perceives a world of particulars, which are not ordered by a 
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44 Similar water imagery can be found in “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten.” For instance, there the letter 
writer contrasts the fresh cold water from the mountains running through a fountain to the water in the jar 
in his hotel room.  
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greater organizing principle.45 Things do not hold together the way they once used to as 
eternal forms, and a radical sense of arbitrariness overwhelms Chandos, threatening to 
render his thinking and his perception of the world incoherent. However, it is precisely in 
those moments when the very arbitrariness of the space outside strikes Chandos in an 
idiosyncratic way that the objects around him seem most alive. Although Chandos claims 
that his post-crisis life is “geistlos” and “gedankenlos,” it is in his Gedankenlosigkeit, 
while he is roaming in the countryside, that he can have the occasional, fleeting 
experience of what he calls “gute Augenblicke.”46 
I argue that these “gute Augenblicke” are epiphanic moments. These moments are 
not sublime in a strictly Kantian sense. That is, they are not triggered by the view of a 
majestic mountain range, or by the subject witnessing the terrifying display of nature’s 
power in a hurricane, but instead these moments are experienced when the subject 
fleetingly encounters a terrifying, chaotic aliveness in the object of perception, which is 
beyond the limits of his reason and beyond his ability to adequately capture this 
experience in language.47 In order to illustrate this experience, Chandos provides the 
following example: 
[…] wenn ich an einem Abend unter einem Nußbaum eine halbvolle Gießkanne 
finde, die ein Gärtnerbursche dort vergessen hat, und wenn mich diese Gießkanne 
und das Wasser in ihr, das vom Schatten des Baumes finster ist, und ein 
Schwimmkäfer, der auf dem Spiegel dieses Wassers von einem dunklen Ufer zum 
andern rudert, wenn diese Zusammensetzung von Nichtigkeiten mich mit einer 
solchen Gegenwart des Unendlichen durchschauert, von den Wurzeln der Haare 
bis ins Mark der Fersen mich durchschauert, daß ich in Worte ausbrechen möchte, 
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von denen ich weiß, fände ich sie, so würden sie jene Cherubim, an die ich nicht 
glaube, niederzwingen […]48 
 
Chandos claims that he is overcome, in such moments, with a shiver that runs 
through his bones as he is suddenly overcome by the feeling of the “Gegenwart des 
Unendlichen.” Of course this mention of infinity reminds us of Chandos’ description of 
his pre-crisis life; however, during his crisis, the cosmic unity is only temporary and it is 
not experienced as an “andauerende Trunkenheit.” Moreover, Chandos does not liken the 
relationship between himself and the infinite to a mother-infant relationship through milk 
imagery, as he does in his depiction of his pre-crisis life. Instead, the world appears 
during these “gute Augenblicke” as something completely other – as something that 
cannot be objectified and subsumed by the subject. In addition, Chandos perceives a 
vastness in the objects of his perception that is characteristic of the sublime. Although the 
perceived objects are not vast, empirically speaking, Chandos perceives an immensity in 
them. For instance, he describes a Schwimmkäfer floating on the surface of the water in 
the watering can. The water has been darkened by the shadow of a tree, creating an 
exaggerated sense of depth, and although the beetle is confined to a relatively small area 
within the “Gießkanne,” Chandos conveys a sense of the vastness contained within this 
small space by observing that the beetle was attempting to row “von einem dunklen Ufer 
zum andern.”49 The word “Ufer” conveys a sense of immensity that one would not expect 
to find within the half-filled watering can. 
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Furthermore, it is important that the disparate objects mentioned above stand in 
arbitrary relation to one another. It is through coincidence that an idiosyncratic and 
unrepeatable relationship is formed between the Nußbaum, Gießkanne, Schwimmkäfer 
and Chandos. A series of coincidences – the coincidence of the gardener forgetting the 
watering can outside by the tree, of these objects catching Chandos’ eye on his aimless 
early evening ride, of the shadow being cast from the tree onto the water in the can, and 
of Chandos seeing the beetle inside it – together produce a particular concatenation of 
circumstances that give rise to an epiphanic moment. The arbitrariness that structures this 
experience is underscored by the fact that the “gute Augenblick” takes place outside, in a 
natural environment over which the subject cannot exercise any control. Konrad 
Heumann observes that for Hofmannsthal the natural environment and its conditions – 
season, landscape, quality of air and of light – dictate our internal state. He argues that 
the environmental conditions are not merely evocative of certain feelings, but that they 
are directly involved in shaping our emotional state.50 These fleeting moments in nature 
are for Chandos filled with an intense sense of aliveness, which almost resembles his 
inner state before the onset of his crisis: “Diese stummen und manchmal unbelebten 
Kreaturen heben sich mir mit einer solchen Fülle, einer solchen Gegenwart der Liebe 
entgegen, daß mein beglücktes Auge auch ringsum auf keinen toten Fleck zu fallen 
vermag.”51 But unlike in his pre-crisis life this so-called “Fülle” is one that is intensified 
precisely by its fleeting quality.  
                                                
50 Konrad Heumann, “‘Stunde, Luft und Ort machen alles’ Hofmannsthal’s Phänomenologie der 
natürlichen Gegebenheiten,” in Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Neue Wege der Forschung, ed. Elsbeth Dangel-
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51 GWE, 469. 
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There is an uncanny resemblance between the bucolic idyll that Chandos evokes 
in his portrayal of his pre-crisis life and the agrarian landscape within which he 
experiences the so-called “gute Augenblicke” during his crisis. Both in his life before and 
during his crisis, nature is charged with the potential for mystical revelation. But there is 
also an important difference between these scenes in nature. The epiphanic moments that 
sporadically burst through the grayness of Chandos’ life of crisis do not result in a fusion 
between the subject and object. Instead, they point to the resistance of nature to the 
human attempt to order and dominate it. The enigmatic scene of the rats dying in the milk 
cellars exemplifies a moment in which Chandos encounters the violent revolt of nature 
against the attempt to sanitize it. In this scene Chandos is once again riding out aimlessly 
at dusk, when he is suddenly struck by the involuntary recollection of his order to have 
the rats in his milk cellars poisoned. The boundary between the space without and within 
is blurred in this scene. Chandos recalls:  
Da, wie ich im tiefen, aufgeworfenen Ackerboden Schritt reite, nichts 
Schlimmeres in meiner Nähe als eine aufgescheuchte Wachtelbrut und in der 
Ferne über den welligen Feldern die große sinkende Sonne, tut sich mir im Innern 
plötzlich dieser Keller auf, erfüllt mit dem Todeskampf dieses Volks von 
Ratten.52 
 
His command to have the rats exterminated, which earlier had seemed to him like an 
innocuous housekeeping instruction to him, sets off a chain of disturbing images. The 
“tief[e], aufgeworfen[e] Ackerboden” evokes a visual image of Chandos’ receptive state 
of mind, which is like the turned up soil in the field. Similarly, the startled “Wachtelbrut” 
that takes flight mirrors the spontaneous movement of his thought, and the sinking sun 
parallels the descent of his imagination into the depth of the milk cellar.  
                                                
52 GWE, 467. 
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Whereas the image of the flowing milk in the first part of the letter was associated 
with the fullness of Chandos’ life, in the second part, Hofmannsthal connects the milk 
with poison and with a site of trauma. That is, through the furious, gruesome death throes 
of the rats in the milk cellar, Hofmannsthal crystallizes in a poetic image nature’s revenge 
for the human attempt to scrub it clean. Nature haunts the human subject through the 
traumatic images of death and decay. It is once again important that this scene appears 
involuntarily before Chandos’ mind’s eye, because it stresses the ultimate lack of control 
that human beings have over nature, including their own. The juxtaposition of life and 
death, which is underscored through the contrast between milk and poison, as well as 
through the furious, panicked fight for survival, translates into the sense of aliveness that 
is simultaneously harrowing and exhilarating, and beyond the grasp of reason and 
language. 
Wellbery is also struck by these objects of aesthetic contemplation and he notices 
the “Belanglosigkeit der Gegenstände” 53 that spark what Chandos calls “gute 
Augenblicke.”54 He explains that Schopenhauer introduced the idea that the aesthetic 
experience is unrelated to the cultural worth of the object that acts as the catalyst for the 
experience. Schopenhauer claimed, “so ist jedes Ding schön.”55 Thus, any random object 
can potentially be the object of an aesthetic experience. However, Wellbery points out 
that Hofmannsthal deviates from Schopenhauer’s conception of the aesthetic object in the 
sense that, in “Ein Brief,” it is not that a mundane object is only incidentally also the 
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object of aesthetic contemplation, but rather the nondescript and discarded character of 
the object is the very quality that catalyzes the aesthetic experience.   
While I agree with Wellbery’s point here, I argue that the objects that give rise to 
Chandos’ “gute Augenblicke” have more than their ordinariness in common. Seen 
together, the quotidian objects, which Chandos calls “stumme Kreaturen,”56 evoke scenes 
of agrarian landscapes and agrarian life, and their concreteness gives expression to 
Chandos’ melancholic longing for an immediate and direct connection to the land. 
Furthermore, in noticing “diese Zusammensetzung von Nichtigkeiten,”57 he perceives the 
lower classes’ humble way of life to which he had paid no attention before. Thus, 
Chandos develops a self-conscious, troubled relationship to his social role. He describes 
how in his vacuous life he managed to keep up appearances by attending to the 
maintenance of his estate. He writes, “Ich baue einen Flügel meines Hauses um und 
bringe es zustande, mich mit dem Architekten hie und da über die Fortschritte seiner 
Arbeit zu unterhalten.”58 However, he is inwardly stirred and distracted by his subjects’ 
gritty lives, as he feels that their shabby dwellings and unrefined possessions can 
unexpectedly enchant him and even lead to epiphanic experiences:  
[I]ch bewirtschafte meine Güter, und meine Pächter und Beamten werden mich 
wohl etwas wortkarger, aber nicht ungütiger als früher finden. Keiner von ihnen, 
der mit abgezogener Mütze vor seiner Haustür steht, wenn ich abends 
vorüberreite, wird eine Ahnung haben, daß mein Blick, den er respektvoll 
aufzufangen gewohnt ist, mit stiller Sehnsucht über die morschen Bretter 
hinstreicht, unter denen er nach den Regenwürmern zum Angeln zu pflegen sucht, 
durchs enge, vergitterte Fenster in die dumpfe Stube taucht, wo in der Ecke das 
niedrige Bett mit bunten Laken immer auf einen zu warten scheint, der sterben 
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will, oder auf einen, der geboren werden soll; dass mein Auge lange an den 
häßlichen jungen Hunden hängt oder an der Katze, die geschmeidig zwischen 
Blumenscherben durchkriecht, und daß es unter all den ärmlichen und plumpen 
Gegenständen einer bäuerischen Lebensweise nach jenem einem sucht, dessen 
unscheinbare Form, dessen von niemand beachtetes Daliegen oder –lehnen, 
dessen stumme Wesenheit zur Quelle jenes rätselhaften, wortlosen, 
schrankenlosen Entzückens werden kann. Denn mein unbennantes seliges Gefühl 
wird eher aus einem fernen, einsamen Hirtenfeuer mir hervorbrechen als aus dem 
Anblick des gestirnten Himmels; eher aus dem Zirpen einer letzten, dem Tode 
nahen Grille, wenn schon der Herbstwind winterliche Wolken über die öden 
Felder hintreibt, als aus dem majestätischen Dröhnen der Orgel.59 
 
Chandos’ self is portrayed here as deeply divided. His public self is defined by his 
social class, which restricts him to participate only passively (through his gliding gaze) in 
the gritty life and work that sustains his estate. His private self, in contrast, longs to have 
the unalienated relationship that his workers appear to have with nature. The movement 
and direction of Chandos’ gaze from the workers to the latticed window into the stuffy 
room, in the corner of which lies a bed where he imagines that one dies and one is born, 
parallel the direction of his yearning to be unselfconsciously anchored in a cycle of life 
that seems directly embedded in the land. In observing the lives of the peasants, Chandos 
comes to realize that nature does not lie waiting for us to force our shape upon it; rather, 
nature uses the human being, as he lives and acts in his everyday experience, to manifest 
itself. Chandos recognizes that it is not for the cultured observer of a higher class to 
reveal the beauty and richness of the “bäuerische Lebensweise;” it is rather that the 
peasants themselves, through the Lebenswelt that they inhabit, provide the field in which 
being is revealed.60 As Chandos observes, it is in the “Daliegen oder – lehnen” of these 
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60 Jacques Le Rider observes that Hofmannsthal deconstructs the subject and allows it to reconstitute 
itself in a mystical impulse. According to him, Hofmannsthal called this conversion “mysticism without 
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mere things that these objects’ mute being becomes the source of his “rätselhaften, 
wortlosen, schrankenlosen Entzückens.”  
However, one cannot help but notice that it is still Chandos’ description that 
allows the field of being to emerge. In the above-cited passage Hofmannsthal points to an 
important shift in the artist’s relationship to the world: While Chandos claims to have 
abandoned all of his former intellectual and artistic projects, it is clear that he still 
possesses an artistic sensibility, even after the onset of his crisis; however, this sensibility 
is no longer expressed through artistic productivity, but instead is redefined as a poetic 
receptiveness to the world of lived experience. Whereas the starry sky and the 
majestically droning organ point to an eternal Jenseits, the lonely “Hirtenfeuer” or the 
“Zirpen einer letzten, dem Tode nahen Grille” draw his attention to the Diesseits. And it 
is in his absorption in the ordinary, intimate, finite things of the here and now – the 
finitude of this realm being underscored by the fleetingness of the “Herbstwind” and 
“winterliche Wolken” – that Chandos experiences the immense and ineffable.  
IV. Language Crisis and the Language of Nature 
This shift in Chandos’ artistic sensibility, however, threatens to silence the writer. 
No higher order resonates with him or allows him to gain a sense of stability. Chandos no 
longer has a universal standard by which he can make judgments, be they 
commonsensical, moral, or philosophical. As mentioned near the beginning of this 
chapter, Chandos himself summarizes his crisis with the following diagnosis: “Mein Fall 
ist, in Kürze, dieser: Es ist mir völlig die Fähigkeit abhanden gekommen, über irgend 
                                                                                                                                            
God.” Modernity and Crises of Identity: Culture and Society in Fin-de- Siècle Vienna, trans. Rosemary 
Morris (New York: Continuum, 1994), 50. 
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etwas zusammenhängend zu denken oder zu sprechen.”61 First, he finds that words like 
“Geist,” “Seele,” and “Körper”62 make him uneasy. Then he discovers that he cannot 
even participate in common small talk that involves any amount of critical judgment. He 
laments, “die abstrakten Worte, deren sich doch die Zunge naturgemäß bedienen muß, 
um irgendwelches Urteil an den Tag zu geben, zerfielen mir im Munde wie modrige 
Pilze.”63 Finally, when Chandos catches his daughter in a childish lie, he is physically 
nauseated by the slipperiness of “die mir im Munde zuströmenden Begriffe” that bleed 
into each other, causing him to stammer and to become “bleich im Gesicht,” so that he 
leaves his child in mid-sentence and storms out of the house. Chandos recalls that he 
recovered “erst zu Pferde, auf der einsamen Hutweide einen guten Galopp nehmend.”64 
Once again he has to ride out into the open, where his mind is free to roam. 
During his crisis, Chandos is bereft of his earlier certainty of the direct 
correspondence between language and world and he feels that language has become 
slippery: 
Es gelang mir nicht mehr, sie [alle Dinge, Menschen und ihre Handlungen] mit 
dem vereinfachenden Blick der Gewohnheit zu erfassen. Es zerfiel mir alles in 
Teile, die Teile wieder in Teile, und nichts mehr ließ sich mit einem Begriff 
umspannen. Die einzelnen Worte schwammen um mich; sie gerannen zu Augen, 
die mich anstarrten und in die ich wieder hineinstarren muß: Wirbel sind sie, in 
die hinabzusehen mich schwindelt, die sich unaufhaltsam drehen und durch die 
hindurch man ins Leere kommt.65 
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Not only does the world appear fragmented to Chandos, but words appear to be floating 
around him, unanchored in any corresponding material reality. Whereas language had 
once allowed him to grasp the world, he now finds himself confronting the 
groundlessness of words and statements. He suddenly feels that language resists him. He 
senses an otherness in it of which he had been previously unaware. It is as though 
language has its own will, which is indicated by his description of the words turning into 
eyes that stare at him. And when he stares back into these “eyes,” he perceives them as 
vortices that spiral into a dizzying void.66 The slipperiness of language also affects his 
general perception of the world, as Chandos explains that he is no longer able to see the 
world through the lens of habit. This inability is disturbing to him not only because it 
prevents him from relating socially to his neighbors through “common sense,” but also 
because without a simplifying “Blick der Gewohnheit,” the world emerges as a 
threatening chaos.  
Paralleling Nietzsche’s observations in “Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen 
Sinne,” Chandos has become aware of the non-identity of language and world. In his 
essay, Nietzsche observes that human beings believe that they have a grasp of truth 
because they have become forgetful of the metaphoric nature of language. As Günther 
points out, in “Ein Brief” Hofmannsthal emphasizes the enigmatic quality of the world 
and “die Unmöglichkeit einer letztgültigen Entschlüsselung.”67 Günther asserts, “Der 
Versuch, das Buch der Welt, das Abc des Himmels und der Erde zu entziffern, hat zur 
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Folge, daß der Schlüssel sich in Figuren auflöst in Bilder und Symbole, das heißt er 
verwandelt sich in Poesie, geht auf in Dichtung.”68 Günther’s observation is reminiscent 
of Nietzsche’s critique of language. According to Nietzsche, words are metaphors for our 
sensory perceptions: “Ein Nervenreiz, zuerst übertragen in ein Bild! Erste Metapher. Das 
Bild wieder nachgeformt in einem Laut! Zweite Metapher. Und jedesmal vollständiges 
Überspringen der Sphäre, mitten hinein in eine ganz andre und neue.”69 In his essay 
Nietzsche points to the entirely subjective and arbitrary nature of our names for things, 
and he argues that the very existence of the different languages is evidence of the fact that 
we do not have adequate expressions for the “Ding an sich.”70 What words and concepts 
do stand for are the relations of things to human beings. Moreover, human beings have 
invented concepts to give themselves the illusion of control and domination of nature:  
Das Übersehen des Individuellen und Wirklichen gibt uns den Begriff, wie es uns 
auch die Form gibt, wohingegen die Natur keine Formen und Begriffe, also auch 
keine Gattungen kennt, sondern nur ein für uns unzugängliches und 
undefinierbares X. Denn auch unser Gegensatz von Individuum und Gattung ist 
anthropomorphisch und entstammt nicht dem Wesen der Dinge, wenn wir auch 
nicht zu sagen wagen, daß er ihm nicht entspricht: das wäre nämlich eine 
dogmatische Behauptung und als solche ebenso unerweislich wie ihr Gegenteil.71 
 
According to Nietzsche nature is an inaccessible, indefinable X. The forms, 
concepts, and categories that we believe to discern in nature do not originate from it, but 
rather reflect our own tendency to anthropomorphize nature. Significantly, Nietzsche, 
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however, does not make the absolute claim that our concepts do not point to the essence 
of things. In fact, he keeps the answer to this question in philosophical abeyance, 
claiming that it would be dogmatic to make an absolute claim on this matter. As he says 
above, “das wäre nämlich eine dogmatische Behauptung und als solche ebenso 
unerweislich wie ihr Gegenteil.” Similarly, the Sprachkrise in “Ein Brief” is not a crisis 
that definitively points to the complete failure of language. After all, Chandos’ claim that 
he is no longer capable of creating coherence through language stands in obvious 
contradiction to his act of using language in order to convey his Sprachkrise. 
Nietzsche, however, does make the absolute claim that there is no identity 
between subject and object: 
denn zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären, wie zwischen Subjekt und 
Objekt, gibt es keine Kausalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, sondern 
höchstens ein ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Übertragung, 
eine nachstammelnde Übersetzung in eine fremde Sprache: wozu es aber 
jedenfalls einer frei dichtenden und frei erfindenden Mittelsphäre und Mittelkraft 
bedarf.72 
 
I argue that “Ein Brief” presents us with a figure who is becoming conscious of such a 
fundamentally aesthetic relationship to the world. In the twentieth century, Heidegger and 
others would make the step from Nietzsche’s claim about the non-identity between 
subject and object to a more radical philosophy that questioned that subject-object 
distinction altogether. I contend that in Hofmannsthal’s thought there are intimations of 
this more radical perspective. Although Chandos despairs of his lost confidence in 
language’s power to unlock the secrets of being, I argue that he actually enters into a far 
more mystical relationship with his surroundings precisely because of his crisis. Chandos 
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is on the cusp of a new relationship with nature. The reality is not so much that human 
beings can act on nature to reveal its secrets, but rather that nature reveals itself 
specifically through the acts and lives of human beings. Language is not, then, a tool used 
by the artist to reveal being, but rather the way being uses humans to manifest itself in 
history. To use Heidegger’s phrase, “die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins.”73  
Chandos thus no longer actively creates art out of nature. Instead, he comes to the 
Heideggerian realization that human beings are the stewards of being. “Ein Brief,” then, 
as much as it seems to hail an abdication of its author’s former role as a steward of art 
and culture, in its very form and substance opens the door to a reformulation of that role. 
Hofmannsthal shows through the Chandos Letter that we reveal nature through our very 
activity of being in the world. The process of arriving at this realization involves a 
confrontation with our desire to name nature and to recognize that this impulse is itself an 
expression of nature, which remains enigmatic to us.  
In this chapter, then, I have argued that Hofmannsthal’s “Ein Brief” contrasts two 
different modes of experiencing nature: one in which nature is reduced to a symbolic 
language that carries meaning only through human interpretation, and another in which 
nature appears as something that resists such a reduction and is communicated to human 
beings in its wholeness, in fleeting, epiphanic moments. I have suggested, however, that 
these two different modes of experience are not self-sufficient and straightforwardly 
opposed to one another, but rather are linked.  
Through the figure of Lord Chandos, Hofmannsthal presents a writer who 
experiences a crisis of meaning as he becomes conscious of the fact that the symbolic 
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order, which he believed to be identical to the natural order, is groundless and merely 
self-referential. In other words, the language that is used to name nature, rather than 
bringing him closer to an understanding of the natural world, reflects the human desire to 
control and dominate it. Chandos’ growing awareness of the otherness of nature is 
reflected in the transformation of his active, artistic productivity into a passive, aesthetic 
receptivity. The writer is no longer conceived as the one who assigns meaning to the 
world, but rather meaning is revealed to him through nature’s mute language. Yet, 
through the very act of writing this letter, Chandos demonstrates his inextricable 
entanglement in the symbolic order, in spite of his desire to reject it. 
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Chapter 2: The Bourgeois Subject and Culture: “Briefe des 
Zurückgekehrten” 
In 1907, five years after “Ein Brief,” Hofmannsthal published “Briefe des 
Zurückgekehrten,” another fictional letter, or rather a series of letters, in which the author 
presents a protagonist who is undergoing a crisis. While the crisis at the center of “Ein 
Brief” is the experience of one privileged individual at the turn of the seventeenth 
century, in “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” the crisis is representative of a generation-wide 
experience created by the conditions of European modernity at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Instead of a cultured, aristocratic figure who is connected to the leading 
intellectuals of his time, the writer of “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” is an anonymous 
businessman, who expressly, and almost proudly, declares that he is uncultured. While 
Lord Chandos and his friends represent those who shape and produce culture, in “Briefe 
des Zurückgekehrten” the letter writer’s anonymity points to a new egalitarian age. Even 
within this contrast, however, there is continuity between the Chandos Letter and the 
letter of the nameless letter writer here. In the Chandos Letter there is a rupture in the 
symbolic order, which challenges the very status of the elite steward of that culture and 
threatens the “organic” coherence of society; in “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” 
Hofmannsthal then shows the new social organization that seems to arise to fill in the 
void left by the erosion of the aristocratic cultural class. The new social order is explicitly 
egalitarian, capitalistic, and self-consciously uncultured. It no longer looks to the cultural 
artifacts of an aristocratic class to provide a sense of coherence; instead, it places its faith 
in the power of the self-made man—the individual who makes his own way, spurning the 
guidance of tradition and culture.  
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The broader effect of “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten,” however, is to subvert the 
bourgeois self-understanding, demonstrating how this new social class finds its unity 
through a symbolic order that is all the more pervasive in its influence for going 
unremarked. This point is illustrated most powerfully through the narrator’s encounter 
with the work of Van Gogh; the narrator enthusiastically embraces this art, but only on 
the assumption that it is his subjectivity that gives it its meaning. Hofmannsthal, however, 
provides indications that it is, on the contrary, Van Gogh’s art that has shaped the 
narrator’s bourgeois subjectivity. “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” explores how, in an age 
dominated by the concerns of a rising business class, cultural forms emerge which unify 
and preserve that class, precisely by sustaining the illusion of its independence from 
culture.  
I. Der Zurückgekehrte 
In “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten,” Hofmannsthal begins his narrative where other 
homecoming stories tend to end, namely with the return home. In the German literary 
tradition, the wanderer—be it an adventurer, fool, artist, or thinker—has figured centrally 
in the Romantic imagination. Travel, the Romantics believed, was a necessary component 
of Bildung. Just like Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister or Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen, 
the protagonists of these Romantic Bildungsromane had to leave their homes to gather 
life experiences, to encounter untouched nature, to discover their artistic sensibilities, and 
ideally, to eventually return home with an enriched sense of self. However, these 
narratives of travel and Bildung did not always culminate in heroic self-realizations. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, Gottfried Keller, the Poetic-Realist, shows through his novel 
Der grüne Heinrich that the young man’s journey can result in disillusionment. The 
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education away from home that is supposed to allow the protagonist to become a first-
rate artist leads him to discover that he is merely a mediocre talent, and he returns home 
disillusioned and broke, ready to resign himself to a modest, stable life as a bureaucrat. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the figure of the wanderer becomes the object 
of nostalgia as the technology of travel develops and turns the folklore fantasy of the 
seven-league boots into reality. Thus, the contemplative traveler, who arduously covers 
vast distances on foot, is supplanted by the businessman, crisscrossing Europe by train, or 
by the urban flaneur, who self-consciously attempts to resist the speed of modern life by 
becoming an aimless wanderer within a bustling metropolis.  
Instead of telling the story of a young protagonist who embarks on his journey to 
unfamiliar lands, “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” is about the return of a middle-aged 
traveler74 whose adventures are already behind him. In five confessional letters, an 
anonymous businessman describes the disorienting experience of returning home after 
having led a nomadic existence for eighteen years, traveling around the world from 
Germany to North and South America, China, the East Indies, and New Zealand. Over 
the course of the first three letters, the narrator relates to his friend how he experienced an 
unexpected culture shock upon his return to modern-day Germany; in the final two 
letters, he then describes how his sense of estrangement from Germany intensified and 
manifested itself as a spiritual feeling of nausea caused by a crisis of perception. At the 
height of his crisis, the narrator encounters Van Gogh’s paintings in an unknown little art 
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gallery, and the encounter with Van Gogh’s vividly expressive artwork renews his sense 
of self and revitalizes his perception of the world.    
II. The Bourgeois Subject and the Rejection of Bildung 
The fictional author of these five letters represents a rising business class that 
defines itself against the refinements of a European cultured class. From the beginning, 
the letter writer identifies himself as a “Geschäftsmann,” who lacks the refinements that 
distinguishes the cultural elite from the rest of society. He confesses, “Bildung, im 
europäischen, heutigen Sinne, habe ich nicht.”75 He opposes his “ungeschickte Sprache” 
to the “Kunstsprache” 76 of philosophy and literature. Reminding his friend of this fact, he 
says, “Du kennst mich gut genug, um zu wissen, daß ich bei meinem Leben nicht viel 
Zeit hatte, abstrakte oder theoretische Lebensweisheiten anzusammeln.”77 But while he 
admits to lacking abstract, theoretical insights into life, the narrator takes pride in his 
“praktische Erfahrung, aus den Gesichtern von Menschen oder aus dem, was sie nicht 
sagen, etwas abzunehmen.”78 This ability to read body language and to interpret 
unspoken signs allows him to anticipate and avert interpersonal problems that may stand 
in the way of business deals.79 The letter writer perceives the elevated “Kunstsprache” of 
educated and cultured people to be an artificial language, whereas he sees his 
“ungeschickte Sprache” as a more authentic way of speaking. In trying to explain the 
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ambivalent feeling that has been triggered upon his return to Germany, he reaches for the 
word “Existenzgefühl,” but then quickly follows the use of this word with an apology: 
Du siehst, ich quäle mich zurück in den Gebrauch einer Kunstsprache, die mir in 
zwanzig Jahren fremd genug geworden ist. Aber muß ich wirklich kompliziert 
werden unter den Komplizierten? Ich möchte in mir selber blühn, und dies Europa 
könnt mich mir selber wegstehlen. So will ich es Dir lieber weitschweifig oder 
ungeschickt sagen und ihren Kunstworten ausweichen.80 
 
He suggests that his twenty years abroad are not only causing him to have an 
outside perspective on his former home continent, but also that they have simplified and 
strengthened his sense of self, a self that is representative of a utility-maximizing, 
atomistic, capitalist individual. He is clearly suspicious of the complicated language of 
the cultured Europeans and prefers his “clumsy” language. Moreover, he privileges the 
language of the body as a more authentic expression of a person’s inner state. From the 
perspective of the protagonist, to be “cultured” means to be conformist, affected, and 
unnecessarily complicated. He sees his own uncultured way of being as more natural, 
authentic, and true to his own self.  
There are strong parallels between the Chandos Letter and “Briefe des 
Zurückgekehrten.” The letter writer’s observation that a refined literary and theoretical 
language has a distorting effect, and his privileging of a more primal, non-verbal 
language—be it body language or the language of colors—should remind us of the 
central opposition in the Chandos Letter between conceptual language and the language 
of nature. In both cases, this opposition is fed by an emerging age of discovery. In the 
Chandos Letter, the protagonist is reacting to the experimental methods of science 
pioneered by Bacon, which have established a new and adversarial relationship to nature 
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(as expressed in Bacon’s remark about “putting nature on the rack”). “Briefe des 
Zurückgekehrten,” on the other hand, takes place in a nineteenth-century Europe that has 
already been thoroughly shaped by the Baconian revolution, but that has recently 
discovered a supposedly more organic way of relating to nature through an encounter 
with non-European peoples.  
III. Encountering Heimat Abroad  
Gunther Gebhard has described how the increased exploration of distant and 
exotic countries brought knowledge of and stories from foreign places to Europe, 
provoking self-conscious reflections on the nature of one’s homeland. Gebhard tells us 
that a shift began to take place around 1800 in the conceptualization of Heimat from a 
geographically and legally defined idea to an abstracted, folklorized and aestheticized 
notion.81 It is telling that the narrator of “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” finds the clearest 
expression of what it means to live an authentic and rooted existence in the words of a 
foreigner. He recounts an adage passed on to him by a Scot he once met during his 
travels: “The whole man must move at once.”82 He likens this simple piece of wisdom to 
an “Organ, das wir im inneren Ohr haben, den Knöchelchen oder kleinen beweglichen 
Kugeln: sie sagen uns, ob wir im Gleichgewicht sind oder nicht.”83 For the narrator, 
wholeness means “Wahrhaftigkeit” and “Menschlichkeit.”84 He explains that when he 
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sees this quality in people, he calls it “einen guten Zug,” an unspoken bearing and 
disposition that signals wholeness: 
The whole man must move at once—wenn ich unter Amerikanern und dann 
später unter den südlichen Leuten in der Banda oriental, unter den Spaniern und 
Gauchos, und zuletzt unter Chinesen und Malaien, wenn mir da ein guter Zug vor 
die Augen trat, was ich einen guten Zug nenne, ein Etwas in der Haltung, das mir 
Respekt abnötigt und mehr als Respekt, ich weiß nicht wie, ich dies sagen soll, es 
mag der große Zug sein, den sie manchmal in ihren Geschäften haben, in den U.S. 
meine ich, diese fast wahnwitzig wilde und zugleich fast kühl besonnene 
“Hineingehen” für eine Sache, oder es mag ein gewisses partriarchalisches grand 
air sein, ein alter weißbärtiger Gaucho, wie er dasteht an der Tür seiner Estancia, 
so ganz er selbst [...] es mag auch etwas viel Unscheinbares sein, ein tierisches 
Hängen mit dem Blick am Zucken einer Angelschnur, ein Lauern mit der ganzen 
Seele, wie nur Malaien lauern können, denn es kann ein großer Zug darin liegen, 
wie einer fischt, und ein größerer Zug, als Du Dir möchtest träumen lassen, darin, 
wie ein farbiger Bettelmönch Dir die irdene Bettelschale hinhält—wenn etwas der 
Art mir unterkam, so dachte ich: Zuhause!85 
 
The narrator’s understanding of wholeness is very much based on his idealization 
of a “primitive” or pre-modern way of life, which he claims he experienced in the United 
States, in South America, and in Asia. In a sense he orientalizes the very notion of 
wholeness inasmuch as he sees it manifested in the exotic, “primitive” other, who is not 
internally divided, but appears to be unselfconsciously himself, as he claims of the white-
bearded gaucho, who is described as “ganz er selbst.” What he values about the bearing 
of “whole” men is their ability to command respect, not through words, but simply 
through their uninhibited being. The men he portrays appear to be more fully themselves 
because there is no separation between their action and their being. They inhabit their 
place in the world without the sense that they are fulfilling an abstract professional role, 
or merely engaging in a specialized activity that finds its value only within a complex 
web of specialized relationships. The angler and the beggar perform tasks that serve their 
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most primary and basic function, namely subsistence; the American entrepreneur 
approaches his business deals with a single-mindedness of someone who identifies with 
his task entirely. The Malay angler, furthermore, with his “tierisches Hängen,” is likened 
to a predatory animal, as though the act of fishing were the expression of a powerful 
natural instinct. 
IV. Two Germanies 
The narrator’s encounter with these simpler, more authentic modes of existence 
abroad sets the stage for his disillusionment upon returning to Germany. Back in his 
homeland, the question of Germany has become a self-conscious one for him: 
Dies Deutschland, in dem ich herumfahre, handle, abwickle, mit Leuten esse, den 
kosmopolitischen Geschäftsmann, den fremden, welterfahrenen Herrn agiere—wo 
war ich jedesmal, wenn ich in dem Land zu sein meinte, das man durch den 
Spiegel der Erinnerung betritt, wo war ich in den Augenblicken, wo nur mein 
Leib unter den Gauchos oder unter den Maoris herumwandelte? Wo war ich? Nun 
da dies Deutschland ist, so war ich nicht in Deutschland. Und dennoch, ich nannte 
es in mir Deutschland.86 
 
While he was away from home he was able to call all experiences of wholeness 
“Deutschland”; however, once he is back in Germany, he discovers that he cannot 
encounter the so-called homeland with the immediacy he claims to have experienced 
abroad. From the beginning, the letter writer identifies the cause of his crisis of identity 
as the lack of correspondence between his “Begriff von den Deutschen”87 and the 
experience of living amongst them. He describes this problem in the opening sentences of 
the first letter:  
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So bin ich nach achtzehn Jahren wieder in Deutschland, bin auf dem Weg nach 
Österreich, und weiss selbst nicht, wie mir zumut ist. Auf dem Schiff machte ich 
mir Begriffe, ich machte mir Urteile im voraus. Meine Begriffe sind mir über dem 
wirklichen Ansehen in diesen vier Monaten verlorengegangen, und ich weiß 
nicht, was an ihre Stelle getreten ist: ein zerspaltenes Gefühl von der Gegenwart, 
eine zerstreute Benommenheit, eine innere Unordnung, die nahe an 
Unzufriedenheit ist—und fast zum erstenmal im Leben widerfährt mirs, daß ein 
Gefühl von mir selbst sich aufdrängt.88  
 
The narrator explicitly emphasizes the opposition between concepts and 
experience, concepts and “wirkliche[s] Ansehen,” concepts and “Gefühle.” Because the 
letter writer’s sense of identity and belonging was based on his abstract idea of Germany, 
the fact that this idea does not map onto the actual experience of the country and its 
people is experienced as the loss of an inner stabilizing center, without which he feels 
unanchored, divided and strange to himself. And yet, it appears that this crisis of identity 
is at one level also productive for the narrator because his destabilized and eroded sense 
of belonging to a larger community has given rise to a much stronger awareness of his 
individual self.  
The letter writer applies the binary opposition between theoretical and 
experiential knowledge to his understanding of Heimat. That is, there are two different 
understandings of the homeland at play in this text. On the one hand, there is the 
homeland as a nation-state; this is essentially a concept defined in legal and political 
terms, mapped onto a people within the confines of artificially imposed geographic 
boundaries. On the other hand, it is thought of as a place that is constituted through lived 
experience and through a people’s organic dwelling in the land. I argue that this 
distinction between these two different types of homeland clarifies the letter writer’s 
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often confusing use of the term “Deutschland” and “Österreich.” That is, he mentions that 
he is passing through Germany on the way to Austria, leading us to believe that his 
homeland must be Austria. And yet, he seems profoundly disturbed by the fact that he 
cannot identify with the Germans. He writes that he called the feeling of being at home 
during his travels abroad “Deutschland”: “Indem die Dinge an meine Seele schlugen, so 
war mir, ich läse ein buntes Buch des Lebens, aber das Buch handelte immerfort von 
Deutschland.”89  
Jacques Le Rider explains that even though Hofmannsthal’s narrator is Austrian, 
he uses “Deutschland” synonymously with Heimat because it designates the larger 
German cultural realm to which Austria belongs.90 I assert, therefore, that in the context 
of these letters, when the term “Deutschland” is used in a positive sense, it refers to the 
larger German Kulturnation, whereas when it is negatively charged, it refers to the 
Prussian-led nation-state. The letter writer tells his friend, “Ich machte mir einen Begriff 
von den Deutschen, und noch als ich über die Wesel der Grenze zufuhr, hatte ich ihn 
ganz rein in mir: es war nicht völlig der, den die Engländer vor 70 von uns hatten.”91 
Here the narrator, whose letter is dated 1901, refers to the fact that there are two different 
conceptions of Germany in circulation, namely a greater Germany, held together by a 
common language and culture, and the political nation-state that was founded in 1871. By 
contrast, to the dual meaning of “Deutschland,” the term “Österreich” is always 
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positively charged and representative of a homeland that is organically constituted 
through a people’s attachment to the land.  
The narrator’s opposition between Germany and Austria anticipates 
Hofmannsthal’s comparison between the Prussians and the Austrians in his 1917 piece 
“Preusse und Österreicher: ein Schema.” In this short schematic piece, Hofmannsthal 
outlines the contrasting characteristics of Prussians and Austrians through the lens of 
three categories: “Im Ganzen,” “Soziale Struktur,” and “Der Einzelne.” Not surprisingly, 
Hofmannsthal characterizes Austria more favorably than Germany. Hofmannsthal’s 
elliptical jottings describe Prussia as an artificial construction that requires a state to hold 
the people together. Austria, on the other hand, is described as having developed 
organically into a historical fabric; rich in nature and land, it coheres through 
“Heimatliebe.”92 By listing “Tüchtigkeit,” “Streberei,” and “Disziplin” under the Prussian 
column, he aligns Germany with modern progress; the Austrians, on the other hand, are 
characterized by their attachment to tradition, their humanity, and their sociability – thus, 
they are characterized by their resistance to modern progress.93  
Another linguistic clue to the narrator’s relationship with modern-day Germany 
appears in his shifting use of the terms “us” and “them.” The play of pronouns in his 
letters indicates that he wants to identify with the Germans, while feeling deeply 
ambivalent towards them. For instance, he writes to his friend, who is presumably also 
German: “Und nun bin ich seit vier Monaten unter ihnen, habe in Düsseldorf mit ihren 
Minenleuten gehandelt und in Berlin mit ihren Bankleuten, [...] habe mit Ämtern und 
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Behörden zu tun gehabt, Eure Eisen- und Maschinenleute, Eure kleinen und großen 
Herren gekostet—und weiß nicht, was ich sagen soll.”94 The impersonal nature of his 
interactions with the Germans, the repeated use of the third-person plural pronouns 
“ihnen” and “ihre,” and the second-person plural possessive pronoun “eure” instead of 
the first-person plural pronoun “unsere,” all underscore his alienation from the German 
people. He sees the German nation-state as an inorganic entity, formed largely as an 
economic union. This criticism is reflected in the above-cited passage, in which the 
people encountered in Imperial Germany are identified by their profession, and the cities 
are recognized by the industry or economic sector that are associated with them.  
But why should it be that the narrator, as the self-identified businessman, should 
not feel more at home in a Germany that defines itself by its economic productivity? 
While the protagonist seems to be genuinely impressed by his contact with the Germans 
in their various professional specializations, who together promote greater economic 
growth, he is on another level also disturbed by what he sees. “Denke nicht,” he writes 
his friend of modern Germany, “daß ich ihre Leistungen nicht achte. Aber daß die 
Deutschen arbeiten, davon ist die Welt voll: Da ich heimkam, dachte ich zu sehen, wie 
sie leben. Und ich bin da, und wie sie leben, sehe ich nicht.”95 On the one hand, he sees a 
world of broadening connections, where formerly geographically remote areas are 
integrated through trade; indeed, his involvement in successful “javanesisch-deutschen 
Negoziationen”96 points to his own participation in this integrating process. Moreover, 
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the needs of the modern industry require people to adopt specialized functions that bring 
them together with others from outside the familiar circle of family, friends, and 
neighbors. On the other hand, the new connections that are formed through business 
relations create anomie and erode traditional values and social ties.  
This fracturing effect of the modern economy appears to be more obvious to the 
letter writer now that he has returned to a place he had thought of as Heimat, and thus as 
a place of origin and belonging in a narrower, more traditional sense. However, instead of 
finding such an organic place of belonging, he finds a fragmented society in Imperial 
Germany, observing that the Germans have “bürgerliche Verhältnisse und adelige 
Verhältnisse und Universitätskreise und Finanzkreise,” but that all of these relations lack 
“eine wahre Dichtigkeit der Verhältnisse […] das Gemeinschaftbildende, all das 
Ursprüngliche davon, das was im Herzen sitzt.”97 Thus, while the protagonist is himself 
involved in creating the sinews of the new nation, he pines for some lost organic 
wholeness.98   
V. Austria, Dürer and the Immediacy of Experience 
This lost wholeness is embodied in the narrator’s recollections of his childhood in 
Austria. In his imagination, Austria represents a place that is impervious to the passage of 
time and to modernization:  
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in zwei Wochen fahre ich nach Gebhartsstetten und kann so ziemlich sicher sein, 
den Laufbrunnen wiederzufinden mit der friedlichen Jahreszahl 1776 in 
verschnörkelten theresianischen Chiffren—da wird er stehen und mich 
anrauschen, und der alte, schiefe vom Blitz gespaltenen Nußbaum, der immer am 
spätesten von allen Bäumen seiner Blätter bekam und am unwilligsten von allen 
sie dem Winter preisgab, der wird in all seiner Schiefheit und seinem Alter 
irgendwie ein Zeichen geben, daß er mich erkennt und daß ich nun wieder da bin 
und er da ist, wie immer.99  
 
When he imagines his return to Gebhartsstetten, his childhood hometown, he expects to 
find everything as it was before. What stands out in this passage is the narrator’s 
description of the year 1776 as a peaceful year. The “theresianischen Chiffren” inscribed 
into the water fountain indicate their origin in Maria Theresia’s reign. The positive 
association that the protagonist has with this date suggests that the he considers the old 
imperial relationship as a peaceful and durable state of affairs, even while the 
paradigmatic bourgeois revolt against colonialism was taking place in America in 1776. 
This strange oversight points to the romanticism and fragility of his identification with 
the Habsburg Empire, which was already fracturing under the pressure of irrepressible 
anti-colonial forces around 1900 (the fictional date of his letter being 1901). The 
romanticization of Heimat is also reflected in the image of the age-old walnut tree, which 
evokes a sense of ageless rootedness, implying that Heimat is a place that has always 
already been there. Finally, the writer’s expectation that the tree will greet him with a 
“Zeichen” of mute recognition reminds us of Lord Chandos’ pining for an unmediated 
understanding between the subject and his environment, which he expresses in his dream 
of “eine Sprache, in welcher die stummen Dinge zu mir sprechen.”100  
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The narrator emphasizes that his idea of Heimat was preceded by the physical 
feeling of inhabiting a particular landscape and climate. To convey the feeling of 
familiarity that he longs for but is failing to recapture in Germany, he describes a 
childhood experience that, to him, became representative of the idea of feeling at home:  
Daß ich mich dir mit einem Beispiel ausdrücke, das freilich albern ist: es ist wie 
mit dem Wassertrinken am Brunnen. Du weißt, ich war als Kind fast immerfort in 
Oberösterreich auf dem Land, nach meinem zehnten Jahr dann nur mehr die 
Sommer. Aber sooft ich in Kassel während der Schulwinter oder sonst wohin ich 
mit meinen Eltern kam, einen Trunk Wassers tat—nicht wie man gleichgiltig bei 
der Mahlzeit trinkt, sondern wenn man erhitzt ist und vertrocknet und sich nach 
dem Wasser sehnt—so oft war ich auch, jedesmal für eines Blitzes Dauer, in 
meinem Oberösterreich, in Gebhartsstetten, an dem alten Laufbrunnen. Nicht: ich 
dachte daran—war dort, schmeckte in dem Wasser etwas von der eisernen Röhre, 
fühlte übers ganze Gesicht die Luft vom Gebirg her wehen und zugleich den 
Sommergeruch von der verstaubten Landstraße herüber—kurz, wie das zugeht, 
weiß ich nicht, aber ich habe es zu oft erlebt, um nicht daran zu glauben, und so 
gebe ich mich zufrieden. —Noch in New York und in St. Louis die kurze Zeit 
ging das mit mir, dann freilich in New Orleans schon und später noch weiter im 
Süden da verlor es sich: Luft und Wasser waren da zu sehr ein Verschiedenes von 
dem, was in Gebhartsstetten aus dem Rohr sprang und über den Zaun wehte—und 
Luft und Wasser sind große Herren und machen aus den Menschen, was sie 
wollen.101  
 
The narrator recalls how his feeling of home is anchored in a concrete experience of 
sensory aliveness that he had as a child in Austria: the taste of water “von der eisernen 
Röhre,” the feeling of the mountain air sweeping over his face, and the smell of the 
“verstaubte Landstraße” in the summer. The feeling of being at home is thus defined by a 
very specific somatic experience of a particular geography and climate. Konrad Heumann 
explains that according to Hofmannsthal’s phenomenology of natural conditions, feelings 
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are to a certain degree always prefigured by environmental factors.102 The physical 
memory of drinking cold water from the spring in Oberösterreich lingers into his 
adulthood, so that as long as he was traveling in the Northern Hemisphere, the taste of a 
refreshing swig of cool water could suddenly transport him, in a moment that anticipates 
Proust, to the very fountain in Gebhartsstetten from which he drank as a child. The 
sudden moments in which the letter writer experienced Heimat even while traveling in 
foreign countries are structurally like epiphanic moments. They are experiences that are 
out of the subject’s control and cannot be reproduced at will; they are fleeting 
experiences of immediacy, which the letter writer fails to relive upon his return to 
Imperial Germany. 
These reveries of a childhood connection to Austria that was once naïve and 
immediate of course present an idealized recollection. This is a fact that the letter writer 
himself comes to recognize at some level. In his third letter, he begins to muse about the 
effect that the art of Dürer had in shaping his lived connection to Austria. This reflection 
on Dürer offers the first small sign that the narrator is aware of the ways in which our 
experience of the world may be mediated through the products of culture. Fittingly, it is 
his father who introduces him and his siblings to Dürer, as if leading them through a rite 
of passage that was meant to break their innocent childhood attachments. The letter writer 
describes how his father would often invite him and his siblings to look at a folder of 
Albrecht Dürer’s engravings, which he kept in his private library in Gebhartsstetten: 
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“Dies ist das alte Deutschland,” sagte mein Vater und das Wort klang mir fast 
schauerlich und ich mußte an einen alten Menschen denken, wie solche in den 
Bildern waren, und um zu zeigen, das ich Geographie gelernt hatte und die Welt 
begriff, fragte ich: “Gibt es auch ein Buch, wo man das alte Österreich drin sehen 
kann?” Da sagte mein Vater: “Dies hier unten ist wohl Österreich” (die Bibliothek 
war im Turmzimmer, und drunten lag das Dorf und die Hügel und da und dort die 
kleinen Wäldchen, die den Gemeinden und den einzelnen Bauern gehören, und 
zwischen den Hügeln der gewundene Fluß und die weiße Straße und in der Ferne 
die blauen Weinberge über den großen dunkelnden fernen Wäldern), und wir sind 
Österreicher, aber wir sind auch Deutsche, und da das Land immer zu den 
Menschen gehört, die darauf wohnen, so ist hier auch Deutschland.103 
 
Perhaps the first thing worth noting about this dense passage is that it hints at the 
deeper origins of the letter writer’s prejudice against “culture” as the product of an 
educated, elite class. The protagonist’s father reinforces a distinction between two 
competing ways of representing the world: the artistic and the conceptual. This 
distinction is not, however, drawn in a neutral fashion, as visual representation is given 
priority over the son’s schoolbook knowledge of German and Austrian geography (as 
evidenced in the father’s response to his son’s question whether Dürer’s images are also 
of old Austria).  As Ethel Matala de Mazza points out, the protagonist is taught at an 
early age that the visual representation of reality is a superior medium for the 
authentication of his subjective experiences.104   
But if the engravings serve to reaffirm the narrator’s subjective experience, they 
also mediate and shape that experience. In doing so, they reassert the distinctive role of 
the creative class whose activity creates the symbolic cultural order. Hofmannsthal 
alludes to this role by foregrounding the narrator’s discussion of Dürer with a brief 
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speculation on the possible need for some form of cultural education or Bildung: 
“vielleicht muß man, um dieser vielgespaltenen Welt gerecht zu sein, eine innere 
Vorbereitung besitzen, eine Bildung.”105 The juxtaposition of these two themes points to 
an important etymological connection between the words Bild and Bildung. As Friedrich 
Kluge’s dictionary of etymology states, “Die älteste Bedeutung [von Bild] ist ‘Vorbild, 
Muster,’ erst später überwiegt ‘Abbild.’”106 Bilden meant “gestalten, Form geben” in Old 
High German.107 Susan Cocalis points out that in the dictionaries of Adelung and Campe 
the verb bilden denoted primarily: “1) Einem Körper seine äußere Gestalt geben, von 
Bild, so fern dasselbe ehedem Gestalt bedeutete […] 2) Die Gestalt einer Sache 
nachahmen, abbilden.”108 In 1807 Campe records a newer, figurative meaning: “Den 
Fähigkeiten des Geistes und Willens die gehörige Richtung geben.”109 Despite his 
pronouncements against Bildung, the narrator is himself the product of just such a process 
– only the education that he receives through his exposure to Dürer does not look 
anything like the elite cultural grooming that he has come to associate with Bildung. 
Rather than offering a little upper-class polish, Dürer’s art has shaped the narrator at a 
much deeper level; it has provided him with an intimation, however inchoate, that both he 
and the Austrian culture that has shaped him are finite.  
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The narrator writes that Dürer’s images were like “Zauberblätter”110 because of 
the powerful impression they left on him: 
Wie vertraut und fremd zugleich waren mir die alten Blätter, wie zuwider und wie 
lieb zugleich! Die Menschen, die Ochsen, die Pferde wie aus Holz geschnitzt, wie 
aus Holz die Falten ihrer Kleider, die Falten in ihren Gesichtern. Die spitzen 
Häuser, die geschnörkelten Mühlbäche, die starren Felsen und Bäume, so 
unwirklich und überwirklich. Manchmal quälte ich den Vater, er solle die Mappe 
bringen lassen. Und manchmal war ich nicht dazuzubringen, noch ein Blatt mehr 
zu sehen, lief mittendrin fort und wurde gescholten. Ich könnte es auch heute 
nicht sagen, ob mir die Erinnerung an diese schwarzen Zauberblätter lieb und 
kostbar oder verhaßt ist. Aber nahe gingen sie mir, in mich hinein drang eine 
Gewalt von ihnen.111 
 
Once again the rural imagery, which the letter writer associates with a sense of 
rootedness, is important to his image of Heimat. But unlike his earlier description of the 
refreshing water fountain in Gebhartsstetten, the picture of his homeland is marked by 
rigidity, even grimness. The narrator tells us that Dürer’s images of “das alte 
Deutschland” appeared as though they were cut out of wood.  
What stands out in this passage is the narrator’s reaction to Dürer’s engravings; 
several questions arise here: Why did he perceive them to be both familiar and 
unfamiliar, unreal and overly real? What fascinated him about the depiction of such 
mundane and concrete subjects as faces, rocks, houses, oxen and horses? Why did he beg 
his father to show him these pictures, and then feel compelled to run away from them? 
Why does he still not know to this day whether the memory of his childhood encounter 
with Dürer’s Zauberblätter are dear or hateful to him? I would argue that in the letter 
writer’s recalled reactions to Dürer’s art we find his first real admission that there is an 
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uncanny quality inherent in the idea of Heimat. That is, in recalling these images by 
Dürer, the narrator is confronted by the constructedness of his notion of Heimat. His 
childhood memories of Heimat in this instance do not support his earlier conception of 
Heimat as a realm that is impervious to change; instead, he senses that there is a gaping 
abyss underneath the stable ground he called Heimat. The world in which he lives is 
subject to the endless cycles of growth, decay and death; what stability and unity he 
perceives in it requires the involvement of imagination and the mediation of a constructed 
symbolic order.  
Paradoxically, it is partly Dürer’s skill at incorporating death into his art that gives 
this art whatever power it holds over death. The art is at one and the same time a 
reminder of the dark shadow that death casts over life and a consolation in the face of this 
fact. The narrator explains to us how his childhood world came to be inhabited by the 
medieval figures depicted by Dürer, such that he started to feel as though they were living 
next to him in his daily life: 
[A]ber unbewußt bevölkerte ich doch mit den Schattengebärden dieser 
überwirklichen Ahnen die einsamen Stellen im Walde, die Halde mit den großen 
Steinblöcken, den halbzerfallenen Kreuzgang hinter der Kirche, der viel älter war 
als die freundliche kleine Kirche selber [...] Das Gehaben jener mit den 
überstarken Gebärden, die nicht mehr da waren, ging doch zusammen mit dem 
Gehaben derer, mit denen ich aß und trank und in den Birnbaum stieg und die 
Pferde schwemmte und zur Kirche ging, so wie die alten Geschichten von 
Räubern, Einsiedlern und Bären zusammengingen mit der Landschaft [...] Es war 
alles anders in den alten Bildern als in der Wirklichkeit vor meinen Augen: aber 
es klaffte kein Riß dazwischen. Jene alte Welt war frömmer, erhabener, milder, 
kühner, einsamer. Aber im Wald, in der Sternennacht, in der Kirche führten Wege 
zu ihr.112 
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The narrator tells us that he unconsciously peopled his reality with the ancestral figures 
he saw in Dürer’s Zauberblätter so that he could sense their presence not only in lonely 
places marked by the passage of time, but also in the very gestures of those around him. 
Ironically, it is the dead who offer a sense of continuity with the past. Rather than simply 
serving to remind the narrator about the fleeting nature of life and all that is experienced 
therein, these ghostly images are part of an ersatz eternity, a changeless symbolic order 
that allows a vanished reality to inform and shape the present. They become a necessary 
part of our everyday cultural inheritance, however, precisely because we can never 
escape the awful fact of death, and must limit its dominance over our thoughts by 
containing its meaning within a finite series of representations. There is a profoundly 
existential dimension to culture in this portrait. 
It is this existential dimension that perhaps explains why the nature of Dürer’s 
influence has remained largely hidden from the narrator. Its power over his imagination 
lies partly in its effectiveness at masking death—at masking, then, the very nature of the 
fear that fuels the embrace of this art. And it is the same existential dimension that helps 
to explain why, in his later years, the narrator is ready to reflect more upon Dürer’s 
influence: having been preoccupied throughout his adult life with the goals of bourgeois 
attainment, he is now confronted with questions about the significance of this life, whose 
end is perhaps finally coming into view. His unprompted, somewhat blustering, defense 
of his vocation in the first letter is perhaps an initial sign that the identity he had so 
unreflectively adopted in his earlier years has begun to unravel: it is an identity that can 
no longer be taken for granted and so now requires justification.  
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This observation helps to illuminate the narrator’s growing antipathy to the idea 
of Germany: it is natural that an ambitious young businessman would readily identify 
with a newly minted empire in the throes of economic expansion; it is just as 
comprehensible, however, that an older businessman, experiencing a crisis of identity, 
might begin to question that empire, and even project his crisis onto it. As the Prussian 
state becomes more single-mindedly fixed on business success, the aims of the German 
Kulturnation are eclipsed. The narrator’s childhood associations with Dürer take on a 
new life as the antithesis of all that the German nation now stands for. As part of the 
cultural bedrock of his development into a self-conscious adult, these childhood 
associations provide a fixed point against which he compares his reality in order to 
determine its authenticity or inauthenticity: “denn es lag in mir, daß ich das Wirkliche an 
etwas in mir messen mußte, und fast bewußtlos maß ich an jener schreckhaft erhabenen 
schwarzen Zauberwelt und strich alles an diesem Probierstein, ob es Gold wäre oder ein 
schlechter gelblicher Glimmer.”113 Convinced that Dürer’s art captures an ineffable 
essence behind the surface of everyday life, the letter writer tests his experiences and 
observations about modern Germany against the “real” Germany portrayed by Dürer:  
Und vor den Richterstuhl dieser Kindereien, von denen ich im Innersten nicht 
loskam, schleppe ich das große Deutschland und die Deutschen des heutigen 
Tages, und sehe, daß sie mir nicht bestehen, und komme nicht darüber hinweg. 
Ich meinte, heimzufahren, und für immer, und nun weiß ich nicht, ob ich bleiben 
werde.114  
  
The letter writer seems to admit to the irrationality of measuring Germany by the image 
and memory of his homeland that were formed in his childhood, and yet he concludes 
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that modern Germany, having failed to live up to his vision of what it ought to be, can no 
longer be his permanent and true homeland.  
What Hofmannsthal presents in this text is not a sober theoretical analysis of what 
Heimat means, but rather the subjective and theoretically unarticulated experience of 
someone who is, in a deeply personal way, negotiating the difference between his unreal, 
ideal conception of Heimat and the incongruent reality. The gap between what he wants 
to see and what he actually sees is profoundly disturbing to him because it throws into 
doubt his entire understanding of the experiences he has had abroad, 115 and leaves him 
without a secure point of orientation now that he is back in Germany. Measured against 
his conception of wholeness, life in modern Germany seems inauthentic, and thus he 
repeatedly describes Germany as having a ghostly, spectral appearance. He confesses to 
his friend, “und in der Welt, in die ich da momentweise aus dem Eisenbahnfenster 
hineinschauen kann, da wohnt etwas—mich hat nie vor dem Tod gegraut, aber vor dem, 
was da wohnt, vor solchem Nichtleben grauts mich.”116 He describes the horror vacui in a 
number of different ways, including as “ein momentanes Schweben über dem 
Bodenlosen, dem Ewig-Leeren,”117 or “wie ein Hauch, ein so unbeschreibliches 
Anwehen des ewigen Nichts, des ewigen Nirgends, ein Atem nicht des Todes, sondern 
des Nicht-Lebens.”118 The letter writer experiences this feeling of horror as a crisis of 
perception, explaining that his “böser Blick” is the result of “eine Art leise Vergiftung, 
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eine schleichende Infektion” that afflicts those who have returned after a long absence, as 
he has.119 In short, he believes that he is suffering from an “Übel europäischer Natur.”120  
VI. Van Gogh: Merging Artistic Production and Consumption 
In the end, the antithesis that the letter writer draws between the authenticity of 
his childhood experience of Austria, on the one hand, and the inauthenticity of a modern-
day, economically driven Germany, on the other, does not hold. His insistence that the 
historical reality that he confronts upon returning to Germany is somehow less real than 
his childhood memories of Dürer’s art represents an unsustainable flight from the 
concrete conditions that exist in his time. Yet his nostalgic reflections on the power of 
Dürer’s art do push him toward a valuable reckoning: the letter writer has come to some 
sort of awareness of the role that culture—its products or symbols—have in the 
construction and representation of a coherent reality. This realization informs the 
narrator’s eventual conversion from self-proclaimed cultural philistine to earnest admirer 
of the art of Van Gogh.  
By the end of the third letter, the protagonist gives up on his desire to find his old 
homeland in Germany or Austria, saying: “Und ich möchte in diesem Deutschland nicht 
sterben. Ich weiß, ich bin nicht alt und bin nicht krank—aber wo man nicht sterben 
möchte, dort soll man auch nicht leben.”121 And again he states resolutely: “Hier ist es 
nicht heimlich. Wie in einer großen ruhelosen freudlosen Herberge ist mir zumute. Wer 
möchte in einem Hotel sterben, wenn es nicht sein muß. […] Österreich will ich 
                                                
119 GWE, 562. 
120 GWE, 561. 
121 GWE, 560. 
 64 
jedenfalls vorher noch einmal wiedersehen. Ich sage ‘vorher,’ denn ich denke schwerlich 
dort zu bleiben.”122 But as he abandons his search for Heimat, the protagonist’s sense of 
disorientation intensifies and culminates in a crisis. The letter writer’s inner chaos, 
however, is the very precondition for his inner renewal, and the visual arts play a central 
role in his response to his own mounting crisis. Hofmannsthal shows in the final two 
letters of “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” that the modern subject needs to find a new mode 
of perceiving the world in order to maintain his or her sense of vitality and creativity in 
the face of an increasingly fragmented world. 
In the fourth letter the protagonist describes his encounter with Van Gogh’s 
paintings as follows:  
Über die Malweise kann ich keine Auskunft geben: Du kennst wahrscheinlich fast 
alles, was gemacht wird, und ich habe, wie gesagt, seit zwanzig Jahren kein Bild 
gesehen. […] Diese [Bilder] da schienen mir in den ersten Augenblicken grell und 
unruhig, ganz roh, ganz sonderbar, ich mußte mich erst zurechtfinden, um 
überhaupt die ersten als Bild, als Einheit zu sehen—dann aber, dann sah ich, dann 
sah ich sie alle so, jedes einzelne, und alle zusammen, und die Natur in ihnen, und 
die menschliche Seelenkraft, die hier die Natur geformt hatte, und Baum und 
Strauch und Acker und Abhang, die da gemalt waren, noch das andre, das was 
hinter dem Gemalten war, das Eigentliche, das unbeschreiblich Schicksalhafte—, 
das alles sah ich so, daß ich das Gefühl meiner selbst an diese Bilder verlor, und 
mächtig wieder zurückbekam, und wieder verlor! Mein Lieber, um dessentwillen,  
was ich da sagen will, und niemals sagen werde, habe ich Dir diesen ganzen Brief 
geschrieben! Wie aber könnte ich etwas so Unfaßliches in Worte bringen, etwas 
so Plötzliches, so Starkes, so Unzerlegbares!123    
 
Unlike the engravings by Dürer, in which the subjects are depicted in an almost overly 
realistic fashion, in his viewing of Van Gogh’s paintings, the protagonist at first perceives 
solely the bright colors, and only in a second perceptual step is he able to make out what 
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the paintings depict. The act of perceiving is experienced, then, as a creative act. Van 
Gogh’s paintings appear to have a powerful effect on him because he approaches these 
paintings naively, without any prior knowledge of Van Gogh’s art. As he mentions 
himself, it has been twenty years since he has last seen a painting. The letter writer’s 
experience of Van Gogh’s art is strongly reminiscent of the “gute Augenblicke” Chandos 
experiences. However, while the epiphanic moments in the Chandos Letter are triggered 
by unmediated encounters with nature, in “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” they are 
mediated by Van Gogh’s paintings of rural landscapes much like the ones that Chandos 
describes.  
Matala de Mazza suggests that Hofmannsthal presents Van Gogh’s 
impressionistic art as paving the path away from the “längst selbst-referentiell 
gewordenen symbolischen Ordnung der Begriffskultur” toward a “schöpferische 
Vision.”124 The subject’s visual encounter with the imaginary world of the visual arts, 
according to Matala de Mazza, liberates the creative potential in the subject because the 
painting or drawing has an immediate impact on the senses of the viewer, thereby 
allowing the individual to enjoy the creative potential of his own physical perception 
unfettered by concepts; whereas language exacerbates the fragmentation of the world, the 
visual arts are able to capture the simultaneity of things existing next to each other. While 
Matala de Mazza’s account provides an important insight insofar as it emphasizes the 
intensely subjective form of representation made possible through Van Gogh’s painting, 
it overstates the case somewhat. However direct and personal the appeal of this art, it 
does not operate outside of the realm of concepts and symbols entirely. Nor does it allow 
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the viewer to have an immediate subjective response to the world; rather, reality is still 
being represented through the intervention of a cultural mediator. It is worth noting that 
painting is supposed to communicate something immediate, whereas the written word 
always abstracts and mediates; interestingly, the narrator himself is only capable of 
writing about visual art, rather than producing it himself. 
Because Van Gogh’s art is meant to provide a profoundly subjective response to 
the world, it provides a fitting form of representation for a profoundly subject-oriented 
culture. It apparently allows the narrator to bridge the contradiction between, on the one 
hand, his sense of himself as a self-sufficient, bourgeois “individual,” and on the other, 
his recent, existentially motivated reawakening to the role of culture in shaping the 
individual. In another manner of speaking, Van Gogh provides the necessary synthesis to 
resolve the unsustainable antithesis between the narrator’s rootedness in the timeless 
Austria of Dürer and his involvement as a bourgeois individual in the distressingly 
ephemeral Germany of the present. If Dürer’s art is that which conditions or allows an 
Austrian subjectivity to emerge, the meaning of Van Gogh’s art, as Matala de Mazza 
contends, seems to lie in the reaction of an already formed subject. Understood in this 
way, the latter represents a challenge to the traditional hierarchy between the elite 
producers and the consumers of culture. The isolated subject that dominates in the 
socially fragmented age of the business transaction can thus, in theory, become the author 
of his or her own symbolic representations.  
As stated earlier, however, there is a difficulty with this view of Van Gogh’s art. 
It places far too much weight on the subjective reaction of the viewer and overlooks how 
that reaction is being manipulated or elicited, not just by Van Gogh but also by the 
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cultural traditions that informed his production. As Ursula Renner observes, 
Hofmannsthal, in a quasi-religious turn, conceives of the soul as a dynamically 
productive realm of dreams and images; in the search for new means of expressing the 
workings of the soul in language and the visual arts, however, he comes to the bitter 
recognition that the artist’s subjective perceptions and aesthetic representations are 
always already prefigured and coded by cultural patterns. The question of tradition and 
cultural inheritance therefore stubbornly returns.125 
Van Gogh’s art, like Dürer’s, plays a role in mediating the subjectivity of his 
audience. But whereas Dürer’s art is at odds with the fragmented and mercenary 
character of modern Germany, Van Gogh’s art apparently is not. It does not go too far to 
say that it exemplifies an art form that reinforces the identity of the bourgeois individual 
by representing his or her highly developed subjectivity in the symbolic realm of culture. 
Culture becomes a matter of “taste,” something that lends dignity to the choices and 
habits of a consumer-self no longer animated by the notion of a greater communal good.  
It teaches the subject to find beauty in the lonely, the quotidian, the marginal, and thereby 
redeems or at least hides the fragmentation and alienation of modern society. Art aims 
not to shape or improve society, but rather to offer a reprieve from it and thereby to 
restore its ability to carry on in the same old patterns.  
The lonely, quotidian subjects of Van Gogh’s paintings not only remind us of the 
narrator’s earlier description of Dürer’s engravings, but also of the rural landscape that 
gave rise to Chandos’ epiphanic moments: “Ein Sturzacker, eine mächtige Allee gegen 
den Abendhimmel, ein Hohlweg mit krummen Föhren, ein Stück Garten mit der 
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Hinterwand eines Hauses, [...] ein kupfernes Becken und ein irdener Krug, ein paar Bauer 
um einen Tisch, Kartoffeln essend.”126 What is different about Van Gogh’s depiction of 
these rural images is his use of strikingly vivid colors, which, instead of creating the kind 
of “zauberische Atmosphäre”127 of Dürer’s engravings, seem to convey the very essence 
of the represented objects as though they were “neugeboren aus dem furchtbaren Chaos 
des Nichtlebens,” providing deliverance from the “fürchterlichen Zweifel an der Welt.” 
128 Whereas Dürer’s work provides a reminder of death and at the same time consoles by 
tying us into a seemingly eternal, symbolic cultural order, Van Gogh’s art revitalizes the 
objects of a fading culture, but on a new, highly subjective level, overpowering the 
shadow of death with brilliant colors and ushering in a world where meaning emerges in 
the private gaze of the individual.  
Ultimately “Briefe des Zurückgekehrten” testifies to Hofmannsthal’s belief in the 
enduring relevance of a class of cultural producers in an increasingly individualistic and 
egalitarian age. The irony, however, is that in order to play an influential role they may 
have to produce an art that hides this very influence. Van Gogh’s art accomplishes this by 
emphasizing the subjective nature of art itself. In this way, he allows the bourgeois 
subject to appropriate his art in a manner that does not challenge his self-perception and 
privileged social status. At the end of the narrator’s fourth letter home, Hofmannsthal 
offers a final illustration of this new relationship between the artist and the bourgeois 
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subject; in a brief postscript, the letter writer announces his intention to buy a Van 




Chapter 3: Poetic Language and Subjectivity in Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal’s “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” 
In this chapter I turn my attention to Hofmannsthal’s essay “Das Gespräch über 
Gedichte” and show its linkages with earlier poetological essays from his lyrical period. 
Some scholars have seen in “Das Gespräch über Gedichte,” published in 1903, an attempt 
to move beyond the language crisis that had preoccupied Hofmannsthal in “Ein Brief”: 
they find in “Das Gespräch” evidence of a belief that poetic language is capable of 
producing an experience of transcendence wherein the boundaries of the self and other 
disappear. My examination of “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” challenges such a 
straightforward reading. After exploring a more conventional reading of Hofmannsthal’s 
text, I go on to point out two ambiguities in it, which show that the question of whether or 
not poetic language can produce the effect of transcendence is an unresolved matter in 
this dialogue. The first of these ambiguities is embedded in the famous origin story of the 
symbol. I argue that it is never quite made clear where the human being’s impulse for the 
symbolic sacrificial act comes from, therefore leaving the question unanswered as to 
whether the symbol is a product of the subject’s own making, or whether it is indeed the 
result of a “unio mystica.” The second ambiguity, I suggest, is produced by the dialogue 
form of this text. The use of Alltagssprache and Begriffssprache in order to discuss poetic 
language casts doubt on the assertions made by the dominant voice (Gabriel) that poetic 
language stands in strict opposition to everyday language and conceptual language. In the 
end, I suggest that the dialogue form of Hofmannsthal’s poetological essay points to the 
fact that language, be it poetic or conceptual, is at an important level also a medium for 
the exercise of power. 
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I. The Permeable Self 
It has often been noted that Hofmannsthal’s conception of subjectivity was shaped 
by the empiricist psychology at the turn of the century that rejected the Cartesian 
conception of the self. Ernst Mach rejected a “beyond” of the empirical world and 
regarded even consciousness itself as merely an effect of sense impressions that change 
from moment to moment. In her seminal study of the new psychologies at the turn of the 
century and their influence on modernist writers, Judith Ryan points out that 
Hofmannsthal had “a decidedly empiricist beginning,” and that in his later works after 
1900, he increasingly saw “the fractured self as a problem that must be overcome.”129 
While Ryan’s analysis of Hofmannsthal’s work is largely focused on his early poetry and 
lyrical drama, in this chapter I examine Hofmannsthal’s fictional “Gespräch über 
Gedichte” from 1903 in order to examine his explicit poetological reflections on the 
implications of the empiricist conception of the self for the lyrical subject and the locus 
of meaning in poetry. I argue that by anchoring our subjectivity in the empirical world, 
Hofmannsthal shows that poetry can no longer be understood as self-expression, but is 
rather the expression of the sensory world through language. Rather than despairing over 
the loss of an Ich-Substanz that results from a Machian breakdown of the subject-object 
dualism, the dissolution of the self is presented here as a necessary condition for an 
“originary” perception of the world.  
As the title suggests, “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” presents a conversation 
between two friends, Clemens and Gabriel, who read poems together and speak by turns 
casually, admiringly and critically about them. Their conversation is structured to a 
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certain extent like a Socratic dialogue, in which Gabriel assumes the role of the teacher, 
who dialogically reveals and corrects his interlocutor’s “common-sense” assumptions 
about the nature and purpose of poetry. The cited excerpts from poems by George, 
Hebbel, and Goethe serve as a springboard for Clemens’ and Gabriel’s associative 
reflections on the unique power of poetic language.  
“Das Gespräch über Gedichte” begins very casually, but through the two 
interlocutors’ spontaneous reactions to poetry, Hofmannsthal gestures right from the start 
at the central question that motivates their conversation, namely: What is expressed 
through poetry – our inner or our outer world? Gabriel and Clemens are in agreement that 
poetry captures Gemüt, the affective disposition of the soul. In reaction to one of the 
poems, Clemens says, “Es drückt einen grenzenlosen Zustand so einfach aus,”130 to 
which Gabriel responds, “Das tun alle Gedichte, alle guten zum mindesten. Alle drücken 
sie einen Zustand des Gemütes aus. Da ist die Berechtigung ihrer Existenz.”131 Gabriel 
further distinguishes poetry from drama and narrative prose through its privileged ability 
to convey the emotional state of the soul; however, the two friends disagree over how our 
inner state, captured in poetry, is related to the outer world. Clemens believes that the 
reading of a poem is like an encounter between two inner worlds. When he listens to 
excerpts from Stefan George’s poetry cycle Das Jahr der Seele, he is delighted by his 
ability to identify emotionally with the poetic imagery, observing, “Ich sehe eine 
Landschaft meiner Kindheit.”132 From Clemens’ perspective, a poem expresses feelings 
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that resonate with the reader’s inner experience. For Gabriel, by contrast, poetry can 
evoke moods and feelings in the reader, not because these feelings are already in us, but 
because poetry carries them towards us. He responds to Clemens, saying: 
Diese Jahreszeiten, diese Landschaften sind nichts als die Träger des Anderen. 
Sind nicht die Gefühle, die Halbgefühle, alle die geheimsten und tiefsten 
Zustände unseres Inneren in der seltsamsten Weise einer Landschaft verflochten, 
mit einer Jahreszeit, mit einer Beschaffenheit der Luft, mit einem Hauch? [...] 
Wollen wir uns finden, so dürfen wir nicht in unser Inneres hinabsteigen: draußen 
sind wir zu finden, draußen.133 
 
As Hans-Jürgen Schings points out, Gabriel’s statement that we must look outside for our 
selves goes in direct opposition to the famous maxim by Novalis: “Nach Innen geht der 
geheimnisvolle Weg. In uns, oder nirgends ist die Ewigkeit mit ihren Welten, die 
Vergangenheit und die Zukunft. Die Außenwelt ist die Schattenwelt.”134 He suggests 
further that Gabriel’s call to look outside inverts the famous Augustinian formula, “Geh 
nicht nach draußen, kehre in dich selbst zurück! Im inneren Menschen wohnt die 
Wahrheit.”135 Schings argues that Gabriel thus launches a revolt against a long 
philosophical tradition of conceiving of the self as something that can be reached through 
introspection. Moreover, he finds that Gabriel’s position is reflective of the post-
Cartesian philosophy of the subject promoted by the likes of Ernst Mach.136  
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Building on Schings’ observation, I argue that Hofmannsthal shows in this 
dialogue that there is no straightforward inside-outside dichotomy between the sensory 
world and our inner perception thereof. Conspicuously, the dialogue begins with an 
apparent opposition between a non-verbal empirical reality and a reality that emerges out 
of language. Gabriel says to Clemens, “Ich habe dir hier aufs Fenster einen Band 
Gedichte gelegt.”137 The placement of the book of poetry by the window points to a 
seeming outside-inside opposition; that is, while the window appears to open to an 
empirical outer world, the book of poetry seems to open to an inner world. However, 
such a straightforward dichotomy is quickly undermined, as the first poem that Gabriel 
reads to Clemens invites the reader outdoors into an autumnal park found inside Stefan 
George’s poem. Hofmannsthal cites in its entirety the first three stanzas of the first poem 
from Das Jahr der Seele, which depicts the fall season:  
Komm in den totgesagten Park und schau: 
Der Schimmer ferner lächelnder Gestade 
Der reinen Wolken unverhofftes Blau 
Erhellt die Weiher und die bunten Pfade. 
 
Dort nimm das tiefe Gelb, das weiche Grau 
Von Birken und von Buchs: der Wind ist lau, 
Die späten Rosen welkten noch nicht ganz, 
Erlese, küsse sie und flicht den Kranz. 
 
Vergiß auch diese letzten Astern nicht, 
Den Purpur um die Ranken wilder Reben 
Und auch was übrig blieb vom grünen Leben 
Verwinde leicht im herbstlichen Gesicht.138 
 
                                                
137 GWE, 495. 
138 Hofmannsthal’s text does not reproduce George’s idiosyncratic spelling and punctuation.  
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The opening line reads: “Komm in den totgesagten Park und schau”; 139 with the 
intimate second person commands “komm” and “schau,” the implicit lyrical subject 
invites us to come and see a world outside of ourselves, inasmuch as it is created by the 
poet’s words, and into ourselves, insofar as the poem resonates with us. Thus, inside and 
outside are shown to be in dialectical relationship with each other. Even George’s image 
of the autumnal park is used by Hofmannsthal to introduce the idea of a modern 
permeable subject: like the subject, the park is a porous border region that is at once a 
piece of external nature and an artificial world set up within and cut-off from nature. That 
is, while it is part of the outdoors, it is artificially and aesthetically set apart from it. 
Furthermore, if the park can be regarded as a metaphor for the self, as I suggest, then the 
self is not a hermetically enclosed place, but rather a place of encounter, which is implied 
in the series of second-person address in George’s poem: komm, schau, nimm, erlese, 
küsse, vergiß, verwinde. The park in George’s poem is not the only metaphor that Gabriel 
uses to underline the unsubstantial, permeable nature of the self; at another moment, he 
compares the self to a rainbow: “Wie der wesenlose Regenbogen spannt sich unsere 
Seele über den unaufhaltsamen Sturz des Daseins.”140 The rainbow has no substance of 
its own, but only exists through the interaction of light, water, and a perceiver. Moreover, 
throughout the conversation he suggests that the self is anchored in nothing more than a 
“Hauch” of feelings and sensations.  
                                                
139 GWE, 495. 
140 GWE, 497. 
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Schings points out that Hofmannsthal did not take what he perceived as the 
“Zerstörung der Seele”141 lightly, which perhaps explains the melancholic image of the 
autumnal park. However, when we look more closely at George’s image of the park, we 
see that it is filled with vibrant colors; the intensity of the fall colors signals a vitality that 
is heightened by the closeness of death. While Hofmannsthal may have been personally 
troubled by the loss of a solid, coherent self, his character Gabriel emphasizes the poetic 
productivity of the dissolution of the Cartesian self.142 It is through the breakdown of the 
Cartesian mind-body dualism that a new poetry can emerge, namely a poetry that can 
better capture the immediacy of our experiences. The second stanza of George’s poem 
emphasizes the perception of colors in the park rather than shapes, which underlines the 
impressionist perception of the world.  
Gabriel suggests that the reconceptualization of the self as a permeable entity 
allows poetry to undergo an important transformation: “Aber es ist wundervoll, wie diese 
Verfassung unseres Daseins der Poesie entgegenkommt: denn nun darf sie, statt in der 
engen Kammer unseres Herzens, in der ganzen ungeheuren, unerschöpflichen Natur 
wohnen.”143 He likens poetry to Ariel, a demiurge from Hebrew and Christian mysticism, 
who rules over the natural elements. Now poetry is liberated from the narrow chamber of 
the heart to inhabit freely what is her domain, namely the immeasurable expanse of 
nature: 
                                                
141 Schings, 317. GWRA III, 379. 
142 Schings argues: “Nicht die Krise des ‘unrettbaren Ich’ oder die Tragödie des einsamen Ich ist die 
Folge, der poetische Gewinn vielmehr wird sichtbar: ‘draußen sind wir zu finden, draußen.’ Die Aufhebung 
des lyrischen Cartesianismus und Idealismus löst Gabriels Theorie des Gedichts erst die Zunge.” Schings, 
321.  
143 GWE, 498. 
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Wie Ariel darf sie sich auf den Hügeln der heroischen purpurstrahlenden Wolken 
lagern und in den zitternden Wipfeln der Bäume nisten; sie darf sich vom 
wollüstigen Nachtwind hinschleifen lassen und sich auflösen in einen Nebelstreif, 
in dem feuchten Atem einer Grotte, in das flimmernde Licht eines einzelnen 
Sternes. Und aus allen ihren Verwandlungen, allen ihren Abenteuern, aus allen 
Abgründen und allen Gärten wird sie nichts anderes zurückbringen als den 
zitternden Hauch der menschlichen Gefühle.144 
 
Again, Hofmannsthal uses imagery of wind, fog, breeze, and breath in order to convey 
both the force of life that inspires poetry and the intangible quality of the feelings that it 
brings back to the reader. The inside-outside relationship is again characterized by 
permeability and the origin of feeling appears to be located outside of the inner sanctum 
of the soul. Up to this point, Gabriel’s understanding of subjectivity could be described as 
empiricist because he claims that our feelings, which are constitutive of the self, are 
inextricably linked to our physical experience of the world. He even insists that our 
“inner possessions” would disappear completely if they were not rooted in a thousand 
“Erdendinge.”145 For Gabriel, there seems to be no absolute consciousness that exists 
outside of the realm of perception.  
Yet, while Gabriel tries to liberate the lyrical subjectivity from the narrow 
chamber of the heart, the self remains the site of experience and can neither be 
characterized as rationalist nor strictly empiricist. Experience does not amount to an 
imposition of the external world on a mind that is like Locke’s piece of white paper.146 
                                                
144 GWE, 498. 
145 GWE, 497. 
146 “Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any 
ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless 
fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason 
and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in all that our knowledge is founded, and 
from that it ultimately derives itself.” John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), 
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Otherwise, how is it that feelings do not simply pass through the self, but are recognized 
by it? Gabriel describes the movement of feelings that the subject experiences as a return 
or homecoming: 
Wir besitzen unser Selbst nicht: von außen weht es uns an, es flieht uns für lange 
und kehrt uns in einem Hauch zurück. Zwar – unser “Selbst”! Das Wort ist solch 
ein Metapher. Regungen kehren zurück, die schon einmal früher genistet haben. 
Und sind sies [sic] auch wirklich selber wieder? Ist es nicht vielmehr nur ihre Brut, 
die von einem dunklen Heimatgefühl hierher zurückgetrieben wird? Genug, etwas 
kehrt wieder. Und etwas begegnet sich in uns mit anderem. Wir sind nicht mehr 
als ein Taubenschlag.147 
 
Gabriel clearly rejects an essentialist, rationalist idea of the self, when he says that the 
word “self” is nothing but a metaphor. And as Timo Günther points out, the sense of 
recognition evoked by the “returning” feelings is different from Plato’s idea of 
anamnesis: the dark “Heimatgefühl” described here is not reflective of the subject’s 
recognition of timeless ideas.148 However, as much as Gabriel seems to question whether 
the feelings that gravitate toward the self can ever be recognized as being the same ones 
that were there before, he nonetheless repeatedly describes the movement of feelings that 
come together in the subject as a return.  
What I am suggesting here, then, is that Gabriel vacillates in his conception of the 
self. While he is convinced that there is no distinct inside-outside, subject-object 
opposition, he is far from certain that the self is just a bundle of sense impressions. This 
uncertainty is betrayed by the vagueness of his language and by the impatience in his 
                                                                                                                                            
Book II, ch. 1, complete text found at Online Library of Liberty, accessed July 16, 2012, 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/.  
147 GWE, 497. 
148 Timo Günther, Hofmannsthal: Ein Brief (München: Fink, 2004), 46. 
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statement, “Genug, etwas kehrt wieder. Und etwas begegnet sich in uns mit anderem.”149 
What is this “something” that returns? And what is this “other” that the “something” 
encounters? It is as though Gabriel is frustrated by his inability to find an adequate 
metaphor for the paradoxical condition that our self is made up of streams of ever-
changing, arbitrary feelings that somehow still produce a sense of recognition in the 
subject. The term “etwas,” used to describe the “returning” feelings, is so vague that it 
almost has the effect of effacing any image that comes to one’s mind, thereby underlining 
the mysterious nature of the self. And yet, the quote above does not end in merely vague 
language, but with yet another metaphor for the self: the aviary. Katrin Scheffer points 
out that the aviary is Plato’s metaphor for memory in his Theaetetus. She suggests that 
Hofmannsthal takes this classical metaphor and extends it into an image of the self as a 
spatial and temporal entity.150 This spatial metaphor merely re-describes the mystery 
rather than offering an explanation that obviates the mystery: that birds flying in and out 
of a human-built house should explain how our species reasons surely appeared doubtful 
even to Plato. 
II. Poetic Language as Site of Experience 
For Gabriel the experiences that constitute the self are neither grounded in reason 
nor purely in the empirical world. Experience manifests itself in poetic language that is 
neither entirely rooted in the external nor internal world, but that for a moment somehow 
mediates or unifies these two realms. How is it that poetry can have this effect using mere 
                                                
149 Günther. 
150 Katrin Scheffer, Schwebende, webende Bilder: Strukturbildende Motive und Blickstrategien in 
Hugo von Hofmannsthals Prosaschriften (Marburg: Tectum Verlag Marburg, 2007), 278. 
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language? Thomas Kovach points out that while Hofmannsthal argued for a complete 
separation between poetic and ordinary language in “Poesie und Leben” (1896),151 it 
became increasingly clear to him that this distinction would be problematic and that it 
could not hold, both because poetic language draws from the language of our everyday 
communication and because for Hofmannsthal poetry only has power insofar as it can 
affect the reader.152 In the following passage from “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” it might 
seem as though Gabriel is making distinctions between poetic language, Alltagssprache, 
and conceptual language, but upon closer examination, the separation between these three 
types of languages is not all that clear: 
CLEMENS: Sie ist doch nicht ganz die Sprache, die Poesie. Sie ist vielleicht eine  
gesteigerte Sprache. Sie ist voll von Bildern und Symbolen Sie setzt eine  
Sache für die andere. 
GABRIEL: Welch ein häßlicher Gedanke! Sagst du das im Ernst? Niemals setzt die  
Poesie eine Sache für die andere, denn es ist gerade die Poesie, welche  
fieberhaft bestrebt ist, die Sache selbst zu setzen, mit einer ganz anderen  
Energie als die stumpfe Alltagssprache, mit einer ganz anderen  
Zauberkraft als die schwächliche Terminologie der Wissenschaft. Wenn  
die Poesie etwas tut, so ist es das: daß sie aus jedem Gebilde der Welt und  
des Traumes mit durstiger Gier sein Eigenstes, sein Wesenhaftestes  
herausschlürft, so wie jene Irrlichter in dem Märchen, die überall das Gold  
herauslecken.153  
 
Gabriel obviously privileges poetic language because he believes that it possesses 
a completely different magical power than everyday speech or scientific language. And 
yet, what differentiates Alltagssprache and the terminology of science from poetic 
language is not that their words are drawn from an entirely different source, but rather 
                                                
151 “Es führt von der Poesie kein direkter Weg ins Leben, aus dem Leben keiner in die Poesie.” 
GWRA I, 16. 
152 Kovach, 142. 
153 GWE, 498-99. 
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that they are duller, weaker than poetic language. Reflected in Gabriel’s conception of 
poetic language is the Nietzschean idea that all language is essentially metaphoric, but 
that we are forgetful of language’s metaphoricity in our Alltagssprache and 
Begriffssprache. The real difference, then, lies in the function of poetic language. 
Through this exchange between Clemens and Gabriel, Hofmannsthal presents us with 
two opposed conceptions of what poetic language does. In suggesting that poetry speaks 
in images and symbols and that it substitutes one thing for another, Clemens voices a 
traditional understanding that poetic language is primarily decorative, and is in a sense a 
false way of speaking, because it disguises, in images, what it “actually” means. 154 
Gabriel, on the other hand, rejects Clemens’ substitution theory. He makes the curious 
assertion that poetry strives “die Sache selbst zu setzen.”  
In order to grasp this notion that poetic language does not substitute but rather 
gives us the things themselves, it is important to understand a shift in Hofmannsthal’s 
thinking on the nature of metaphoric language. Ethel Matala de Mazza observes that there 
is a significant change in Hofmannsthal’s conception of poetic language from his early 
lyrical phase to his post-lyrical period. She notes that in his short aphoristic sketch 
“Bildlicher Ausdruck,” from 1897, Hofmannsthal characterizes all speech as 
“uneigentliches Reden” and then privileges poetry over Alltagssprache because it is the 
most conscious of its Uneigentlichkeit: 
Man hört nicht selten die Rede: ein Dichtwerk sei mit bildlichem Ausdruck 
geziert, reich an Bildern. Dies muß eine falsche Anschauung hervorrufen, als 
seien die Bilder – Metaphern – etwas allenfalls Entbehrliches, dem eigentlichen 
Stoff, aus welchem Gedichtetes besteht, äußerlich Aufgeheftetes. Vielmehr aber 
ist der uneigentliche, der bildliche Ausdruck Kern und Wesen aller Poesie: jede 
Dichtung ist durch und durch ein Gebilde aus uneigentlichen Ausdrücken. […] 
                                                
154 Matala de Mazza, 104.  
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Mit der Sprache ist es nicht anders, nur sind es unter den Redenden die Dichter 
allein, die sich des Gleichnishaften er Sprache unaufhörlich bewußt bleiben.155 
 
However, while Hofmannsthal argues in “Bildlicher Ausdruck” that metaphoric language 
(and for that matter, language in general) does not give us access to something “actual” 
that lies outside of language, in “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” his character Gabriel 
argues the opposite, namely that the metaphor is a “seinserschließend[es]” medium.156 
Metaphoric language is charged with the power of revealing the essence of things and 
therefore as triumphing over Alltagssprache and Begriffssprache. Gabriel’s idea that 
poetic language has a revelatory power is incompatible with the notion that poetic 
language merely substitutes one thing (the “real” thing) with another (an “unreal” image). 
To Gabriel, then, signs in poetry have an irreducible quality. Metaphors, symbols, similes, 
and images are “Chiffren” that cannot be treated as a substitute for something else.157 For 
example, when Clemens takes the figure of two swans from a poem by Hebbel and 
attempts to interpret their meaning, he is immediately interrupted by Gabriel: 
CLEMENS: Und diese Schwäne? Sie sind ein Symbol? Sie bedeuten –  
GABRIEL: Laß mich dich unterbrechen. Ja, sie bedeuten, aber sprich es nicht aus,  
was sie bedeuten: was immer du sagen wolltest, es wäre unrichtig. Sie  
bedeuten hier nichts als sich selber: Schwäne. Schwäne, aber freilich  
gesehen mit den Augen der Poesie, die jedes Ding jedesmal zum erstenmal  
sieht, die jedes Ding mit allen Wundern seines Daseins umgibt [...]  
Gesehen mit diesen Augen sind die Tiere die eigentlichen Hieroglyphen,  
sind sie lebendige geheimnisvolle Chiffren, mit denen Gott  
unaussprechliche Dinge in die Welt geschrieben hat. Glücklich der  
Dichter, das auch er diese göttlichen Chiffren in seine Schrift verweben  
darf –158 
                                                
155 GWRA I, 234. 
156 Matala de Mazza, 106. 
157 Matala de Mazza, 107. 
158 GWE, 501. 
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Gabriel rejects the idea that symbols are simply a colorful way of dressing up 
ideas, and insists, therefore, that it would be wrong to reduce the swans from Hebbel’s 
poem to their “meaning.” For the swans to bear meaning, they have to stand in place of 
nothing but themselves. The magic of the poetic image lies in the fact that it is not a mere 
stand-in for an abstract idea; that is, the swans cannot be treated as a textual surplus, and 
the abstract, symbolic meaning cannot replace the literal, concrete meaning of the poetic 
image. Gabriel claims that through the eyes of poetry we see each thing each time for the 
first time. The pictures produced by poetic language thus present us with an “originary” 
vision of the world, restoring to the reader the sense of wonder that is the very 
precondition for his or her ability to perceive and decipher signs in the book of nature. 
Thus, poetic language is charged with a magical power through which it reveals the true 
nature of things. Moreover, poetry is not conceived as self-expression, but rather as an 
expression of the epiphanic moment in which the true essence of the world is revealed to 
the subject. As Margit Resch points out, what sets the poet apart from others for 
Hofmannsthal is his ability to translate this moment into words.159  
It is precisely because Gabriel has an ontological conception of poetic language 
that he traces the origin of the symbol, the key element of poetry, back to a religious 
experience at the border between life and death and at the limit of the physical body. 
Curiously, the story with which Gabriel illustrates the revelatory power of the symbol is 
                                                
159 “Jeder Mensch kann zwar dazu ausersehen sein, für einen Moment einen Blick in die Tiefe der 
Dinge zu tun; aber erst die Fähigkeit, das aus diesem Erlebnis gewonnene Welt- und Ichverständnis in der 
Sprach zu bändigen, macht ihn zum Dichter. 
Die Gewalt über das bezauberte Wort ist nach Hofmannsthal ein letztes Geschenk der Momente der 
Ekstase, oder wie der Dichter an einer Stelle sagt: “Es ist der Augenblick, an den das Produktive gebunden 
ist.” GWRA II, 222. 
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not about the poetic use of language, but instead is a story in which the idea of the 
symbol as an abstract, linguistic operation of substitution is presented as a non-verbal, 
physical act of substitution: the sacrificial act. Gabriel provides the following reason for 
telling the story of the first animal sacrifice as the origin story of the symbol: “Aber ich 
möchte ein vom tiefsten Geist der Sprache geprägtes Wort erst von seiner Lehmkruste 
reinigen.”160 He asks Clemens to imagine a man who, based on a few sparse details from 
the story, appears to be a simple peasant, living in the country. This man was tortured by 
the feeling that the gods hated him, and he felt that he could satisfy their bloodlust only 
by killing himself. Intoxicated from fear and closeness to death, his hand runs half-
unconsciously through the wool of a ram:  
Und dieses Tier, dieses Leben, dieses im Dunkel atmende, blutwarme, ihm so nah, 
so vertraut – auf einmal zuckte dem Tier das Messer in die Kehle, und das warme 
Blut rieselte zugleich an dem Vließ des Tieres und an der Brust, an den Armen 
des Menschen hinab: und einen Augenblick lang, während ein Laut des 
wollüstigen Triumphes aus seiner Kehle sich mit dem ersterbenden Stöhnen des 
Tieres mischte, muß er die Wollust gesteigerten Daseins für die erste Zuckung des 
Todes genommen haben: er muß einen Augenblick lang, in dem Tier gestorben 
sein, nur so konnte das Tier für ihn sterben. Daß das Tier für ihn sterben konnte, 
wurde ein großes Mysterium, eine große geheimnisvolle Wahrheit. Das Tier starb 
hinfort den symbolischen Opfertod. Aber alles ruhte darauf, daß auch er in dem 
Tier gestorben war, einen Augenblick lang. Daß sich sein Dasein, für die Dauer 
eines Atemzugs, in dem fremden Dasein aufgelöst hatte. – Das ist die Wurzel der 
Poesie.161 
 
Gabriel explains that this first symbolic act would have had no meaning if the sacrificer 
himself had not literally died in the sacrificed animal for an instant. The symbolic act is 
thus not an act of substitution in which one thing stands in place of another, or where a 
sign stands in place of the real; rather, it is a moment in which the subject merges with 
                                                
160 GWE, 502. 
161 GWE, 503. 
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the object, and where the self experiences a dissolution in the object. In this example of 
the sacrificial act as the first symbolic act, the distinction between reality and 
representation collapses: when the subject momentarily merges with the sacrificed animal, 
the animal becomes the sign for the subject’s own self.  When we consider what has 
taken place on a non-verbal plane in linguistic terms, we can see that the opposition 
between the “eigentlich Gemeintem” and the “uneigentlich Gesagtem” no longer holds in 
the sacrificial act.162 As Resch points out, the terms “metaphor,” “symbol,” “cipher,” and 
“magic words” are used synonymously by Hofmannsthal because he does not understand 
them as mere figures of speech, but rather as terms that refer to the experience of a 
mystical “Einheitsgefühl” between the subject and object.163 Resch argues that Gabriel 
tells the origin story of the symbol through the story of the sacrifice in order to illustrate 
that the symbol is not a mere rhetorical figure, but a process whereby the individual 
experiences a mystical “Einheitsgefühl.”  
David Wellbery suggests that this scenario of the first sacrifice, seen in the larger 
context of Hofmannsthal’s oeuvre, is a “fantasy” that informs Hofmannsthal’s 
understanding of poetry and aesthetics in an important way. In fact, he argues, “Es 
scheint eine Gesetzmäßigkeit des sich in Hofmannsthal Texten wiederholenden 
Opferszenarios zu sein, daß der kultische Opfervorgang nur dort explizit genannt wird, 
wo es, wie in dem ‘Gespräch über Gedichte,’ um die Erörtung ästhetischer Belange 
                                                
162 Matala de Mazza, 109. 
163 Margit Resch, Das Symbol als Prozeß bei Hugo von Hofmannsthal, (Regensburg: Verlag Anton 
Hain Meisenheim, Forum Academicum, 1980), 18ff. 
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geht.”164 Wellbery explains that Hofmannsthal’s Opferphantasie is informed by 
Lebensphilosophie and the ethnological findings of his time, such as Frazer’s Golden 
Bough. The function of Hofmannsthal’s sacrificial poetology is “die Wiedergewinnung 
einer kulturellen Fundierung, die trotz der durchgängigen Relativität der Werte 
unabweisbare, weil aus dem Erlebnis des ästhetischen Opfers hervorgegangen 
‘Führerschaft’ zu beanspruchen vermöchte.”165 More specifically in Hofmannsthal’s texts, 
though, Wellbery finds that the author uses the fantasy of the sacrificial act in order to 
produce a sense of transcendence; in the moment when the sacrificial animal is killed, the 
subject experiences an “Erschütterung,” which destroys the self’s culturally mediated 
identity, and the subject is put in touch with an ineffable, overwhelming force. The 
“Zucken” mentioned in the passage quoted above is indicative of the subject’s somatic 
experience of this aesthetic moment. The contraction of the body, followed by the stream 
of blood, points to the experience of a liquefaction, a streaming, as though the feeling of 
one’s self were expanded beyond the limits of the body.166 Wellbery argues that 
Hofmannsthal is not so much trying to represent the scenario of the sacrifice as he is 
attempting to find a mechanism that translates an affective reaction into a physical one. 
He finds that, through this move, Hofmannsthal celebrates the triumph of metaphysical 
life.  
In contrast to Wellbery, Anna-Katharina Gisbertz argues that the sacrificial act 
does not result in the experience of transcendence. Gisbertz contends that the dissolution 
                                                
164 David Wellbery, “Die Opfer-Vorstellung als Quelle der Faszination,” in Hofmannsthal-Jahrbuch 
11 (2003): 302.  
165 Wellbery, 306. Wellbery is relying here on Rene Girard’s theory of the scapegoat. 
166 Wellbery, 309. 
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of the self, which leads to the experience of union with the world, is not an experience 
that the subject makes consciously. Instead, the experience is one that is registered in the 
body. She says that it is neither a subjective phantasm nor evidence for a metaphysical 
reality in the sense of a transcendental idea, but rather a physical experience through 
which authorship is born.167 Thus, both Gisbertz and Wellbery point out the centrality of 
the bodily experience of the subject-object union that is effected by the sacrificial act; 
however, they disagree on whether or not this experience points to a transcendental 
reality or a concrete physical reality. 
III. The Two Ambiguities of “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” 
My aim here is not to establish the legitimacy of either Wellbery’s or Gisbertz’ 
interpretation; instead, I argue that these two different interpretations are made possible 
by Hofmannsthal’s text because in Gabriel’s story of the origin of the symbol, it is not at 
all clear where the site of the subject-object fusion experience is. There are two different 
levels of ambiguity that I want to point out: The first is the ambiguous origin of the 
symbol, while the second is of a meta-textual nature and has to do with the literary form 
of this text itself.  
                                                
167 “Es ist ein entscheidender Bestandteil dieser paradoxen Koinzidenz, dass sie nicht bewusst 
erfahren wird, sondern somatisch verankert ist, durch die Nerven ‘lesbar’ wird. Sie bildet folglich kein 
subjektives Phantasma und ist auch keine ‘metaphysiche Wirklichkeit’, etwa als transzendente Idee, 
sondern zeigt sich auf einer Erfahrungsebene, die im Leib verankert ist und durch ihn förmlich zur Geburt 
der Autorschaft führt. Sie kann genau in diesem Sinne auch als eine Stimmung bezeichnet werden, da sich 
in ihr ebenfalls Leben und Tod, Ich-Auflösung und Erlösung zu einer Einheit zusammenbinden.” Anna-
Katharina Gisbertz, Stimmung – Leib – Sprache: Eine Konfiguration in der Wiener Moderne (München: 
Wilhelm-Fink, 2009), 124. 
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1. The Origin of the Symbol 
We may take Resch’s analysis of the symbol in Hofmannsthal’s work to help us 
understand the first of these ambiguities. She explains that Hofmannsthal was influenced 
by the legacy of Schiller’s and Goethe’s respective ideas regarding symbols. According 
to Schiller’s theory of the symbol, the subject endows the object with symbolic meaning, 
whereas for Goethe, symbols are found in nature – the symbol is not created by the 
subject but is rather uncovered and deciphered by him. Resch finds that Hofmannsthal’s 
conception of the symbol resembles that of the Romantics, who combined both Schiller 
and Goethe’s theories: “Das Symbolische ist bei den Romantikern ein Element der Welt, 
das der menschliche Geist ihr zugesteht, um es ihr dann zu entwinden.”168 The Romantics 
were reacting to the disenchantment of the world resulting from the processes of 
modernity. Novalis described the problem in the following way: “Wir suchen überall das 
Unbedingte und finden immer nur Dinge.”169 In order to get around this predicament, 
reality had to be “romantisiert;” a magic power had to be ascribed to nature, that is, “dem 
Dinglichen muß die Möglichkeit einer Bedeutungssphäre gegeben werden.”170 Implicit in 
this Romantic conception of the symbol is a certain doubt that any inherent meaning may 
be inscribed in nature; therefore, the human subject is the one who gives meaning to 
nature by “romanticizing” it, and yet this process, as willful as it seems, is still conceived 
                                                
168 Resch, 27. 
169 Novalis, Blüthenstaub § 1, in Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs, vol. 2, 
Das philosophisch-theoretische Werk, edited by Hans-Joachim Mähl (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 
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as an uncovering of the “original” condition of nature, which once did communicate with 
human beings.171  
In Hofmannsthal’s text, a similar tension between doubt and belief in the world’s 
inherent meaning can be found. This origin story of the symbol has received much 
commentary; however, critics tend to focus on the moment of the sacrifice, in which the 
subject and object merge, rather than on the part of the story that describes the conditions 
that cause the subject to make the sacrifice in the first place. It is, of course, often noted 
that the man in this story feels persecuted by the gods, but the fact that this feeling of 
persecution is triggered by the man’s fear of nature is overlooked in the existing 
interpretations of this text. I argue that this fear of nature needs to be taken into account 
for us to fully appreciate the highly ambiguous origin of the symbol. At the beginning of 
his story of the first animal sacrifice, Gabriel describes the following scene: 
Mich dünkt, ich sehe den ersten, der opferte. Er fühlte, daß die Götter ihn haßten: 
daß sie die Wellen des Gießbaches und das Geröll der Berge in seine Acker 
schleuderten; daß sie mit der fürchterlichen Stille des Waldes sein Herz 
zerquetschen wollten, oder er fühlte, daß die gierige Seele eines Toten nachts mit 
dem Wind hereinkam und sich auf seine Brust setzte, dürstend nach Blut.172  
 
It is an important detail that the man in this story believes that the gods’ hatred of him is 
evidenced in the terrifying sights and sounds of nature, such as “die Wellen des 
Gießbaches und das Geröll der Berge.” This passage highlights the man’s animistic 
worldview: nature is not only terrifyingly alive to him, but is animated by furious 
divinities. The impulse for the sacrificial act originates both from a fear of death and from 
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the desire to gain control over a threatening, mysterious force: nature. In this sense, the 
origin story of the symbol is also a survival story; that is, it appears that the human 
being’s will to live is manifested in his ability to create a non-literal relationship to the 
world.  
But what does it mean to speak of a non-literal or literal relationship to the world? 
To have a “literal” connection means that we would relate to the world as animals do. 
That is, we would have an unselfconscious, unmediated relationship with it. But as the 
passage above points out, the man has a self-conscious relationship with it, and this is 
indicated by the fact that he does not only respond with fear to the threatening aspects of 
nature, but also interprets the sights and sounds of nature as signs and assigns meaning to 
what he sees and hears. This ability of the human being to interpret and to read meaning 
into his surrounding points to his alienated relationship to nature. Thus, self-
consciousness both alienates the subject from nature and liberates him from having 
purely physical responses to it.  
This is not to say, however, that Gabriel is celebrating the triumph of reason over 
the body through this story of the first animal sacrifice. In fact, the story emphasizes the 
fact that our consciousness is not ruled by rationality, but instead (and here we see the 
influences of psychoanalytical thought on Hofmannsthal) there is an unconscious drive 
that motivates our actions. The man reaches for the animal, for example, “halb unbewußt.” 
But ultimately, the sacrificial act is not just indicative of the fact that the man succumbs 
to irrationality. On the contrary, the substitution of the animal for the subject’s own life is 
a means by which the subject creatively gains some control over nature. And yet, the 
sacrificial act is not a rational act. It is not produced through clever scheming on the part 
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of the human being – unlike in the ancient myth about how the animal sacrifice 
originated from the human being’s ability to fool the gods (thereby outsmarting them) by 
offering up animal parts instead of actual human flesh. Here, on the contrary, the subject 
is driven to make the sacrifice half unconsciously; there is part of the subject that does 
not really realize or understand what he is doing.  
For this reason, the origin story of the sacrifice and the symbol is highly 
ambiguous. It remains unclear where the impulse for this act comes from, and similarly, 
it remains uncertain whether the symbol is the product of the poet’s mind, or the product 
of his receptivity to nature’s language. Gabriel’s focus is not really the power of poetic 
language, but rather the power of poetic language is indicative of something even more 
mysterious and rudimentary, namely the instinct for survival and the drive towards 
meaning that allows human beings to substitute one thing for another. The scene of the 
sacrifice makes it clear that our relationship to the world is a highly ambivalent one: we 
fear nature, and we attempt to bring it under control by dominating it; meaning is wrested 
from the incoherence of life through a violent act. The story of the sacrifice is in a sense 
the story of our consciousness. The merging of the subject and object is violent and only 
fleeting, and what we have left once the sacrificial act is completed is a dead, bloody 
animal and our self-consciousness. Paradoxically, the subject’s violent union with the 
object separates him from nature and in the moment of this separation, symbolic meaning 
emerges as the residue.  
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2. The Dialogical Form 
The second ambiguity that I want to address is related to the form of 
Hofmannsthal’s text. The scholarly literature on “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” largely 
neglects to address the connection between the dialogue form of this text and its content.  
Critics tend to regard Gabriel as Hofmannsthal’s mouthpiece and read this essay as 
though it were a monologue. To be fair, the text lends itself to such a reading, because 
Gabriel’s perspective clearly dominates the dialogue and, as mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, Gabriel seems to play the role of a teacher who attempts to correct his 
interlocutor’s “common-sense” understanding of poetry. That is, while this text is 
structured as a conversation between two people, in actuality it is closer to monological. 
For this reason, my own analysis has also focused primarily on Gabriel’s utterances.  
However, we should not dismiss the fact that Hofmannsthal specifically chose the 
dialogue form for the poetological reflections in this text. In this section I point to two 
different functions that the dialogue serves. First, I claim that the dialogue form shows 
that the relationship between Alltags- and Begriffssprache, on the one hand, and poetic 
language, on the other, is not one of simple opposition, but rather is characterized by an 
interdependence. Second, I argue that only by taking into account the relationship 
between the form and content of “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” can we see the 
performative quality of this text. That is, not only do the characters in this dialogue model 
for us how reading is affective and subjective, as Simon Jander recently pointed out, but 
the dialogue is also an enactment of an open-ended way of speaking about poetry, which 
Hofmannsthal promotes not only in this text but also throughout his oeuvre.173  
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In his study of Hofmannsthal’s Erfundene Gespräche und Briefe, Simon Jander 
classifies Hofmannsthal’s fictional dialogues as dialogue-essays, a genre of prose in 
Hofmannsthal’s oeuvre the form of which has been largely understudied. Jander finds 
that most studies of Hofmannsthal’s fictional dialogues tend to brush over the question of 
the dialogue form by simply referring to Hofmannsthal’s own thesis that one cannot 
speak about poetry in a logical or explicitly analytical manner. He points out that there 
are as of yet very few studies of Hofmannsthal’s imaginary conversations that closely 
examine the specific textual strategies that the form of the dialogue gives rise to. He 
argues that the dialogue form is a means by which Hofmannsthal poeticizes the essay, 
meaning that the author personalizes his reflections on art and literature by turning them 
into utterances made by fictional characters. Jander contends that the thematization of 
aesthetic experience is at the center of Hofmannsthal’s Erfundene Gespräche, and that 
the dialogue form, allowing for a plurality of perspectives, enables Hofmannsthal to 
emphasize the subjective reception of art.  
Jander traces the genre of dialogue-essays back to the 18th century, and identifies 
the Earl of Shaftesbury as a writer who greatly influenced the German essay tradition. He 
was one of the earliest writers to recognize the importance of the dialogue form as a 
medium for philosophical reflections. It was important to him that thought be expressed 
in a non-didactic, non-dogmatic form, and therefore regarded the dialogue as a promising 
form, since it lent itself to unsystematic reflections that could be left open-ended. By 
contrast, Gottsched is an Enlightenment thinker who opposed this use of the dialogue 
form, believing that reflections on science and art must be systematic, which is something 
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that the dialogue could not do.174 Shaftesbury’s influence, however, can be seen in 
Germany in the last decades of the 18th century, with an increased emphasis on figures 
and scenery, a plurality of perspectives, open-ended thought processes, and the 
foregrounded figure of the reader. Jander points out that while the epistolary form of 
writing was already popular in the 18th century, the letters and epistolary novels of this 
period are predominantly of a different character from the dialogues written by Lessing 
and Schlegel. Winckelmann’s Sendschreiben über die Gedanken, Schiller’s Über die 
ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen einer Reihe von Briefen (1795), and Herder’s 
Humanitätsbriefe (1792-97)175 are examples of poeticized essays in a limited sense 
because they tend to be still more didactic and systematic. By comparison, Lessing’s 
“Ernst und Falk” (1778-1780) and Friedrich Schlegel’s “Gespräch über die Poesie” 
(1800) have a more pronounced fictional-poetic dimension. Around 1900, under the 
influence of Nietzsche, the self-reflexive character of the essay is radicalized, 
emphasizing the instability of the reflecting “I”.176   
 “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” is one of many fictional dialogues that 
Hofmannsthal wrote. Mary Gilbert notes that Hofmannsthal wrote frequently in the form 
of imaginary letters and conversations between 1900 and 1908, a transitional period in 
which he moved away from writing lyric poetry, in favor of prose and tragedies. She says 
that Hofmannsthal was well aware of the literary tradition of philosophical and literary 
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dialogues going back to Novalis. Echoing Richard Alewyn,177 she observes, too, that his 
“predilection for this form seems to reflect one side of Hofmannthal’s nature who, as all 
his friends testify, was the most wonderful of conversationalists. ‘Gespräche’ to him were 
a spiritual need and a great part of his thinking seems to have been done in this form.”178 
Gilbert nevertheless finds it peculiar that there is a “preponderance of ‘Gespräche’ and 
‘Unterhaltungen’” during a phase of Hofmannsthal’s career which was “inaugurated by 
the Lord Chandos letter” and in which one might have expected “deep withdrawal” from 
the author.179 Yet as Gilbert rightly notes, Hofmannsthal “consistently chose ‘Gespräche’ 
and ‘Unterhaltungen,’ a form which entirely depends upon the demonstrable capability of 
the figure to communicate through words. For in these essays insight is not there a priori; 
it grows and deepens perceptibly in the give and take of sympathetic minds.”180  
How does Gilbert then explain the curious fact that Hofmannsthal frequently 
wrote in this social form of the fictional dialogue during a period of his career that is 
marked by a preoccupation with the language crisis? She argues that Hofmannsthal’s 
fictional letters and dialogues “constitute an act of self-clarification”181 and that they 
reflect a “thirst for reality,” a move away from the irreality of Präexistenz.182 This move 
                                                
177 Richard Alewyn observed that conversations for Hofmannsthal were of existential importance: “Er 
lebte nicht wie andere von Gesprächen, sondern im Gespräch. Das Gespräch war ihm nicht nur Mittel, es 
war geradezu die Form seiner Existenz.” Richard Alewyn, “Unendliches Gespräch. Die Briefe Hugo von 
Hofmannsthals,” DNR 65, no. 3/4 (1954): 539. 
178 Mary E. Gilbert, “Hofmannsthal’s Essays, 1900-1908: A Poet in Transition,” in Hofmannsthal: 
Studies (London: University of London Institute of Germanic Studies, 1963), 31. 
179 Gilbert, 31. 
180 Gilbert, 31. 
181 Gilbert, 44. 
182 Gilbert, 51. 
 96 
is reflected in the choice of his speakers in the imaginary letters and conversations. With 
the exception of the Balzac dialogue, all of the interlocutors in the fictional dialogues are 
not experts. Hofmannsthal, thus, assigns the role of the creative critic to the “ordinary” 
reader. “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” is a good example of a text that presents the kind 
of critical reader Hofmannsthal had in mind. As noted briefly at the beginning of this 
chapter, this dialogue is written in a casual tone and the exchange is not between two 
experts, but between two well-read friends with strong poetic sensibilities. Gilbert 
characterizes the seemingly ordinary interlocutors of Hofmannsthal’s dialogues as 
“reader-poets.”183 Her interpretation of Hofmannsthal’s fictional dialogues is reflective of 
one of two dominant ways in which they have been understood: one is to regard them as 
Hofmannsthal’s attempt to forge a “Weg ins Soziale,”184 while the other is to see them as 
a continuation of Hofmannsthal’s lyrical work, inasmuch as the focus is still on aesthetic 
experience and poetic subjectivity.185 
While these two dominant understandings of Hofmannsthal’s fictional dialogues 
are valuable, they are too polarized. As we have seen, “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” is 
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more monological than dialogical. The two polarized readings arise from an attempt to 
isolate form from content. This approach is made possible by the text itself because the 
form and content of this dialogue seem to be distinct from one another. That is, the 
content, or the subject of the conversation, is the question of what poetry is and does; the 
form, i.e. the dialogue structure, does not seem to explicitly reflect this subject matter, but 
rather appears to serve the purpose of underscoring the interlocutors’ associative and 
open-ended thought processes. I argue, however, that when these two seemingly 
independent aspects of the text are considered together, we can see that the text as a 
whole casts doubt on Gabriel’s claim that poetic language is distinctly different both from 
the “stumpfe Alltagssprache” and from what he calls the “schwächliche Terminologie der 
Wissenschaft.”186 In the dialogue we have, on the one hand, the use of everyday and 
conceptual language in the exchange between Clemens and Gabriel, and on the other 
hand Gabriel’s claim that everyday language and conceptual language are impoverished 
by comparison with the more powerful poetic language. What seems contradictory, 
however, is the fact that Gabriel has to resort to everyday language in order to make his 
case for the power of poetry. The dull everyday language is thus not so weak after all; in 
fact, it is a very powerful tool, with which Gabriel can transform Clemens’ understanding 
of poetry. In other words, the powerful act of persuasion is performed through everyday 
language.  
One could say that the difference between everyday and poetic language, implied 
by the dialogue as a whole, is that the former is used for communication and the latter is 
used for the renewal of our perception of the world. Gabriel suggests that poetry has the 
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inverse effect of everyday language: whereas everyday language, in the process of 
mediating reality, objectifies experience and thus alienates us from it, poetic language 
effaces its mediating character and as a result makes us more aware of our immediate 
perception of the world. Gabriel suggests that poetry translates our feelings into words, 
which is something that any ordinary use of language cannot achieve.  
Part of the problem with Gabriel’s argument, however, is its vagueness. For 
instance, it remains unclear what the causal relationship between poetic language and our 
affective experience of reality is: Does the poetic use of words have the effect of 
intensifying our physical experience of reality? Or does poetry actually produce our 
physical sensation of the world? How is it that poetic language is better at communicating 
with our senses? Does Hofmannsthal actually distinguish that strictly between the two 
different languages in this dialogue?  
Benjamin Bennett argues that Hofmannsthal ultimately does not distinguish 
strictly between poetry and everyday language. He suggests that the opposition between 
conceptual language, which supposedly fossilizes experience, and poetry, as a deeper 
form of communication, should actually be regarded as “merely a kind of poetic 
convention, a fruitful problem or tension, an opening of space for linguistic play.”187 Just 
as the language crisis is to a certain extent a trope or fashion in Hofmannsthal’s time, so 
is the opposition between poetry and conceptual language. To understand this opposition 
as a trope does not mean that Hofmannsthal did not take this problem seriously, but it 
suggests that he likely aestheticized the tension between poetry and everyday language.  
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To complement and extend Bennett’s observation, I would argue that the reason 
that the opposition between poetic, everyday and conceptual language is a fruitful figure 
of thought for Hofmannsthal is because it is a highly problematic opposition. How poetry, 
using words from ordinary language, can fleetingly restore a sense of sensory immediacy 
is ultimately unanswered by this text. Like Clemens, we are left to choose either to accept 
or to reject Gabriel’s claims. In the absence of an explanation as to how it is that poetry 
can allow us to experience a cosmic unity,188 we have to trust Gabriel’s assertions about 
the magical powers of poetry. Even Gabriel’s story of the symbolic act illustrates that we 
reach for symbols, and yet it does not explain how this works. The “how” remains a 
mystery. When we consider seriously the fact that Gabriel does not answer this question, 
what becomes increasingly apparent is the asymmetrical power relation between Gabriel 
and Clemens. The existing criticism on “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” largely fails to 
take into account how the two interlocutors’ power relationship informs our 
understanding of this text as a whole. I argue that when we take the asymmetrical power 
relationship between Gabriel and Clemens into account, we can begin to see that 
Gabriel’s claims about the unique status of poetry rest largely on his emphatic insistence 
that this is so, and on Clemens’ acceptance of Gabriel’s superior understanding of poetic 
language. Of course, Clemens directs the conversation in his own way by posing 
questions to Gabriel; however, on the whole he tends to defer to Gabriel’s expertise.  
I argue, therefore, that the character of Gabriel should not be understood as a mere 
mouthpiece for Hofmannsthal’s own views, but rather as a figure whose claims about 
poetry should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism. Jost Schneider is among the few 
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critics who make a similar point, and he does so through a biographical reading of 
Hofmannsthal’s text. He argues that the author modeled Gabriel on Stefan George, of 
whose romantic-symbolist worship of poetry Hofmannsthal was wary. He believes that 
Gabriel’s claims about poetry reflect a combination of “romantisch-ästhetizistischen 
Prädispositionen und symbolistisches Gestaltungswillen,”189 reminiscent of Stefan 
George’s conception of poetry. It is well established that George and Hofmannsthal had a 
very ambivalent relationship, in which Hofmannsthal ultimately rejected George’s 
attempts to bring him into his literary circle.  
Schneider draws attention to the fact that Hofmannsthal was highly aware of the 
fraught power dynamic in a prophet-disciple relationship. In his poem “Der Prophet,” 
which was written in 1891, two days after George paid Hofmannsthal a visit in his 
apartment in Vienna,190 the author depicts the sinister, seductive powers of a prophet 
figure: 
In einer Halle hat er mich empfangen  
Die rätselhaft mich ängstet mit Gewalt 
Von süßen Düften widerlich durchwallt. 
Da hängen fremde Vögel, bunte Schlangen. 
 
Das Thor fällt zu, des Lebens Laut verhallt 
Der Seele Athmen hemmt ein dumpfes Bangen 
Eine Zaubertrunk hält jeden Sinn befangen 
Und alles flüchtet, hilflos, ohne Halt. 
 
Er aber ist nicht wie er immer war,  
Sein Auge bannt und fremd ist Stirn und Haar. 
Von seinen Worten, den unscheinbar leisen 
Geht eine Herrschaft aus und ein Verführen 
Er macht die leere Luft beengend kreisen 
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Und er kann tödten, ohne zu berühren.191  
 
While the prophet is active and present here, the lyrical subject is passive and 
absent, appearing only twice, in the opening lines, in the form of the accusative personal 
pronoun. The lyrical subject is the direct object of the prophet’s sinister, intangible 
influence and of the aggression exercised with his seemingly gentle words, which have 
the quality of a revolting sweet scent that invisibly permeates the air and closes in on the 
subject, suffocating him. Schneider interprets the last stanza as a characterization of a 
prophetic way of speaking, which is not only seductive and opaque but also circular and 
isolating, indicated by the shutting of the gate.192 He argues that Hofmannsthal was 
criticizing George in this poem and that he continues to portray George in a similarly 
critical light through the figure of Gabriel in “Das Gespräch über Gedichte.”193 Schneider 
asserts that Hofmannsthal grew skeptical of the symbolist manner of speaking, which 
aimed to constitute a “Sondersprache,” accessible only to the few, rather than to clarify 
language.194 
While Schneider points us in the right direction, however, he does not examine in 
sufficient detail how it is that Gabriel’s manner of speaking makes him resemble the 
prophet figure in Hofmannsthal’s poem. I argue that it is possible to see, not just in what 
Gabriel says but also in how he communicates with Clemens, that there is an 
asymmetrical power relationship between them. For example, in the following exchange, 
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challenged by Clemens’ very valid questioning of the origin story of the symbol, Gabriel 
responds not so much with further explanation, but rather with a rejection of Clemens’ 
reaction: 
CLEMENS: Woher kommt ihnen diese Kraft? Wie konnte er in dem Tier sterben? 
GABRIEL: Davon, daß wir und die Welt nicht Verschiedenes sind. 
CLEMENS: Etwas Seltsames liegt in dem Gedanken, etwas Beunruhigendes. 
GABRIEL: Im Gegenteil, etwas unendlich Ruhevolles. Es ist das einzig Süße, einen  
Teil seiner Schwere abgegeben zu sehen; und wäre es nur für die  
mystische Frist eines Hauches. In unserem Leib ist das All dumpf  
zusammengedrückt: wie selig, sich tausendfach der furchtbaren Wucht zu  
entladen. 
CLEMENS: Und dennoch, ist mir, muß es Gedichte geben, die schön sind ohne  
diese schwüle Bezauberung.195 
 
This exchange demonstrates Gabriel’s exercise of power over Clemens, which is 
subtle, yet illustrates my point that Gabriel tends to insist on, rather than explain his 
understanding of, the power of poetic language. In this passage Gabriel simply dismisses 
Clemens’ objection that there is something unsettling about the thought that we are one 
and the same as the world. Clemens’ unease in response to Gabriel’s suggestion that the 
symbol can trigger in us the experience of a unio mystica seems perfectly reasonable; 
after all, is there not something potentially threatening about the idea that the subject 
would be stripped of his individuality and identity in a moment of mystical union with 
the world? Rather than acknowledging that Clemens’ reaction may be worth examining, 
Gabriel authoritatively prescribes how Clemens should feel about such a cosmic union, 
insisting that there is something infinitely peaceful in the idea that we could release the 
weight of the universe that is compressed in our bodies. Moreover, we should note here 
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that there is something seductive about Gabriel’s description of the magical power of 
poetry: he uses words like “Hauch” to underscore the intangible quality of this power. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that Clemens is by no means a completely 
quiescent interlocutor. In this particular passage Clemens persists in voicing his 
skepticism. He questions whether there might not be poems that are beautiful without 
having the hazy effect of enchantment (“schwüle Bezauberung”) that Gabriel sees as the 
virtue of poetic language. Clemens’ question introduces a comparison between classical 
poetry, which appeals to the mind through “geformten Ideen,” and modern poetry, which 
appeals to the soul: 
CLEMENS: [...] Antworte mir Gabriel, ist der geformte Gedanke nicht schön? Hat 
er  nicht den Glanz des Lebens verzehnfacht in sich, wie die Perlen den feuchten 
Schimmer der nackten Hand in sich saugen und zehnfach widerstrahlen? 
GABRIEL: Ja, der Gedanke ist etwas Schönes und du hast so großes Recht, ihn der  
Perle und dem Edelstein zu vergleichen. Dieses beiden gleicht er, die schöner  
sind als alles Blühen und Leben, weil sie über das Blühen und Leben und  
Sterben hinaus sind. Und für eine junge Welt, die daliegt in Blindheit, ist er  
das Wunder der Wunder [...] wir aber sind reicher an Gedanken, als der  
endlose Meeresstrand an Muscheln. Was uns not tut, ist der Hauch. 
Wovon unsere Seele sich nährt, das ist das Gedicht, in welchem, wie im  
Sommerabendwind, der über die frischgemähten Wiesen streicht, zugleich ein  
Hauch von Tod und Leben zu uns herschwebt, eine Ahnung des Blühens, ein  




Striking in Gabriel’s response to Clemens here is his vitalist vocabulary. Gabriel picks up 
on Clemens’ description of a more sober, classical form of poetry as like “pearls,” and 
points out that this description aptly reflects the inorganic nature of a poetry that appeals 
to the mind. He then contrasts the metaphor of pearls and precious stones (which are 
common motifs for aestheticism) with organic metaphors, like “Sommerabendwind” and 
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freshly mowed grass, which refer to a modern poetry that brings us closer to life. Gabriel 
describes the poetry that is better suited to the needs of modern times as ephemeral 
because it does not aim to capture unchanging truths but rather the transience of our 
feelings. The emphasis on the transience of life intensifies the experience of the present 
moment: “eine Ahnung des Blühens, ein Schauder des Verwesens, ein Jetzt, ein Hier und 
zugleich ein Jenseits.”197 Moreover, Gabriel historicizes the value of this kind of poetry. 
He argues that when the world was young, ideas could produce a sense of wonder, but the 
modern time is oversaturated with ideas. Thus, what the modern subject needs are not 
ideas and concepts, but rather poetry that fine-tunes our awareness of being in the world. 
He claims that we need poetry that can allow us to feel an intangible “Hauch” that can 
infuse the overly intellectual modern individual with a feeling of life.  
Gabriel’s observation about what ails the modern individual is insightful, and is 
reflective of a strain of cultural critique that is still current today. However, the claims he 
makes at the end of the dialogue about what such a poetry of feeling can achieve are 
hyperbolic. He overpromises what poetry can do: 
Das wirkliche Erlebnis der Seele, welche Worte möchten es ausdrücken, wenn 
nicht bezauberte! Ein Augenblick kommt und drückt aus tausenden und tausenden 
seinesgleichen den Saft heraus, in die Höhe der Vergangenheit dringt er ein und 
den tausenden von dunklen erstarrten Augenblicken, aus denen sie aufgebaut ist, 
entquillt ihr ganzes Licht: was niemals da war, nie sich gab, jetzt ist es da, jetzt 
gibt es sich, ist Gegenwart, mehr als Gegenwart; was niemals zusammen war, 
jetzt ist es zugleich, ist es beisammen, schmilzt ineinander die Glut, den Glanz 
und das Leben. [...] Daß es Zusammenstellungen von Worten gibt, aus welchen, 
wie der Funke aus dem geschlagenen dunklen Stein, die Landschaften der Seele 
hervorbrechen, die unermeßlich sind wie der gestirnte Himmel, Landschaften, die 
sich ausdehnen im Raum und in der Zeit, und deren Anblick abzuweiden in uns 
ein Sinn lebendig wird, der über alle Sinne ist. Und dennoch entstehen solche 
Gedichte...?198 
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This passage contains imagery of volcanic eruption. The thousands of petrified moments 
that represent our cumulative experiences in life are described like a pile of rocks that 
tower over us. Gabriel suggests with this imagery that there is glowing life within this 
mountain of fossilized experiences that is brought to eruption through poetry. He claims 
that such moments are rare because it is rare to come across a perfect poem that will 
produce this effect. However, such poems do exist, and their existence is cause for 
wonder. Once again, what lurks behind the description of the so-called “vollkommenen 
Gedichte”199 is the fact that Gabriel is making prescriptive claims. In claiming that he 
knows what the true power of poetry is, he steps out of his role of a reader with a high 
sensibility for poetry, and takes on the role of the prophet, namely the prophet of the poet.  
 	  
                                                
199 GWE, 509. 
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Chapter 4: The Poet and Mass Readership in  
 Hofmannsthal’s Time 
Hofmannsthal felt that he was part of an age oversaturated with culture and 
knowledge, and as we saw in “Ein Brief,” he was critical of the idea that the world 
consists of signs that we cannot decipher until all the secrets of nature have been 
unlocked. Gerhard Neumann asserts that Hofmannsthal tried to counter the idea of the 
“Lesbarkeit der Welt” with a “Poetik des Nicht-Lesens.”200 In this chapter I explore the 
practical implications of this idea of the unreadability of the world through a study of 
Hofmannsthal’s “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” (1906). In his own time Hofmannsthal was 
attacked by Karl Kraus, one of his harshest critics, for seeking refuge from life in art.201 
This one-sided view has been effectively countered by many thinkers, including Carl E. 
Schorske, who demonstrated that Hofmannsthal in fact recognized an urgent need for the 
poet to escape the temple of art and establish a connection to his society.202 While I do 
not dispute that Hofmannsthal sought to create an art that could communicate with the 
people, I think it is questionable whether he ever succeeded in this task. The difficulty, as 
I argue in this chapter, is that Hofmannsthal wanted to retain the privileged position of 
the artist, but was never able to elaborate how the poet’s unique perspective could be 
communicated to a people who, by his own conception, stood outside of such a 
                                                
200 Gerhard Neumann, “‘Kunst des Nicht-lesens’: Hofmannsthals Ästhetik des Flüchtigen,” in 
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201 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 
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perspective. “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” gestures at this impasse but, I argue, never 
successfully articulates a way beyond it. His attempt to simultaneously broaden his 
audience’s understanding of poetry by making it encompass all forms of writing, on the 
one hand, and to secure a special status for it, on the other, leads to an extremely 
ambiguous portrayal of the relationship between poet, reader, and literature.  
I. Poetry and the Modern Reader 
When Hofmannsthal submitted “Das Gespräch über Gedichte” for publication in 
September of 1903, he explained to Oscar Bie, the publisher of Neue Rundschau, that he 
broke off the dialogue at a point where it was about to turn to a discussion about the role 
of the reader. He told him that he intended to write a second part to this dialogue: “Dieses 
Thema, ‘wer sind die, in denen das Gedicht lebt, durch die es durch die Zeit getragen 
wird,’ will ich Ihnen wenn die lebhafte Stimmung für solche Prosa wiederkommt, zu 
einem eigenen Aufsatz ausarbeiten, welcher ‘Der Leser’ heißen wird und wofür ich viele 
Notizen habe.”203 Although Hofmannsthal did not end up writing this second part of “Das 
Gespräch über Gedichte,” he continued to work on it between 1903 and 1908. His notes 
indicate that some of the thoughts he had for “Der Leser” were included in “Der Dichter 
und diese Zeit,” in which he reflects more broadly on the relationship between the poet 
and the modern readership. In this essay Hofmannsthal provides a diagnosis of the poet’s 
status in relation to the popular reading culture of his time; he argues that the declining 
status of the poet and of poetry is merely a surface phenomenon, beneath which one finds 
an intense but unconscious spiritual longing for poetry amongst the general reading 
public. Hofmannsthal observes that on the surface, the journalist, popular novelist, 
                                                
203 See “Das Gespräch über Gedichte,” in GWE, 337. 
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scientist, and newspaper reporter appear to have marginalized the poet. The general 
public’s thirst for literature seems to be driven by two desires: a desire for distraction, on 
the one hand, and a desire for more reality, on the other. The modern mass consumer of 
literature, he observes, assumes that the poet cannot satisfy either of these needs. 
However, Hofmannsthal argues that despite all outward signs to the contrary, the 
ordinary reader’s “ungeheuere Krankheit […] des Lesens”204 is indicative of “eine 
unstillbare Sehnsucht nach dem Genießen von Poesie.”205 However, Hofmannsthal 
recognizes that his argument may strike his audience as counter-intuitive: 
Dies muß Sie befremden und Sie sagen mir, daß in keiner früheren Zeit das 
Poetische eine so bescheidene Rolle gespielt hätte, als es in der Lektüre unsere 
Zeit spielt, wo es verschwindet unter der ungeheueren Masse dessen, was gelesen 
wird. Sie sagen mir, daß meine Behauptung vielleicht auf die Zuhörer der 
arabischen Märchenerzähler passe oder allenfalls auf [...] die Generation des 
Werther, doch sicherlich gerade am wenigsten auf unsere Zeit, die Zeit der 
wissenschaftlichen Handbücher, der Reallexika und der unzählbaren 
Zeitschriften, in denen für Poesie kein Raum ist.206  
 
He acknowledges that reading as a contemplative act is an ideal that belongs to a 
distant, more tranquil time.207 The modern readers Hofmannsthal has in mind in “Der 
Dichter und diese Zeit” are undiscriminating readers, mass-consumers of random books 
and print material: “Ich rede von denen die je nach der verschiedenen Stufe ihrer 
Kenntnisse ganz verschiedene Bücher lesen, ohne bestimmten Plan, unaufhörlich 
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wechselnd, selten in einem Buch lang ausruhend, getrieben von einer unausgesetzten, nie 
recht gestillten Sehnsucht.”208 Whereas Hofmannsthal’s fictional readers in his other 
poetological essays read and hold their refined conversations about literature in private or 
public gardens, the mass consumer of literature portrayed in this essay reads in crowded, 
distracting public spaces like the omnibus.209 In his typical fashion, Hofmannsthal seizes 
on a central image, the gesture of “das rastlose Wieder-aus-der-Hand-legen der 
Bücher,”210 which for him crystallizes the characteristic disposition of the modern 
consumer of books.  
Hofmannsthal’s observations about the feverish reading habits at the turn of the 
20th century echo the ones made by critics of the mass consumption of literature in the 
late 18th century. As Karin Littau points out, “Lesesucht” was a term commonly used in 
the 1780s and 1790s in German discussions about the phenomenon of bibliomania.211 
Thus, already a century before Hofmannsthal’s time, anxieties were voiced about the 
excessive and speedy consumption of reading material, which critics found was resulting 
in unreflective reading habits and even physical strain. Littau says that the speed of 
reading picked up over the course of the 19th century, “as if readers were reproducing the 
speed of production in the speed of their own reading.”212 Critics worried that rather than 
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sharpening the mind, the habit of reading purely for stimulation might be mentally 
enfeebling.213 
In this regard, Hofmannsthal’s observations about the unreflective reading habits 
of the masses are based on an already established cultural criticism. However, rather than 
simply disparaging the distractedness of modern readers, he argues that their insatiable 
appetite for literature is indicative of an unconscious yearning for enchantment, which is 
something only poetry can offer. Implicit in his argument is the idea that literature fills a 
spiritual vacuum that has resulted from the secularization of society. In other words, 
instead of looking to God as people did in an overtly religious past, the modern 
secularized individual looks to books for spiritual guidance: “Ich sehe beinahe als die 
Geste unserer Zeit den Menschen mit dem Buch in der Hand, wie der kniende Mensch 
mit gefaltenen Händen die Geste einer anderen Zeit war.”214 Thus, he sees the act of 
reaching for a book as replacing the religious ritual of prayer. But whereas the believer of 
the past could turn to the authority of the priest for an interpretation of God’s will, the 
modern reader is both priest and believer in one. The leveled hierarchies of knowledge 
and the invisibility of cultural leaders has made the individual responsible for finding his 
own orientation:  
Waren sonst Priester, Berechtigte, Auserwählte die Hüter dieser Sitte, jener 
Kenntnis, so ruht dies alles jetzt potentiell in allen: wir könnten manches ins 
Leben werfen, wofern wir ganz zu uns selbst kämen…wir könnten dies und jenes 
wissen…wir könnten dies und jenes tun. Keine eleusinischen Weihen und keine 
sieben Sakramente helfen uns empor: in uns selber müssen wir uns in höheren 
Stand erheben, wo uns dies und jenes zu tun nicht mehr möglich, ja auch dies und 
jenes zu wissen nicht mehr möglich: dafür aber dies und jenes sichtbar, 
verknüpfbar, möglich, ja greifbar, was allen anderen verborgen. Dies alles geht 
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lautlos vor sich und so wie zwischen den Dingen. Es fehlt in unserer Zeit den 
repräsentativen Dingen an Geist, und den geistigen an Relief.215  
 
Hofmannsthal provides a relativistic characterization of the individualistic 
approach to what had been a hierarchy of knowledge, suggesting in very vague terms that 
some possibilities are gained while others are lost, without identifying exactly what these 
gains and losses are. Thus, the gestural character of Hofmannsthal’s language in this 
essay has led some critics to characterize Hofmannsthal’s position vis-à-vis modernity as 
relativistic, even provocatively progressive. For instance, Frank Wood suggests that the 
logical conclusion of the leveling described above is that there is nothing separating the 
reader from the poet.216 By making the reader the poet, Hofmannsthal democratizes the 
figure of the poet, turning him into a capability in everyone, as opposed to conceiving of 
him as a genius who belongs to a class of people apart from the ordinary person.217 
However, based on the cited passage above, one can equally argue, to the contrary, that 
Hofmannsthal is emphasizing ordinary readers’ lack of orientation, and that their task of 
raising themselves to a “höheren Stand” necessitates guidance from the poet, a figure 
who has a higher awareness of the forces shaping a time that is oversaturated with a 
heterogeneity of knowledge and lacking in “repräsentativen Dingen.” I argue that 
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Hofmannsthal actually sees the priesthood of all believers as exacerbating the modern 
individual’s sense that the world is fragmented and incoherent. While he attempts to 
democratize poetry by making it encompass all forms of writing, he resists blurring the 
line between poet and reader. 
In one sense, Frank Wood is right to observe that Hofmannsthal presents a 
democratic conception of the poet. He points out that when “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” 
appeared in the Neue Rundschau in 1907, it “rightly caused a stir among those 
accustomed to hear poetry spoken of as the prerogative of the few, a sixth sense, so to 
speak, bestowed supernaturally.”218 He claims that the author refused “to draw any 
distinctions in a democratic, scientific age between one [intellectual] capacity and 
another.”219 Indeed, in the following passage, Hofmannsthal explicitly says that he 
considers it illiberal to draw strict distinctions between poets and non-poets, or between 
poetry and non-poetry:  
Am wenigsten wüßte ich ihn [den Begriff des Dichters] von vorne herein nach 
unten abzugrenzen, ja diese haarscharfe Absonderung des Dichters vom Nicht-
Dichter erscheint mir gar nicht möglich. Ich würde mir sagen müssen, daß die 
Produkte von Menschen, die kaum Dichter zu nennen sind, manchmal nicht ganz 
des Dichterischen entbehren, und umgekehrt scheint mir zuweilen, das, was sehr 
hohe und unzweifelhafte Dichter geschaffen haben, nicht frei von undichterischen 
Elementen. Es scheint mir in diesen Dingen eine illiberale Auffassung nicht 
möglich und immer ziemlich nah am Lächerlichem.220 
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Hofmannsthal indeed appears to present a liberal understanding of poetry. In this 
essay,221 “Dichtung” is synonymous with literature in the broadest sense: everything from 
the highest form of literature to the daily newspaper is understood by this term. He even 
dismisses the distinction between the “Dichter” and “dem bloßen Schriftsteller” as an 
arrogant practice by those who produce literature.222 By conceiving of poetry in this 
broad sense, Hofmannsthal secures the presence of the poet in all forms of literature. That 
is, the modern reader, regardless of whether he engages with highbrow or lowbrow 
literature, is in contact with the poet and exposed to poetry. Thus, Hofmannsthal aims to 
broaden the public’s understanding of poetry in order to show that the poet is not a 
defunct or out-dated figure, but very much present in his time.  
However, while Hofmannsthal claims that he does not seek to draw strict 
distinctions between poetry and all other forms of writing, or between the poet and the 
writer in a looser sense, he allows himself to expand these terms on the basis of a more 
conservative theory of literature. He presents this theory plainly in this essay, asserting 
that all writing descends directly from the great books of world literatures:  
Alles, was in einer Sprache geschrieben wird und, wagen wir das Wort, alles, was 
in ihr gedacht wird, deszendiert von den Produkten der wenigen, die jemals mit 
dieser Sprache schöpferisch geschaltet haben. Und alles, was man im breitesten 
und wahllosesten Sinn Literatur nennt, bis zum Operntextbuch der vierziger Jahre, 
bis hinunter zum Kolportageroman, alles deszendiert von den wenigen großen 
Büchern der Weltliteratur. Es ist eine erniedrigte, durch zuchtlose Mischungen bis 
zum Grotesken entstellte Deszendenz, aber es ist Deszendenz in direkter Linie.223  
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Hofmannsthal’s expanded and democratized understanding of poetry is, thus, 
based on a hierarchical and essentialist understanding of literature. Rather than saying 
that all forms of writing have a value of their own, Hofmannsthal argues that even the 
lowest form of writing can be regarded as poetry because it carries within it the germ of 
the purest and highest form of literature. Thus, his “genetic” theory about the origins of 
all writing allows Hofmannsthal to remain confident that poetry will not be bastardized to 
the point where it loses its essence. Implicit in this theory is the idea that the continued 
existence and preservation of poetry is not dependent on the modern writer’s creative 
powers. The writer is not so much considered to be the creator of literature, but rather 
conceived of as someone who can channel the world through the medium of language. 
But while Hofmannsthal thus makes poetry largely independent of the writer’s 
creative ability, he does not go so far as to claim that anyone can be the poet. There is a 
confusing tension in this essay between Hofmannsthal’s culturally liberal and 
conservative impulses. His attempt to simultaneously broaden his audience’s 
understanding of poetry (so as to distance it from any pedantic bourgeois conceptions of 
Bildung), on the one hand, and to secure a special status for it, on the other, leads to an 
extremely ambiguous portrayal of the relationship between poet, reader, and literature.  
 
II. Models of Coherence: The Storyteller and the Poet 
 To more fully understand Hofmannsthal’s view regarding the modern reader’s 
unconscious longing for poetry, we must further examine the context in which he sets the 
relationship between poet, reader, and literature. Specifically, Hofmannsthal thinks that 
this relationship is anchored in a historical epoch that is marked by a fundamental 
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indeterminacy and lack of coherence. Part of the problem of even identifying the reader 
or the poet is that they are both anonymous and in a sense unknown to each other – as, 
indeed, people in general are in the modern age. By contrast to his own time, 
Hofmannsthal regards the Middle Ages as a time when there was a collective inner state 
that could be externalized in the form of monumental cathedrals; in the modern age, 
however, the interiority of modern individuals is so vast and so heterogeneous that it is no 
longer possible to agree upon representative metaphors for the innumerable inner realms 
that make up the fragmented modern society: 
Es ist das Wesen dieser Zeit, das nichts, was wirkliche Gewalt hat über die 
Menschen, sich metaphorisch nach außen ausspricht, sondern alles ins Innere 
genommen ist, während etwa die Zeit, die wir das Mittelalter nennen und deren 
Trümmer und Phantome in unsere hineinragen, alles, was sie in sich trug, zu 
einem ungeheuren Dom von Metaphern ausgebildet aus sich ins Freie 
emportrieb.224 
 
Hofmannsthal sees this cleaving apart of the subjective from the objective sphere 
of reality as a central problem of modernity: human beings no longer find themselves – 
find their inwardness – represented in the forms of the material world. As a consequence 
of this separation of the inside and outside realms from each other, reality has taken on a 
spectral quality, as the visible phenomena of the time do not serve as reliable indicators 
of the forces that shape and determine the modern condition. Hofmannsthal, therefore, 
finds that the “Vieldeutigkeit” and “Unbestimmtheit”225 of his time give reality itself an 
incoherent and even chimerical appearance.  
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Given the indeterminate nature of his time, Hofmannsthal asks whether the poet 
still serves as a figure of cultural authority for the broader public. He says of his epoch, 
“Ein leiser chronischer Schwindel vibriert in ihr. Es ist in ihr vieles da, was nur wenigen 
sich ankündigt, und vieles nicht da, wovon viele glauben, es wäre da. So möchten sich 
die Dichter zuweilen fragen, ob sie da sind, ob sie für ihre Epoche denn irgend wirklich 
da sind.”226 Hofmannsthal’s own answer to this question is, perhaps not surprisingly, yes; 
however, this is a qualified affirmation because he cannot deny that all the outward signs 
of his time indicate that the poet is no longer regarded as someone who can shed light on 
his historical period. He observes of the mass reader: “Aber die Sehnsucht dieser, möchte 
es scheinen, geht durchaus nicht auf den Dichter. Es ist der Mann der Wissenschaft, der 
diese Sehnsucht zu stillen vermag, oder für neunzig auf hundert unter ihnen der 
Journalist.”227 These readers are not after poetry, but rather are in search of 
“Zusammenstellungen realer Fakten.”228  
Walter Benjamin makes similar observations about the modern readership’s 
tendency to value facts and journalistic writing over experiences that are transmitted in 
the form of stories. In his essay “Der Erzähler,” Benjamin argues that storytelling is 
replaced altogether with a new form of communication, which he calls “information.” 
Whereas the storyteller used to provide a sense of totality with his story, information is a 
form of communication that intensifies the sense of incoherence characteristic of the 
modern age. Information has its own distinct temporal structure, in the sense that it feeds 
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on what is new and it is relevant for the present moment only: “Die Information hat ihren 
Lohn mit dem Augenblick dahin, in dem sie neu war. Sie lebt nur in diesem Augenblick, 
sie muß sich gänzlich an ihn ausliefern und ohne Zeit zu verlieren sich ihm erklären. 
Anders die Erzählung; sie verausgabt sich nicht.”229 Hofmannsthal similarly finds that the 
masses are suffering from a sense of incoherence and that by turning to journalism and 
science they are looking in the wrong place for a restoration of a coherent sense of reality.  
An important difference, though, between Benjamin and Hofmannsthal is that 
Benjamin sees the disappearance of the storyteller as irreversible. In addition, Benjamin 
is willing to say what the storyteller’s disappearance means for society; in his view, the 
dominance of information indicates that people no longer value accounts of lived 
experience and that modern people have a vastly diminished ability to communicate their 
own experiences. By contrast, Hofmannsthal is not willing to say that the poet has 
disappeared. While he recognizes that the poet has enjoyed greater respect and visibility 
in the past, he argues that the poet’s invisibility in his time indicates that he exercises his 
influence at a subterranean level. Because the modern reader is inundated with 
journalistic and scientific reading material, his desire for enchantment has been buried in 
his unconscious. Most readers, Hofmannsthal argues, are not conscious of what they are 
really looking for; they have no “Übersicht” and lack the “Kraft der 
Zusammenfassung.”230 The only way in which the masses can express what is taking 
place inside of them is through the mute gesture of putting down an opened book and 
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picking up a new one. There is a strange sense in which the only truth that seems to be 
left for human beings to embrace is the truth that they are meaning-seeking creatures:  
Sie suchen immerfort etwas, was ihr Leben mit den Adern des großen Lebens 
verbände in einer zauberhaften Transfusion lebendigen Blutes. Sie suchen in den 
Büchern, was sie einst vor den rauchenden Altären suchten, eins in dämmernden 
von Sehnsucht nach oben gerissenen Kirchen. Sie suchen, was sie stärker als alles 
mit der Welt verknüpfe, und zugleich den Druck der Welt mit eins von ihnen 
nehme. […] Sie suchen in einem Wort, die ganze Bezauberung der Poesie.231 
  
Once again, Hofmannsthal uses the image of religious ritual in order to capture the 
mysterious process by which poetry intensifies the experience of life. The atomistic 
individual seeks to be unified with the cosmos. And it is this experience of unity that 
Hofmannsthal believes poetry can restore to the reader. As Bernhard Böschenstein 
observes, in Hofmannsthal’s essay “wird die Ästhetik des Fin de siècle, die Sprachmagie, 
in den Dienst einer religiösen Funktion gestellt, die nun aber, anders als in früheren 
Jahrhunderten, ihre repräsentative Fassade aufgegeben hat.”232 Poetry can provide a sense 
of coherence, not by linking things together logically, but by providing the reader with 
the feeling that he is part of a greater whole.   
While both of Benjamin’s storyteller and Hofmannsthal’s poet offer their readers 
a feeling of coherence, they create this sense differently. That is, whereas the storyteller 
provides coherence by creating a narrative out of experience, the poet offers an intimation 
of wholeness by throwing into relief the polyvalence and flux of life communicated 
through intangible moods. Hofmannsthal’s poet is someone who, in a sense, cannot string 
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together a narrative out of experience. The poet offers up images, rather than narratives, 
that capture the atmosphere of the present moment, and thereby intensifies the reader’s 
Daseinsgefühl at an unconscious level. The poet does not give concrete form to the 
complex inner state of the modern individual, but he is someone who, through the magic 
of his language, can give the reader a revitalized sense of life, by revealing that the outer 
life of mundane activity and inner realm of inchoate feelings belong together; in other 
words, he provides an antidote to precisely the characteristic problem of the age, 
discussed above. Thus, the poet is a subject who can discern “die Ordnung der Dinge”233 
in a time when phenomena rest on what Hofmannsthal calls “Gleitendes.”234 However, it 
is important not to exaggerate or overestimate the opposition between the storyteller and 
the poet because, as we should recall from the discussed above, for Hofmannsthal there is 
a poetic element in everything that is written.  
III. Metaphorical Conceptions of the Poet 
Although Hofmannsthal insists that the poet has an important presence in modern 
times, it is difficult to tell whether he is ultimately elevating or diminishing the poet’s 
role in society. Perhaps this is because, much as the poet offers images to capture the 
spirit of his age, in “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” Hofmannsthal offers a series of images 
to illuminate the nature of the poet, and these images do not cohere into one clear and 
unified picture. Indeed, I contend that the sheer variety of metaphors that Hofmannsthal 
uses to convey the role of the modern poet suggests that the author himself cannot quite 
explain the poet’s powers. At times it appears that the poet is conceived of as a privileged 
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individual with an almost unnatural sensibility for the essence of his environment and his 
time. Elsewhere, Hofmannsthal describes the poet as a disembodied perceptual organ, 
and again at other times, he is likened to a chameleon-like creature, who adopts the colors 
of his surrounding. In the following section I examine the implications of these various 
metaphoric descriptions of the poet’s place in the world.  
First, Hofmannsthal portrays the poet as a genius who has his finger on the pulse 
of his time. An important source for Hofmannsthal’s essay was Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
essay “The Poet” (1844), and his copy of Emerson’s text is heavily marked. Emerson’s 
description of the poet as a representative subject who has the rare ability to translate the 
language of nature resonated with Hofmannsthal. He underlined the following passage 
from Emerson’s essay: 
The man is only half himself, the other half is his expression. Notwithstanding 
this necessity to be published, adequate expression is rare. I know not how it is 
that we need an interpreter; but the great majority of men seem to be minors, who 
have not yet come into possession of their own, or mutes, who cannot report the 
conversation they have had with nature. 235 
 
Hofmannsthal noted next to this passage, “Menschen bedürfen eines 
Dolmetschers,”236 which suggests that the poet is endowed with an ability that the 
ordinary person does not have. His characterization of the masses suggests that he regards 
them as minors, similar to Emerson. In fact, in “Der Tisch mit den Büchern,” from 1905, 
he compares the modern reader, faced with an overwhelming variety of reading material, 
to a child distracted by the many different games that other children are playing in the 
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park.237 But while he may compare the popular reading public to children, he does not 
present the poet as the rational adult who imparts lessons. In fact, he attempts to construct 
the poet as a passive figure, whose special capacity is to passively listen to and observe 
the world, and then translate into words what has been revealed to him. And yet, we may 
well ask how it can be considered a straightforward act of translation if the poet has 
produced coherence out of incoherence; it would seem that he must have added or 
transformed something, in order to have delivered up a new unity. Thus, while 
Hofmannsthal claims that he does not seek to distinguish between poets and non-poets, in 
the final analysis he does not democratize the figure of the poet but, on the contrary, 
portrays the poet as possessing a genius that he does not share with the ordinary person. 
Furthermore, the poet’s genius consists of his unique understanding of his time, 
and thus it is especially interesting to examine the poet’s own relationship to temporality. 
He is described as a figure who dwells in the house of time: “Seltsam wohnt er im Haus 
der Zeit, unter der Stiege, wo alle an ihm vorüber müssen und keiner ihn achtet.”238 
While the poet is subject to various transformations to his role and nature, brought about 
through the passage of time, there appears at the same time to be something enduring in 
the nature of the poet, which remains constant in all ages. In this sense, Hofmannsthal 
could be said to present both a diachronic and synchronic understanding of the poet. His 
historical account of the poet’s transformed position in modern times involves a 
                                                
237 “Wir sind wie das Kind im Kinderpark, das seine Gouvernante verloren hat. Rechts sind Kinder, 
die spielen Kämmer-Vermieten und freuen sich, aber zu denen gehört es nicht. Links sind Kinder, die 
spielen Blindekuh und freuen sich, aber zu denen gehört es auch nicht. Und wegzulaufen getraut es sich 
nicht, das verlorene Kind, denn im Gebüsch wird es schon dämmerig, und den Wächter zu fragen getraut es 
sich noch weniger, da steht es und schaut hin, und seine Angst und Bangigkeit und die Spiel der anderen 
gehen in seinem Kopf immerfort durcheinander.” GWRA I, 338. 
238 GWRA I, 66. 
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description of manifest historical changes that cover up the actual (or latent) meaning of 
the poet’s changed position in society.  
On the surface level, he explains, it appears that the Jena Romantics were the last 
to have recognized the poet’s cultural leadership. He points out that they used the word 
“Genie” to describe “das dichterische Wesen.”239 However, he finds that they restricted 
the concept of the genius too much by limiting it to refer to artists or poets.240 By contrast, 
he observes that the English have a far broader and grander understanding of the figure of 
the genius because they think of him as a man of action, a vital cultural leader.241 He 
laments, “Dieses Wort ‘Genie,’ wenn man es in unseren Zeitungen findet, in den 
Nekrologen oder Würdigungen von toten Dichtern oder Philosophen, wo es das höchste 
Lob bedeuten soll, so erscheint es mir – ich meine auch dort, wo es an seinem Platz ist – 
undefinierbar dünn, würdelos, kraftlos.”242 In the German cultural realm of the twentieth 
century, however, the word “Dichter” evokes at most institutionalized 
“Bildungsgefühle.”243 What he believes is missing in the modern use of this word is a 
                                                
239 GWRA I, 58. 
240 “Denn sie dachten dabei keineswegs an das Genie der Tat und nie und nimmer hätten sie ihr 
Lieblingswort auf den angewandt, der vor allem würdig war, es zu tragen in seiner funkelndsten und 
unheimlichsten Bedeutung: auf Friedrich den Großen.” GWRA I, 58.  
241 Hofmannsthal says the following about the English understanding of the genius: “Welchen 
lebensvollen und imponierenden Gebrauch macht der Engländer heute, und macht ihn seit sechs 
Generationen, von seinen ‘man of genius.’ Er schränkt ihn nicht auf seine Dichter ein; und doch haftet allen 
denen, von denen er ihn braucht, etwas Dichterisches an, ihnen oder ihren Schicksalen. Er bedenkt sich 
nicht, ihn auch auf einen Mann anzuwenden, der nicht von der allerseltensten geistigen Universalität ist. 
Aber es muß eine Gestalt sein, aus der etwas Außerordentliches hervorblitzt, etwas Unvergleichliches von 
Kühnheit von Glück, von Geisteskraft oder von Hingabe.” GWRA I, 58. He names as examples of such men 
of genius Milton, Nelson, Lord Clive, Samuel Johnson, Byron, Warren Hastings, the younger Pitt, and 
Cecil Rhodes. 
242 GWRA I, 59.  
243 GWRA I, 58. 
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tone that indicates respect and trust: “ein Ton des Zutrauens und der freien 
ungekünstelten Ehrfurcht, eine Betonung dessen, was Männer an Männern am höchsten 
stellen müssen: Führerschaft.”244 Of course, the word “Führerschaft” has an ominous ring, 
especially in the post World War II context. However, Hofmannsthal does not argue that 
the poet commands the kind of respect that charismatic leaders like Friedrich der Große 
do; instead, he explains that the poet exercises his power from a much humbler place.  
The poet is portrayed as someone who has a privileged perspective on life 
because he has no material stake in it. Unlike Lord Chandos, for instance, who is part of 
the landowning gentry, the poet in the 20th century has lost his social status and appears 
like an anonymous beggar. The modern poet lives an anonymous existence, which 
Hofmannsthal calls “[das] unerkannte Wohnen im eigenen Haus, unter der Stiege im 
Dunkel, bei den Hunden.”245 He likens the modern poet specifically to the figure of Holy 
Alexius from Gesta Romanorum, a prince who has returned home after many years of 
absence and, because he is not recognized by his family, is reduced to living like a beggar 
under the stairs to his own house. Thus, two things must be noted: First, the anonymous 
beggar is at the same time an aristocrat, who is simply not recognized as such; we might 
see in this metaphor, then, the poet’s dispossession on the level of appearances, in a 
modern world which longs for poetry only unconsciously and no longer explicitly 
recognizes the importance of the poet. Second, it is precisely the anonymity from which 
the poet suffers which allows him to have an aesthetic perception of his environment that 
is marked by a certain kind of disinterest.  
                                                
244 GWRA I, 59. 
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Claudia Bamberg suggests that “Besitzlosigkeit” characterizes the modern poet.246 
What Bamberg overlooks, however, is that by depicting the poet as a beggar-prince 
Hofmannsthal makes the double move of bringing the poet closer to the ordinary person, 
while keeping him apart from the plebs through his aristocratic standing.247 Thus, the 
poet may not command public respect and may live like a homeless pauper, yet his 
hidden aristocratic origin entitles him to a privileged hold on the world at least in another 
sense. That is, although Bamberg is right to observe that the modern poet, like Rilke’s 
Malte, is someone who is “besitzlos” in a conventional sense, Hofmannsthal actually 
redefines the idea of Besitz. While describing the poet as a person with no right to 
property, Hofmannsthal repeatedly uses the verb “besitzen” to characterize the poet’s 
hold on the world:  
[...] als ein Lebendiger gestoßen von der letzten Magd und gewiesen zu den 
Hunden; und ohne Amt in diesem Haus, ohne Dienst, ohne Recht, ohne Pflicht, 
als nur zu lungern und zu liegen und in sich dies alles auf einer unsichtbaren 
Waage abzuwiegen, dies alles besitzen wie niemals ein Hausherr sein Haus besitzt 
– denn besitzt der die Finsternis, die nachts auf der Stiege liegt, besitzt er die 
Frechheit des Koches, den Hochmut des Stallmeisters, die Seufzer der niedrigsten 
Magd? Er aber, der gespenstisch im Dunkeln liegt, besitzt alles dies; denn jedes 
                                                
246 Claudia Bamberg, Hofmannsthal: Der Dichter und die Dinge (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag 
Winter, 2011), 63. 
247 Theodor Adorno found Hofmannsthal’s claim to outsider status hypocritical. That is, Adorno 
asserts that Hofmannsthal never produced an outsider perspective through his writing because he was not 
genuinely bothered by the relationship between culture and economy: “Transzendenz zur Gesellschaft 
beansprucht auch Hofmannsthal, und der Gedanke an Outsidertum ist dem nicht fremd, der seine Society 
fingieren muß. Aber es ist ein konziliantes Outsidertum, zu verliebt in sich selber, um den anderen ernsthaft 
böse zu sein.” Adorno then quotes Hofmannsthal, saying, “Ich hatte von der Kindheit an ein fieberhaftes 
Bestreben, dem Geist unserer verworrenen Epoche auf den verschiedensten Wegen, in den verschiedensten 
Verkleidungen beizukommen.” Adorno passes the following judgment on Hofmannsthal’s drive to 
encounter the spirit of his epoch in different disguises: “Der Trieb zur Verkleidung, in prästabilierter 
Harmonie auf der Erfordernisse des Marktes eingestimmt, ist der des Schauspielers.” (Theodor Adorno, 
“George und Hofmannsthal: Zum Briefwechsel,” in Prismen, Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), 249-50.  
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von diesen ist eine offene Wunde an seiner Seele und glüht einmal als ein 
Karfunkelstein an seinem himmlischen Gewand.248 
 
What the poet may lack, then, in material possessions and social rights, he makes up for 
in sensual possessions. He sees and hears all the unselfconscious activities that the owner 
of the house never gets to see.  
The passage just cited lends itself in addition to a psychoanalytical reading 
inasmuch as the house can be regarded as a metaphor for human consciousness, where 
the movements within the murky unconscious (the gruff and disgruntled exchanges in the 
servants’ quarters) are more telling than what happens on the conscious level (the 
master’s quarters). Because the poet has no stakes and sees the activities inside the house 
from an unseen place, his perception is unobstructed by his own entanglement in inter-
subjective relations. However, the Kantian idea that the aesthetic moment gives rise to an 
experience of detached pleasure does not quite map onto the modern poet’s experience.249 
That is, while the poet’s aesthetic experience is made possible by the fact that he cannot 
make social, political, or material claims, the pleasure that he draws from the aesthetic 
perception of his environment is not a detached, intellectual one. On the contrary, his 
response to the world turns out to be primarily physical and affective, and he grasps his 
surroundings through instinct rather than by means of the intellect. Thus although the 
poet is distanced from the world around him in the sense that he is not recognized and 
                                                
248 GWRA I, 66-67. 
249 “Die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit kann nur vermittelst der Beziehung des Mannigfaltigen auf einen 
bestimmten Zweck, also nur durch einen Begriff erkannt werden. Hieraus allein schon erhellt, daß das 
Schöne, dessen Beurteilung eine bloß formale Zweckmäßigkeit, d.i. eine Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, 
zum Grunde hat, von der Vorstellung des Guten ganz unabhängig sei, weil das letztere eine objektive 
Zweckmäßigkeit, d.i. die Beziehung des Gegenstandes auf einen bestimmten Zweck, voraussetzt.” 
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Heiner F. Klemme (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006), 79. 
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integrated by others, his own mode of relation to the world is much more one of empathic 
connection and even identification; Hofmannsthal introduces further metaphors in order 
to develop this aspect of the poet’s nature. 
The poet has an immediate, almost animalistic, relation to the world. As Schorske 
points out, in his search for a way out of the hermetic temple of art, Hofmannsthal 
discovered instinct as a link to the outer world. He saw “art as the awakener of 
instinct.”250 To convey the poet’s instinctual relationship to the world, Hofmannsthal 
likens the poet to a chameleon-like figure who takes on the colors of his surroundings:  
Er ist da und wechselt lautlos seine Stelle und ist nichts als Auge und Ohr und 
nimmt seine Farbe von den Dingen, auf denen er ruht. Er ist der Zuseher, nein, 
der versteckte Genosse, der lautlose Bruder aller Dinge, und das Wechseln seiner 
Farbe ist eine innige Qual: denn er leidet allen Dingen, und indem er in ihnen 
leidet, genießt er sie.251  
 
By describing the poet as a creature that absorbs the colors of its environment, 
Hofmannsthal emphasizes that the mimetic process by which the poet relates to the world 
is not self-conscious but rather instinctual and almost automatic. Furthermore, he strips 
the poet of his individuality by presenting him as the perceptual organs of his time. That 
is, the poet’s perceptions are not thought to be his own, but those of his time. Once again, 
however, we are reminded that the impersonal nature of the poet’s perceptions do not 
result from an emotional detachment from the world. For this reason Hofmannsthal is not 
satisfied to describe the poet as a mere “Zuseher,” but corrects himself and calls the poet 
instead “der versteckte Genosse” and “lautlose Bruder aller Dinge,” who draws pleasure 
from his suffering. The poet’s impersonal perceptions are thus grounded in empathy. This 
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peculiar relationship to the world is not unlike Schopenhauer’s idea that, at bottom, the 
self forms a unity with the world. Borrowing from the Upanishads, he called this unity 
tat tvam asi, meaning “You are that.”252 Thus, because the self and the cosmos form a 
unity, the suffering of the other is the suffering of the self. According to Hofmannsthal, 
the poet cannot help but suffer every feeling, reality, and fantasy that passes through him: 
“Dies Leidend-Genießen, dies ist der ganze Inhalt seines Lebens.”253 The poet’s suffering 
and enjoyment, however, are not his own, for what he feels and perceives is simply 
reflective of the space and time that he inhabits.  
A similar understanding of the poet’s role is suggested by Hofmannsthal’s 
comparison of the poet to the seismograph. Through this analogy Hofmannsthal conveys 
the idea that the poet’s words are not merely subjective expressions:  
Er ist der Ort, an dem die Kräfte der Zeit einander auszugleichen verlangen. Er 
gleicht dem Seismographen, den jedes Beben, und wäre es auf Tausende von 
Meilen, in Vibrationen versetzt. Es ist nicht, daß er unaufhörlich an alle Dinge der 
Welt dächte. Aber sie denken an ihn. Sie sind in ihm, so beherrschen sie ihn. 
Seine dumpfen Stunden selbst, seine Depressionen, seine Verworrenheiten sind 
unpersönliche Zustände, sie gleichen den Zuckungen des Seismographen, und ein 
Blick, der tief genug wäre, könnte in ihnen Geheimnisvolleres lesen als in seinen 
Gedichten.254 
 
The impersonal metaphors for the poet are striking. Hofmannsthal calls the poet the 
location where the forces of his time come together to find equilibrium. The comparison 
of the poet to the seismograph is especially revealing. First, by comparing the poet to a 
mechanical instrument, the author connects the poet’s sensitivity to the world with the 
                                                
252 Karl Albert, Lebensphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bei Nietzsche bis zu ihrer Kritik bei Lukacs 
(Freiburg, Breisgau: Verlag Karl Alber, 1995), 35. 
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notion of scientific accuracy. Second, the seismograph, like the poet, performs the act of 
reading and writing. The “writing” that the seismograph produces is an impersonal 
expression of the “reading” of the vibrations in the ground. Similarly, the poet’s 
subjectivity is in essence impersonal because his being is like a sensor for his time; thus, 
poetry is not the projection of the poetic subject’s feelings, but rather more like a record 
of the fluctuating movements of time. Significantly, the accuracy of the poet’s reading of 
his time is not produced through an objective, scientific analysis of phenomena, but 
through a physical and an emotional sensitivity to his time.  
Claudia Bamberg points out that the poet’s hypersensitivity to every small detail 
in his environment recalls the realist projects of nineteenth-century writers like Gottfried 
Keller, Honoré de Balzac, and Adalbert Stifter, all of whom Hofmannsthal admired and 
also wrote about. The realists found it important to pay attention to every detail in their 
environment in order to reproduce, in their writing, an objective perspective on life. The 
question for them, as for Hofmannsthal, was: From what perspective can one have an 
accurate picture of reality? Bamberg remarks that they too conceived of the artist as an 
outsider, with this outsider perspective allowing the artist to have a privileged perspective 
on life. That is, the realist artist is someone who can have an objective perception of the 
order of things because he is, in one sense, at a remove from it. However, Bamberg 
observes that in Hofmannsthal’s “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” the poet’s dwelling place 
“unter der Stiege” positions him too close to the things around him for him to be able to 
have a distanced, objective perspective on them. For Hofmannsthal, then, relative to the 
realists, the poet’s relationship to the world has shifted. That is, while the relationship 
between the artist and the world for a realist writer like Keller is one of “Distanzierung,” 
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for the poet in Hofmannsthal’s “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” it is that of 
“Identifikation.”255  
Bamberg does not mention, however, another important difference between 
Keller and Hofmannsthal. While Keller captures the details of everyday life in order to 
shed light on the social and material conditions of life, for Hofmannsthal the details of 
reality are like hieroglyphs that symbolically point to the metaphysical ground of life. 
Thus, for Hofmannsthal the aim of literature is not to make the reader conscious of the 
problematic material conditions of his or her life, but rather to meet the spiritual needs of 
the modern individual by giving coherent form to the inarticulate existential feelings that 
the ordinary person struggles to externalize. Hofmannsthal argues that poets belong to the 
few “die zu leben vermögen in einer Luft, die von der Eiseskälte des unendlichen 
Raumes beleckt wird,”256 but he finds that the many neither have the ability nor the desire 
to expose themselves to the “Frost der Ewigkeit.”257 They long for “die verknüpfenden 
Gefühle; die Weltgefühle, die Gedankengefühle,”258 which he believes only the poet (and 
not the scientist) can provide. He reasons, “Denn Dichten, das Wort steht irgendwo in 
Hebbels Tagebüchern, Dichten heißt die Welt wie einen Mantel um sich schlagen und 
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sich wärmen.”259 And it is of this “Wärme,” this feeling-thinking produced by poetry, that 
the masses want to partake.260  
The idea that literature should primarily target the emotional life of the reader, 
however, is not without controversy; already Plato thought that poetry and art can be 
dangerous because of their ability to move people and produce strong emotions that 
prevent the audience from thinking critically and clearly.261 But Hofmannsthal makes it 
clear that he is reacting against the surplus of reason, which he regards as the cause for 
the fragmentation of reality and the alienation from which the modern individual suffers. 
Hofmannsthal was not principally interested in resolving the contradictions of material 
existence, as, for instance, Marx was. From a Marxist perspective, Hofmannsthal’s 
“solution” to the alienation of the individual appears far from satisfactory. Rather than 
using literature to heighten the working-class reader’s awareness of the material and 
social inequalities that underpin his or her life, and thereby kindling the feelings of 
injustice that would move the reader to transform his or her reality through political 
action, literature as Hofmannsthal conceives it serves merely as a spiritual balm for the 
many who live as cogs in the wheels of the industrial economy.262 However, 
                                                
259 GWRA I, 65. 
260 “Und an dieser Wärme wollen sie teilhaben und darum sind es die Trümmer des Dichterischen, 
nach denen sie haschen, wo sie der Wissenschaft zu huldigen meinen; nach fühlendem Denken, denkendem 
Fühlen steht ihr Sinn, nach Vermittlung dessen, was die Wissenschaft in grandioser Entsagung als 
unvermittelbar hinnimmt. Sie aber suchen den Dichter und nennen ihn nicht.” GWRA I, 65-66. 
261 Littau, 87. 
262 Interestingly, Siegfried Kracauer articulates a similar criticism in “Über Erfolgsbücher und ihr 
Publikum,” one of the essays in Das Ornament der Masse, which was first published in 1927. He is highly 
critical of books that cater to the popular demand for emotional stimulation because he believes that it 
hinders the readers from thinking critically and simply makes them resigned to the status quo. He observes: 
“Der Mittelstand und überhaupt die verarmten Massen verlangen statt des teuren Abstandes Herz, das 
kostenfrei ist. Das Gefühl ist alles, wenn alles andere fehlt. Es vermenschlicht die Tragik, ohne sie 
 131 
Hofmannsthal anticipates such criticism, saying, “Ich höre manchmal im Gespräch oder 
in einer Zeitung klagen, daß einzelnes, was des Schilderns wert wäre, von den Dichtern 
unserer Zeit nicht geschildert werde, z.B. die Inhalte mancher Industrien oder 
dergleichen.”263 He counters this criticism with the claim that the poet will be drawn to 
any form of life, including modern industries, wherein he perceives “die unendliche 
Symbolhaftigkeit der Materie.”264 He believes that the unique power and task of the poet 
is to communicate the symbolic dimension of material reality, wherein the interrelation of 
things (“Gewebe von Dingen”) is revealed in a holistic manner. Thus, the poet’s aim is 
not to isolate and focus on one aspect of modern life, but to show how the multiplicity of 
phenomena, be they material or imaginary, are like innumerable particles that cohere into 
a whole. Hofmannsthal reasons, “Denn ihm [dem Dichter] sind Menschen und Dinge und 
Gedanken und Träume völlig eins.” 265 The poet in a sense does not reject the materiality 
of life, but rather converts it into something higher.266 
 
IV. An Unanswered Question: Who Is the Reader? 
The question remains, however, as to how exactly the poet can communicate his 
unique insights to the casual reader, who does not consciously recognize that his or her 
                                                                                                                                            
aufzuheben, und nebelt die Kritik ein, die der Konservierung überalteter Gehalte gefährlich werden 
könnte.” Siegfried Kracauer, “Über Erfolgsbücher und ihr Publikum,” in Das Ornament der Masse 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977), 72. 
263 GWRA I, 69-70. 
264 GWRA I, 70. 
265 GWRA I, 67.  
266 As Frank Wood points out, “Hofmannsthal inclines to invest sociological problems with a dress of 
orphic mysticism or orthodox Christianity,” 261. 
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insatiable appetite for reading material is indicative of an unconscious longing for the 
enchantment of poetry. In this concluding section of this chapter, I demonstrate that while 
Hofmannsthal may offer analogies for the various ways in which one can think about the 
relationship between the modern poet and the reader, he ultimately provides only a 
negative understanding of how the poet and the reader relate to one another.  
Hofmannsthal acknowledges that the relationship between the poet and the 
modern reader is irreversibly changed and that it needs to be understood within its own 
historical context. He speaks in vague terms, however, about how modernity has 
transformed the experiences of the poet, which in turn has changed the experience of the 
individual for whom the poet writes:    
Ein ungeheurer Prozeß hat das Erlebnis des Dichters neu geprägt und damit 
zugleich das Erlebnis jenes, um dessen Willen der Dichter da ist: des einzelnen. 
Der Dichter und der, für den Gedichtetes da ist, sie gleichen beide nicht mehr 
denselben Figuren aus irgendwelcher vergangenen Epoche. Ich will nicht sagen, 
wieweit sie mehr dem Priester und dem Gläubigen zu gleichen scheinen oder dem 
Geliebten und dem Liebenden nach dem Sinne Platons oder dem Zauberer und 
dem Bezauberten. Denn diese Vergleiche verdecken soviel als sie enthüllen von 
einem unfaßlichen Verhältnis, in dem die so verschiedenen Magien aller dieser 
Verhältnisse sich mischen mit noch anderen namenlosen Elementen, die dem 
heutigen Tag allein gehören.267 
 
Hofmannsthal suggests that the relationship between the poet and the reader could be 
likened to the rapport between the priest and the believer, the lover and the beloved, or 
the magician and the enchanted, yet he states explicitly that he does not want to say to 
what extent these comparisons actually apply to the poet and the modern reader, because 
he ultimately perceives theirs to be a relationship that is in a state of flux, as too many 
nameless new elements have entered into it. These imperfect analogies nonetheless 
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reflect the author’s understanding of the conceptual shifts that the figure of the poet and 
the reader have undergone over the course of history. That is, the relationship between 
the magician and the enchanted can be regarded as figuratively referring to the pre-
classical period; that between the lover and the beloved, the classical age; and that 
between the priest and the believer, the Christian era. As different as the above-
mentioned relationships may be from one another, however, a dynamic common to all of 
them reflects how Hofmannsthal conceives of the connection between the reader and the 
poet: The reader, represented in the figures of the believer, the enchanted, and the 
beloved, seeks to understand forces that are beyond the realm of rational explanation. The 
poet, represented by the priest, the magician, and the lover, is regarded as someone with a 
unique understanding of these forces and with the ability to mediate them.  
But whereas in the past these mysterious forces were thought to belong to an 
other-wordly sphere, in the modern era, Hofmannsthal sees them emanating from the 
Diesseits. It is the realm of everyday life, rapidly and radically transformed through the 
forces of modernity, that has become an enigma to the modern subject. Hofmannsthal 
calls modernity “ein ungeheurer Prozeß” that has changed the poet’s experiences, and in 
turn those of his reader. That is, while in the past the poet was able to offer “in 
begriffliche Formeln gezogene Summe” of his time,268 the kind of synthesis that the 
modern poet offers the reader does not immediately appear as a synthesis, because what 
he does is bring the reader face to face with the chaotic phenomenal flux that 
characterizes the modern age. The “order of things” that Hofmannsthal perceives in the 
phenomenal flux of his time is a secular order. The secular nature of his understanding 
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becomes even more apparent when we compare his view to Emerson’s, whose essay 
“The Poet,” as mentioned earlier, informed Hofmannsthal’s reflections in “Der Dichter 
und diese Zeit.” We can see in the passage below that Emerson already found it necessary 
to address the question of how modern developments fit into the poet’s worldview: 
Readers of poetry see the factory-village, and the railway, and fancy that the 
poetry of the landscape is broken up by these; for these works of art are not yet 
consecrated in their reading; but the poet sees them fall within the great Order not 
less than the bee-hive, or the spider’s geometrical web. Nature adopts them very 
fast into her vital circles, and the gliding train of cars she loves like her own.269 
 
In many ways, Hofmannsthal’s belief that the poet perceives unity in the 
multiplicity of modern phenomena echoes the idea expressed by Emerson in the passage 
above. But whereas Emerson believed that this unity was guaranteed by a divine order, 
for Hofmannsthal the order of things originates from life itself. That is, Emerson’s 
essentially religious interpretation of the origin of the cosmic unity is replaced by 
Hofmannsthal with a more thoroughly secular mystical understanding. As Wolfdietrich 
Rasch points out, many writers at the turn of the twentieth century turned to a kind of 
neo-mysticism, “eine säkularisierte, innenweltliche Mystik ohne Gott – präzise zu 
bezeichnen als Lebensmystik.”270 
Another important difference between the poet of the past and of Hofmannsthal’s 
present is that the modern poet no longer appears to be the one acting upon the passive 
reader. As Hofmannsthal elaborates on the way in which reader and poet encounter one 
                                                
269 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Poet,” in The Annotated Emerson, ed. David Mikics (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2012), 209. 
270 Wolfdietrich Rasch, “Aspekte der deutschen Literatur um 1900,” in Zur deutschen Literatur seit 
der Jahrhundertwende: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagungsbuchhandlung, 1967), 
22. 
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another in modern times, it is the reader who, in a limited sense, at least, appears as active, 
and the poet as passive. Because in the modern age the poet’s presence is textual and not 
physical – in other words, because the contact between the poet and the reader is 
mediated through books – in order to be present for his time, the poet depends on the 
reader to find him in books and thereby ensure his existence. Hofmannsthal describes this 
interdependence between the poet and the reader in the following way: 
Aber dies unfaßliche Verhältnis ist da. Das Buch ist da voll seiner Gewalt über 
die Seele, über die Sinne. [...] Das Buch ist da und in ihm der Inbegriff der 
Weisheiten und der Inbegriff der Verführung. Es liegt da und schweigt und redet 
und ist um soviel zweideutiger, gefährlicher, geheimnisvoller, als alles 
zweideutiger, gefährlicher, geheimnisvoller ist in dieser über alle Maßen 
unfaßlichen, dieser im höchsten Sinne poetischen Zeit. [...] Aber sie sind in der 
Hand eines jeden etwas anderes, und sie leben erst, wenn sie mit einer lebendigen 
Seele zusammenkommen. Sie reden nicht, sondern sie antworten, dies macht 
Dämonen aus ihnen.271 
 
On the one hand, the author seems to acknowledge that in a highly literate age, 
the poet no longer has a physical presence and is instead embodied by the words on the 
printed page; on the other hand, he describes the book as though it were an oral 
phenomenon. That is, the book personifies the poet and it is described as though it were 
in an oral dialogue with the reader: in the passage just quoted, the book keeps silent and it 
speaks. The act of reading is described as a meeting between living souls.  
However, while Hofmannsthal acknowledges that it is the reader who brings the 
book to speak, he resists making the reader the active producer of meaning. In fact, the 
last line of the above-cited passage indicates that the book speaks with an authority and 
an understanding of life that the reader does not have. He claims that books do not simply 
speak, but they “answer,” like daemons from Greek mythology. Curiously, it is neither 
                                                
271 Rasch, 77. 
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because the words on the printed page have a life of their own, independent of the author, 
nor because each reader draws his own unique interpretation out of books, but rather 
because books channel the voice of the poet who reveals the ambiguity, the danger, and 
mystery of the modern epoch, that books are “zweideutiger, gefährlicher, geheimnisvoller” 
than ever before. Thus, although Hofmannsthal emphasizes that the poet needs the reader 
in order to be heard in his time, he still regards the reader as quite purely the receiver of 
the meaning written into the text by the author.  
Moreover, not every reader is equipped to hear the voice of the poet. 
Hofmannsthal concedes in the concluding pages of his essay, “Ich kann nur für die reden, 
für die Gedichtetes da ist,”272 and in the following paragraph he speaks of the individual 
“der das Erlebnis des Lesenden kennt.”273  But who are these individuals for whom 
poetry exists? Here we have arrived back at the question that Hofmannsthal himself 
asked in his description of his plan to write an essay entitled “Der Leser”: “wer sind die, 
in denen das Gedicht lebt, durch die es durch die Zeit getragen wird”?274 While 
Hofmannsthal claims, at the beginning of “Der Dichter und diese Zeit,” that poetry lives 
in all those who yearn for enchantment, including the undiscriminating popular reader, in 
the concluding pages of his essay Hofmannsthal modifies his argument by presenting us 
with an ideal reader, who does not resemble the general, unreflective reading public; he 
asserts that poetry lives in those who, like the poet, have the disposition of a believer.275 
                                                
272 Rasch, 79. 
273 Rasch, 80. 
274 SW 31, 337. 
275 “Ich sage “glauben” und ich sage es in einem tieferen Sinn, als in dem es, fürchte ich, in der Hast 
dieser ihrem Ende zustrebenden Rede zu Ihnen hinklingt. Ich meine es nicht als Sich-Verlieren in der 
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That is, like a religious believer, the reader of poetry, does not read for distraction or for 
information, but he is driven by a desire to share in an epiphanic vision of the cosmic 
connection between things.  
This reader, Hofmannsthal claims, does not wait for a single great poet to emerge 
like a herald, but instead, is conscious that by exposing himself to a multiplicity of poetic 
visions, he is already participating, alongside many other anonymous readers, in the task 
of discerning coherence within the chaotic flux of his time.276 Furthermore, this reader is 
capable of distinguishing between poetic and non-poetic books: 
Die einzige Unterscheidung, die [der Leser] fällt ist die zwischen dichterischen 
Büchern und den unzähligen anderen Büchern, den sonderbaren Geburten der 
Nachahmung und der Verworrenheit. Aber auch in ihnen noch ehrt er die Spur 
des dichterischen Geistes und die Möglichkeit, daß aus ihnen in ganz junge, ganz 
rohe Seelen ein Strahl sich senke.277 
 
Clearly, this ideal reader is not part of the modern crowd of undiscerning readers that 
Hofmannsthal identified at the beginning of his essay. In the end, it no longer seems 
sufficient for the reader to have an unconscious yearning for poetry in order for the poet 
to exist in his time. The ideal reader knows to look for him consciously. What causes the 
                                                                                                                                            
phantastischen Bezauberung des Gedichteten, als ein Vergessen des eigenen Daseins über dem Buche, eine 
kurze und schale Faszination. Es ist das Gegenteil, was ich zu sagen meinte: ich dachte das Wort in der 
ganzen Tiefe seines Sinnes zu nehmen. In seiner vollen religiösen Bedeutung meine ich es: als ein 
Führwahrhalten und Ergriffensein in tiefster Seele, ein Ausruhen im Wirbel des Daseins.” GWRA I, 78. 
276 “Denn in ihm und seinesgleichen, an tausend verborgenen Punkten vollzieht sich diese Synthese: 
und da er sich bewußt ist, die Zeit in sich zu tragen, einer zu sein wie alle, einer für alle, ein Mensch, ein 
einzelner und ein Symbol zugleich, so dünkt ihm, daß wo er trinkt, auch das Dürsten der Zeit sich stillen 
muß. Ja, indem er der Vision sich hingibt und zu glauben vermag an das, was ein Dichter ihn schauen läßt 
[…] indem er an solchem innersten Gebilde der Zeit die Beglückung erlebt, sein Ich sich selber gleich zu 
fühlen und sicher zu schweben im Sturz des Daseins, entschwindet ihm der Begriff der Zeit und Zukunft 
geht ihm wie Vergangenheit in einzige Gegenwart herüber.” GWRA I, 80-81. 
277 GWRA I, 80. 
 138 
unconscious longing for poetry to be elevated to a conscious search, however, 
Hofmannsthal never makes quite clear.  
In the next chapter I examine Hofmannsthal’s problematic politicized answer to 
the question that he left unanswered in “Der Dichter und diese Zeit.” In “Das Schrifttum 
als geistiger Raum der Nation,” from 1927, Hofmannsthal provides a nationalist answer 
to the problem of anonymity that prevents the ordinary mass consumer of literature from 
recognizing the cultural Führerschaft of the poet. He does this by reconceptualizing the 
anonymous mass readers in nationalist terms, as constituting a Volk, and the literary 
writer as a genius figure who has an intuitive ability to find and give expression to the 
spirit of the nation. 
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Chapter 5: Hofmannsthal’s Political Turn 
“Der Dichter und diese Zeit” was Hofmannsthal’s most sustained attempt to 
define theoretically a language with which the poet could speak to the many; ultimately, 
Hofmannsthal failed in this text to provide a satisfying way to bridge the gap between the 
transcendent and the everyday, the poet and his time. Although he then turned away from 
the task of theoretically defining the problem, however, he continued to be preoccupied 
with it. Hofmannsthal’s reflections on the relationship between the poet and the people 
became politicized through the First World War, as he began to reconceive the 
anonymous readers as das Volk and the poet as a cultural-political leader. In this chapter I 
examine the conspicuous discrepancy between the hopeful cultural-political vision 
Hofmannsthal expresses, in his role as a public speaker, in “Das Schrifttum als geistiger 
Raum der Nation,” on the one hand, and the nihilistic political vision he offers in his last 
drama, Der Turm, on the other. I argue that the contradiction presented by a juxtaposition 
of these two works communicates the author’s profound doubts about the possibility that 
the poet and the people could form an organic unity. In this chapter I contend, 
furthermore, that Hofmannsthal risked playing the role of a false prophet by suppressing 
his doubts in his statements as a public intellectual. 
I. The Seekers as Finders in “Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation”  
Hofmannsthal argues that language itself has a healing power and that it is the 
task of the writers and thinkers of the German nation, whom he calls “die Suchenden,” to 
reveal the unifying Geist within the German language. In “Das Schrifttum als geistiger 
Raum der Nation,” also known as the Münchner Rede, which he delivered at the 
University of München in 1927, Hofmannsthal returns to the question of the writer’s role 
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in his time. This time, however, the experience of the First World War is evident in the 
background, and the search for coherence through literature has taken on a nationalistic 
coloring that it did not have in 1906, the year he published “Der Dichter und diese Zeit.” 
In “Das Schrifttum als Geistiger Raum der Nation,” the author argues that more than the 
geographic space that a people inhabit, it is the national language that binds people into a 
community.278 He sees a people’s language as an expression of the “Geist der Nation”279 
and believes that the written word plays an important role in the transmission of this 
national spirit.  
As Oliver Tekolf points out, by “Nation” Hofmannsthal does not mean the 
German nation-state, but rather the German-language cultural realm, which includes 
Austria: “Mit Nation meint Hofmannsthal kein staatspolitisches Gebilde, sondern eine in 
der Sprache und der Literatur (“Schrifttum”) verbundene Gemeinschaft.”280 While 
Hofmannsthal had already taken a very broad view of literature in “Der Dichter und diese 
Zeit,” in the Münchner Rede he explains that he uses the word “Schrifttum” (the written 
word) because he believes that it better communicates that he is referring to all forms of 
writing: 
so reden wir vom Schrifttum und meinen damit nicht nur den Wust von Büchern, 
den heute kein einzelner mehr bewältig, sondern Aufzeichnungen aller Art, wie 
sie zwischen den Menschen hin und her gehen, den nur für einen oder wenige 
                                                
278 “Nicht durch unser Wohnen auf dem Heimatboden, nicht durch unsere leibliche Berührung in 
Handel und Wandel, sondern durch ein geistiges Anhangen vor allem sind wir zur Gemeinschaft 
verbunden. […] In einer Sprache finden wir uns zueinander, die völlig etwas anderes ist als das bloße 
natürliche Verständigungsmittel […] wir ahnen dahinter ein Etwas waltend, das wir den Geist der Nation 
zu nennen uns getrauen.” GWRA III, 24. 
279 GWRA III, 24. 
280 Tekolf, 371; see also Nikolaus, 165-170 and Oswalt von Nostitz, “Zur Interpretation von 
Hofmannsthals Münchner Rede,” in Für Rudolf Hirsch zum siebzigsten Geburtstag am 22. Dezember 1975 
(Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1975), 262. 
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bestimmten Brief, die Denkschrift, desgleichen auch die Anekdote, das 
Schlagwort, das politische oder geistige Glaubensbekenntnis, wie es das 
Zeitungsblatt bringt, lauter Formen, die ja zuzeiten sehr wirksam werden 
können.281 
 
He finds that the word “Literatur” is a divisive term, which immediately evokes a 
separation between the cultured and uncultured: “Das Wort Literatur bezeichnet wohl 
annähernd das gleiche, aber es ist uns zweideutiger in seinem Klang: der unglückliche 
Riß in unserem Volk zwischen Gebildeten und Ungebildeten tritt uns gleich ins 
Gefühl.”282 Hofmannsthal argues that the very separation between Schrifttum and 
Literatur is reflective of a dividedness in the German nation. He portrays France as a 
counter-model to Germany, arguing that it is possible to speak of literature in France 
without evoking a separation between the cultured and uncultured. In other words, there 
is no separation between Schrifttum and literature in France because all written 
expression of the French language is recognized by the French people as organically 
partaking in a well-established literary tradition, which communicates the coherent spirit 
of a unified people. Even the genius and individuality of the French writers does not 
separate them from this unity; the works that constitute the French literary tradition, 
according to Hofmannsthal, do not strive to stand apart from this tradition, but to be an 
expression of its evolution.283 Significantly, the French literary tradition, which 
Hofmannsthal dates back to the Renaissance period, does not have a life apart from 
                                                
281 GWRA III, 24. 
282 GWRA III, 24. 
283 “Mode belebt die Tradition, Tradition adelt die Mode. Innerhalb solchen beharrenden Wechsels ist 
der Ehrgeiz nicht darauf gerichtet, abzustechen, sondern: die traditionellen Forderungen zu erfüllen. [...] 
Die Blüte dieser Tendenz ist die Sprachnorm, welche die Nation zusammenhält und innerhalb ihrer dem 
Spiel widerstreitender Tendenzen – der aristokratischen wie der nivellierenden, der revolutionären wie der 
konservativen – Raum gewährt.” GWRA III, 25. 
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French social and political life, but rather is the very expression of the French socio-
political reality. Thus, Hofmannsthal concludes: 
Die Literatur der Franzosen verbürgt ihnen ihre Wirklichkeit. Wo geglaubte 
Ganzheit des Daseins ist – nicht Zerrissenheit –, dort ist Wirklichkeit. Die Nation, 
durch ein unzerreißbares Gewebe des Sprachlich-Geistigen zusammengehalten, 
wird Glaubensgemeinschaft, in der das Ganze des natürlichen und kultürlichen 
Lebens einbeschlossen ist.284  
 
But where Hofmannsthal sees unity and coherence in France, he sees disunity and 
incoherence in Germany. He asserts, “Wir haben eine Literatur im uneigentlichen, 
konventionellen Sinne, die aufzählbar, aber nicht wahrhaft repräsentativ noch 
traditionsbildend ist.”285 Instead of a true literary tradition, Hofmannsthal says, 
Germany’s leading intellectuals and literary giants are lonely figures dispersed across 
vastly different regions of the country, making it difficult to identify them as a 
community. And yet, he believes that these writers do form a community of “Suchende,” 
a term he borrows from Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, where Nietzsche 
opposes “die Suchenden” to the “Bildungsphilister.”286 These so-called seekers are 
brought together by their common search for the hidden spiritual unity of the German 
nation. They form a “Nation der Einzelnen.”287 They are those who reject the smug self-
                                                
284 GWRA III, 27. 
285 GWRA III, 29. 
286 “[…] daß ich sie Suchende nenne, unter welchem Begriff er alles Hohe, Heldenhafte und auch 
ewig Problematische in der deutschen Geistigkeit zusammenfaßte und es gegenüberstellte allem Satten, 
Schlaffen, Matten, aber in der Schlaffheit Übermütigen und Selbstzufriedenen: dem deutschen 
Bildungsphilister.” GWRA III, 30. 
287 GWRA III, 31. 
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satisfaction of the cultured German philistine, and for this reason, Hofmannsthal calls 
them “Träger der produktiven Anarchie.”288  
Hofmannsthal identifies two different types of seekers. He calls the first “[d]er 
schweifende, aus dem Chaos hervortretende Geistige, mit dem Anspruch auf Lehrerschaft 
und Führerschaft.”289 This type of seeker is a poet, but also “mehr Prophet als 
Dichter,”290 who strives after “einer Umschöpfung seines Ich und damit einer 
Umschöpfung der Welt.”291 He does not seek to create a “Sprachnorm,”292 but instead 
struggles through phases of “Sprachbezweiflung”293 to get hold of the magic power of 
language. While this first type could be described as Dionysian, the second type of seeker 
is Apollonian. This second type is a scholar or scientist who passionately strives to bridge 
the gap between the pure sciences, “dies Weggebrochene vom Leben,”294 and the human 
world.295 Hofmannsthal sees both types of seeker as driven by hubris and heroism, which 
in this text are presented as admirable qualities. He concedes that the types he has 
                                                
288 GWRA III, 31. 
289 GWRA III, 32. 
290 GWRA III, 32. 
291 GWRA III, 33. 
292 GWRA III, 33. 
293 GWRA III, 33. 
294 GWRA III, 34. 
295 Severin Perrig points out that Hofmannsthal based his characterization of the seekers on writers 
and thinkers in his time: “In [den Suchenden] hat man Züge von Florens Christian Rang, Alfread Brust, 
Paul Ludwig Landsberg, Stefan George, Rudolf Pannwitz, Joseph Nadler, Max Weber, Aby Warburg, Karl 
Anton Rohan, Ernst Fuhrmann, Ludwig Derleth, Ludwig Klages und Rudolf Kassner gesehen. Kurz, eine 
breite Palette von Einzelgängern und Querdenkern verschiedenster politischer und gesellschaftlicher 
Couleur der 20er Jahre.” Perrig, 201. 
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portrayed here are “nur Schatten und Schemen”296 and that in reality there are thousands 
of such seekers of different ages and walks of life. These “Abseitigen, Ungekannten” are 
all working in the service of a “Geistesnot” and in this disparate group of seekers 
Hofmannsthal believes to recognize the “einzig mögliche deutsche Akademie.”297  He 
says that they are in character much like the early Romantics, but “[s]ehr strenge Zeichen 
der Männlichkeit”298 have replaced the playful boyishness of the Romantics. Unlike their 
predecessors, they are driven by a strong sense of “Notwendigkeit”299 and 
“Verantwortlichkeitssinn.”300   
As Karl Müller points out, the idea of wholeness is reconceived in the postwar 
years in terms of nation and Volk.301 I argue that Hofmannsthal’s desire to see wholeness 
where there is only fragmentation leads him to overlook the dangerous potential in the 
kind of nationalist cultural leadership he promotes. In particular, in the early twentieth 
century the idea of necessity and responsibility toward the nation fostered the kind of 
blind nationalism that led to the violence and the bloodshed in the First World War, while 
                                                
296 GWRA III, 35. 
297 GWRA III, 35. 
298 GWRA III, 39. 
299 GWRA III, 37. 
300 GWRA III, 39. 
301 Müller argues that Hofmannsthal’s idea that poetry and creativity can counter “den 
unparadiesischen Weltzustand” does not change after the First World War. “Die Wahrnehmungsregistratur 
des Autors ist weit vor Beginn des Weltkrieges praktisch fertig, auch wenn sich seine Optik für die 
Konstituierungsfaktoren und Erscheingungsweisen der auf ihn hereinstürmenden Wirklichkeiten noch 
feinjustiert und differenziert. Seine auf die Kraft und die Funktion der Kunstproduktion und –rezeption 
konzentrierte Blickeinstellung, auf den einzelnen als Künstler und Kunst-Erlebenden, verschiebt sich 
zugunsten eines weit stärkeren Interesses an Fragen des Ganzen: des gemeinsam ‘Bindenden,’ des Volkes, 
Österreichs, der deutschen Nation, Europas. Müller, Karl. “Hugo von Hofmannsthals Zeit- und Kulturkritik 
seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Modernité de HofmannsthalAustriaca, ed. Jacques Le Rider, special issue, 
Austriaca, no. 37 (December 1993): 199.  
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even greater atrocities were committed during the Second World War in the name of 
necessity. Evoking Addison’s idea – “Als ein Ganzes muß der Mann sich regen”302 – 
Hofmannsthal claims that to move as one is the goal of every nation. The modern 
seeker’s task is to seize “das Ganze” with both hands in order to give the Germanic 
“weltlose Ich” a home; he calls this move a titanic beginning. He claims that what the 
seekers have learned is that life is nothing without “geglaubte Ganzheit.”303 To be only 
half-believing is to flee from life, as he claims the Romantics did.  
Hofmannsthal believes that the seekers constitute the core of the nation. The 
seekers’ task304 is to absorb the multiplicity of seemingly unrelated phenomena, to take in 
the fragmented outer world, to recognize its inner coherence, and then to restore a vision 
of wholeness to the nation. 305 The seekers must carry out this work of synthesis with a 
religious sense of responsibility. He says that whereas the early Romantics squandered 
spiritual space and the Bildungsphilister narrowed it, the seekers see it as their task to 
secure the spiritual space of the nation: “In dieser Grundhaltung ist die Sicherung des 
geistigen Raumes antizipiert, wie in der romantischen Haltung die Vergeudung des 
Raumes, in der Haltung des Bildungsphilisters die Verengung des Raumes 
inbegriffen.”306 Although they have not arrived at their goal, those who seek have 
                                                
302 GWRA III, 38.  
303 GWRA III, 39. 
304 It is worth noting that the task of the seekers is reminiscent of the task of the poet in “Der Dichter 
und diese Zeit,” discussed in the previous chapter. 
305 “Hier bricht dieses einsame, auf sich gestellte Ich des titanisch Suchenden durch zur höchsten 
Gemeinschaft, indem es in sich einigt, was mit tausend Klüften ein seit Jahrhunderten nicht mehr zur 
Kultur gebundenes Volkstum spaltet. Hier werden diese Einzelnen zu Verbundenen, diese verstreuten 
wertlosen Individuen zum Kern der Nation.” GWRA III, 40.  
306 GWRA III, 40. 
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projected points of orientation into the chaos, and when connected, they make up the 
blueprint of the spiritual space of the nation: “Was dieser synthesesuchende Geist erring 
[…] das sind schon ins Chaos projizierte Punkte, deren Verbindungen den Grundriß jenes 
Geistraumes ergäben.”307  
Hofmannsthal concludes his talk by stating that the process that he describes here 
is “langsam und großartig.”308 He conceives of it as a “konservative Revolution,”309 
which he understands as a countermovement, internal to history, against two historical 
developments of the sixteenth century, namely the Renaissance and the Reformation. As 
Peter Kern points out, at first glance it is not obvious why Hofmannsthal would take issue 
with these two developments in western history. Kern suggests that this has to be 
understood against the backdrop of the contrast that Hofmannsthal draws between France 
and Germany. Whereas Hofmannsthal perceives in France a strong communal spirit that 
is held together by a “geglaubte Ganzheit,” in Germany he sees an overdeveloped sense 
of individualism, causing the great seekers to lack a sense of community and to work in 
isolation and loneliness, despite being unified in one sense by their common task of 
seeking. However, with the notion of a conservative revolution, Hofmannsthal gestures 
toward a dialectical development in history, wherein the French sense of communal 
wholeness (which comes at the cost of often suppressing individual genius) represents the 
thesis, and the excessive German individualism represents the antithesis. Hofmannsthal 
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308 GWRA III, 40. 
309 GWRA III, 41. 
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foresees the realization of the synthesis in the German future, where this synthesis first 
takes place inside the seekers, who then work towards the realization of a higher unity.310  
Much has been made of this invocation of a conservative revolution at the end of 
this speech, but as Perrig points out, this notion shows up only once in Hofmannsthal’s 
entire oeuvre, and it is actually not the central idea even in this speech. Ernst Troeltsch, 
Thomas Mann, Karl Anton Rohan and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck all used this term in 
the early 1920s, and their respective understandings of this term varied greatly. 
Furthermore, Perrig dismisses Mohler’s suggestion that the idea of the conservative 
revolution became “virulent” through Hofmannsthal’s speech, pointing out that when one 
considers the reception of this speech in the author’s time, it is not the conservative 
revolution but the ideas of the seekers that attracted the attention of Hofmannsthal’s 
contemporaries.311 Although there is a large body of scholarship that deals with the 
question of what the conservative revolution meant for Hofmannsthal, it has been 
established that the term “conservative revolution” is not a politically charged term for 
him, although – unfortunately for him – it was taken up by national socialists who, 
especially in the early years of their movement, sought to legitimize their own political 
views by invoking the words of well-known conservative thinkers and writers who 
preceded them.312  
                                                
310 See Peter Christoph Kern, Zur Gedankenwelt des späten Hofmannsthal: Die Idee einer 
schöpferischen Restauration (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1969), 95. 
311 Severin Perrig explains that the term “konservative Revolution” was not coined by Hofmannsthal: 
“Schließlich war Hofmannsthal auch nicht dessen Urheber, sondern vielmehr Thomas Mann, der den 
Begriff erstmalig 1921 in einem Aufsatz verwendet hat und ihn nebenbei auch in seinen Roman ‘Der 
Zauberberg,’ den Hofmannsthal möglicherweise sogar gelesen hatte, als Charakterisierung der Figur 
Naphtas einfließen ließ.” Perrig, 198. 
312 Perrig, 199-200. See also Karl Müller who identifies the NS propagandist who used Hofmannsthal 
to support the NS cause. 
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In describing the task of the seekers as serving the conservative revolution, 
Hofmannsthal already identifies them as presenting solutions to the problem of cultural-
political unity in the German people. I argue, therefore, that in his earnestness, 
Hofmannsthal presents a distorted understanding of Nietzsche’s seekers. That is, in 
ascribing to the seekers a prophetic role, Hofmannsthal comes very close to turning the 
seekers into finders, a mistake of which Nietzsche accuses the Bildungsphilister: 
Was urteilt aber unsere Philisterbildung über diese Suchenden? Sie nimmt sie 
einfach als Findende und scheint zu vergessen, daß jene selbst sich nur als 
Suchende fühlten. Wir haben ja unsere Kultur, heißt es dann, denn wir haben ja 
unsere “Klassiker,” das Fundament ist nicht nur da, nein auch der Bau steht schon 
auf ihm gegründet – wir selbst sind dieser Bau.313 
 
According to Nietzsche, the culture-philistine mistakes the seekers for finders, allowing 
them to celebrate these finders as the “classics” of “die echte, ursprüngliche deutsche 
Kultur” that they claim to possess.314 Of course there are important differences between 
Nietzsche’s culture-philistine and Hofmannsthal. For instance, Hofmannsthal does not 
claim that the Germans have found a coherent culture; in fact, on the contrary, he 
underlines the fact that they are in search of cultural coherence and unity.315 However, he 
nevertheless expresses excessive confidence in the so-called seekers’ ability to find the 
unifying spirit of the nation, which is what leads him to liken them to prophets:  
                                                
313 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1981), 18. 
314 Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, 17. 
315 One could argue that in his propagandistic writing from the wartime period and in his efforts to 
institutionalize a German-Austrian literary canon during and after the war, he does make the same mistake 
as Nietzsche’s Bildungsphilister. See Hofmannsthal’s “Deutsche Erzähler” (1912), “Österreichische 
Bibliothek” (1915-1916), “Bibliotheca Mundi” (1921), and “Deutsches Lesebuch” (1922), as well as his 
engagement in “Bremer Presse” (1922 forward) and “Neue Deutschen Beiträge” (1917-1922), and his work 
on the foundation and promotion of the Salzburger Festspiele. 
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Deuter sind sie in ihren höchsten Augenblicken, Seher – das witternde, ahnende 
deutsche Wesen tritt in ihnen wieder hervor, witternd nach Urnatur im Menschen 
und in der Welt, deutend die Seelen und die Leiber, die Gesichter und die 
Geschichte, deutend die Siedlung und die Sitte, die Landschaft und den Stamm; 
Schriftleser, Handleser, Sternleser – und die Wucht der Erfahrung oder die Not 
der Jugend löst ihnen das Wort vom Munde, der Wirbel der Vielheit oder die 
Ergriffenheit vor dem Einzelnen.316 
 
While admitting that this counter-type to the culture-philistine has a dangerously 
seductive side,317 he does not doubt that the seeker will eventually produce the “Einheit” 
and “Gemeinschaft” that the world lacks.318 Thus because of his overwhelming desire to 
find unity where there is fragmentation, Hofmannsthal makes the very mistake of which 
Nietzsche accuses the culture-philistine. The suspicion that Hofmannsthal once expressed 
vis-à-vis the prophet figure in his poem “Der Prophet”319 does not apply to his own desire 
to speak in a prophetic voice. 
This mistake on Hofmannsthal’s part – the over-eager anticipation of, and faith in, 
an imminent unity – suggests that a fruitful contrast might be drawn between 
Hofmannsthal’s “Suchenden” and another modern type, which Kracauer calls “die 
Wartenden.” My intention is not to argue that there is a direct line of influence between 
these two authors, but rather to shed critical light on Hofmannsthal’s seemingly 
unreserved belief that wholeness can be restored to the German “weltlose Ich.” Although 
Kracauer’s essay “Die Wartenden” was first published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine in 
                                                
316 GWRA III, 36. 
317 “[E]r ist eine gefährliche hybride Natur, Liebender und Hassender und Lehrer und Verführer 
zugleich.” GWRA III, 32. 
318 GWRA III, 40. 
319 See my discussion in chapter 3.  
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1922 (thus, five years before Hofmannsthal held his “Schrifttum” talk), both writers are 
responding to the uncertain cultural climate in the years after the end of the First World 
War.320 Both the seekers and the Wartenden are responding to what they perceived to be 
a spiritual vacuum; the seeker, however, responds to it by finding meaning in nationalism, 
while the Wartenden, though he longs to fill the spiritual void, remains skeptical of the 
intellectual, religious, and aesthetic solutions that others around him have found. Those 
who wait suffer from a feeling of being chased out of a religious sphere, but at the same 
time they have lost the ability to believe in religious truths: they can at most think them, 
but cannot believe in them. Neither the purely scientific nor the religious worldview 
satisfies this type. They inhabit a “Zwischenreich” where “das Nicht-glauben-Können” is 
a source of inner torment.321  
Like Hofmannsthal, Kracauer describes a time in which people are longing for the 
restoration of an order that has been lost through the processes of modernization; he 
emphasizes especially the loss of an order that was formerly held in place by the church. 
Without religion, however, the individual’s “ich” has become separated from the “du,” 
and the modern subject lives as an atomized being in a completely relativistic world. 
Kracauer observes, “Die Beziehungslosigkeiten zum Absoluten und die Vereinzelung 
prägen sich in einem auf die Spitze getriebenen Relativismus aus.”322 This heightened 
relativism is experienced as a crisis of meaning and as a fear of the void: “Horror vacui – 
                                                
320 Oliver Tekolf convincingly demonstrates that although Hofmannsthal does not mention the First 
World War in his Schrifttum speech, the way Hofmannsthal describes the soldiers in his wartime essays 
replicates almost verbatim how the seekers are characterized in this essay. See Tekolf, 386ff. See 
Hofmannsthal’s “Aufbauen, nicht einreißen” (1915), “Geist der Karpathen” (1915), Aufzeichnungen zu 
Reden in Skandinavien” (1916). 
321 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 384. 
322 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 385. 
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der Schrecken vor der Leere beherrscht diese Menschen.”323 Kracauer says that he is less 
interested in discussing the historical factors that have led to the “Entleerung des uns 
umfangenden geistigen Raumes,”324 but rather his intention is to examine the  
“Entfaltung der seelischen Lage”325 in response to the horror vacui. 
Although the disposition of Kracauer’s Wartenden is almost the opposite of 
Hofmannsthal’s seekers, they are characterized in very similar terms. That is, those who 
wait form a community not because they have consciously organized themselves into a 
group, but rather because they share a common disposition toward modern life. Like the 
seekers, they are lonely figures: “ihre Tage verbringen sie zumeist in der Einsamkeit der 
großen Städte, diese Gelehrten, Kaufleute, Ärzte, Rechtsanwälte, Studenten und 
Intellektuelle aller Art.”326 These people are “Schicksalsgefährten”327 because they suffer 
from the same affliction: “das metaphysische Leiden an dem Mangel eines hohen Sinnes 
in der Welt, an ihrem Dasein im leeren Raum.”328 
Kracauer provides some examples of the different ways in which people have 
tried to find a unifying order to life. He identifies Georg Simmel as someone who, in his 
attempt to come to terms with the relativism of modern times, has raised the process of 
                                                
323 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 386. 
324 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 383. 
325 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 384.   
326 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 383.  
327 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 383. 
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life to a new absolute.329 He calls Simmel’s solution “eine Verzweiflungstat des 
Relativismus, der auf der Suche nach einem festen Grunde schließlich an das grund- und 
wurzellose Leben geriet und hiermit wiederum bei sich selber landete – oder auch nicht 
landete… ”330 Other solutions that people reach for include returning to church (which he 
finds is not what the thinking man tends to do), Marxist messianism, or in Stefan 
George’s circle, these “Formgläubige” raise aesthetic form to a new absolute. Kracauer 
claims that those who wait are between the hardnosed skeptic and the “Kurzschluß-
Mensch.”  The “short-circuit” person is someone who joins some religious group, not out 
of conviction, but because he would rather not face the void at all. This type is highly 
defensive of his religious belief because he does not quite understand it himself. The 
hardnosed skeptic, in contrast, embraces the loneliness that inevitably confronts the 
alienated individual who rejects all religious beliefs. His skepticism brings him to the 
point of hatred of those who are religious.  
The Wartenden, providing a contrast to both of these types, are uncompromising 
in their own way because they refuse to be won over by either atheism or religion before 
they feel convinced to the core of their being. Kracauer says that the waiting of this type 
is a “zögerndes Geöffnetsein”331: 
Sagbar ist allenfalls u.a., daß es sich für die hier gemeinten Menschen um den 
Versuch handelt, den Schwerpunkt von dem theoretischen Ich auf das 
gesamtmenschliche Ich zu verlegen und aus der atomisierten unwirklichen Welt 
der gestaltlosen Kräfte und der des Sinnes baren Größen einzukehren in die Welt 
der Wirklichkeit und der von ihr umschlossenen Sphären.332 
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331 Kracauer, “Die Wartenden,” 392. 
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Seen in light of the different types of solutions that Kracauer sketches in this essay, 
Hofmannsthal’s own way of dealing with the existential void appears to be a marriage of 
George’s Formgläubigkeit and Simmel’s “Verzweiflungstat” because he raises both art 
and life to a new absolute. Hofmannsthal’s seekers ultimately lack what Kracauer’s 
Wartende have, namely the courage to wait and to remain skeptical in the face of the 
seductive solutions touted by the many prophets in their time.333  
 
II. Hofmannsthal’s Doubts: Der Turm 
Despite the apparent optimism of the Münchner Rede, critics point to 
Hofmannsthal’s last drama Der Turm, a Trauerspiel in five acts, as an expression of 
doubt about the very vision of cultural leadership he presents in this speech. As Marcus 
Twellmann points out, both texts have as their central focus the connection between 
Dichtertum and Führertum. Whereas the idea of the poet as leader has a metaphoric 
quality in “Der Dichter und diese Zeit” and in “Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der 
Nation,” in Der Turm the poet is literally conceived as a ruler. The drama is set in a 
legendary Polish kingdom “in der Atmosphäre dem siebzehnten [Jahrhundert] 
ähnlich,”334 where King Basilius has his son, Sigismund, locked away in a tower because 
                                                
333 In his essay “Vom Erleben des Kriegs” (1915), Kracauer describes how an uncritical 
Vaterlandsliebe swept over the European nations at the outbreak of the First World War: “Wir haben uns 
im Laufe des Krieges daran gewöhnt, die Glut der Begeisterung, die Tapferkeit, die Opferwilligkeit, das 
Mitleiden, alle hohen Gedanken, die uns durchziehen, die freiwillige Unterordnung, die schwere dunkle 
Feiertagsstimmung unserer Seelen – wir haben uns daran gewöhnt, dies alles mit dem einen Namen der 
Vaterlandliebe zu bezeichnen. Niemals vielleicht waren die Menschen so wenig wie in diesen Zeiten zur 
Selbstbeobachtung, d.h. zur wirklichen Erfassung dessen, was in ihnen vorgeht, geneigt.” Siegfried 
Kracauer Werke 5.1: 11. 
334 GWD III, 256. 
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it has been prophesied that the prince will overthrow him. The main drama revolves 
around the prince’s unwitting involvement in a power struggle between King Basilius and 
those who rebel against him within his immediate service and the population at large. 
There are two different versions of the ending: In the first version, completed in 1925, 
Prince Sigismund, who has lived as a prisoner inside the tower for twenty-two years, 
astonishingly emerges as a capable political leader. He vanquishes the brutal renegade 
soldier, Olivier, who had attempted to seize power, and ultimately fulfills his destiny by 
preparing the way for a child king’s peaceful and democratic rule. In the second ending, 
from 1927, Sigismund is neither willing to take up leadership nor to act as a political 
puppet; the play ends with Sigismund’s assassination and the dawn of Olivier’s violent 
dictatorship.  
Der Turm has been interpreted as the dramatization of Hofmannsthal’s personal 
struggle to define a politically meaningful role for the modern poet. The idea of the poet 
as political leader is not a far-fetched idea in the German context; the “Spiritualisierung 
des Reichsbegriffs”335 was an idea that compensated for the unrealized German “Reich” 
in real political terms. Herder believed that national unity would be produced through 
Bildung, that is, through a unified literature and literary language. Schiller, carrying this 
idea a step further, claimed that precisely because the political realm was insecure, the 
German intellectual and spiritual “Reich” was all the stronger. Thus, the “Kulturnation” 
became the surrogate for the unrealized nation-state and the “Reich” stood for two 
                                                                                                                                            
 
335 Twellmann, 214. 
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different realms: inner and outer nations.336 While some, like Rudolf Borchardt, believed 
that the only true realization of the “Reich” could only be in the spiritual and intellectual 
realm, or in other words in the symbolic sphere, Hofmannsthal believed that the idea of 
the “Reich” could also find external realization. He wanted to find a “Form, eine neue 
deutsche Wirklichkeit an der die ganze Nation teilnehmen kann.”337 Twellmann points 
out that Borchardt’s and Hofmannsthal’s visions differ because Borchardt’s 
understanding of the symbol is essentially Protestant, whereas Hofmannsthal’s is 
Catholic: “Seinem katholisch geprägten Begriff des Symbolischen entsprechend bedeutet 
ihm ‘Form’ nicht ein Ideales, sondern dessen Verwirklichung.”338 Hofmannsthal’s 
promotion of the realization of the nation in the “geistigen Raum” is an “Ontologisierung 
des Ersatzbegriffs.”339 
But while Hofmannsthal promoted the idea that the poet’s responsibility was to 
take up cultural leadership, he kept his distance from Stefan George’s vision of a 
“heilsame Diktatur” that he and those in his circle would one day exercise. Twellmann 
argues that Hofmannsthal subscribed to a different model of leadership. Unlike George, 
Hofmannsthal held the Romantic belief that the poet forms an organic unity with the 
people. Twellmann asserts, “Auf die organische Einheit der Künstler mit dem Volk, aus 
dem sie stammen, legt der Redner [Hofmannsthal] den Akzent, denn der Bindung zum 
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Volk verdankt die Kunst der ‘Geistigen’ ihre Legitimität.”340 Indeed, in his Beethoven 
speech of 1920, Hofmannsthal states, “Nichts war würdig an ihnen, zu bestehen, wofern 
sie sich abtrennen im Letzten von der Wesensart des Volkes.”341  
Hofmannsthal was not unaware, however, of the problematic aspects of this 
Romantic idea that the artist and the people form an organic unity.342 As Jacques Le 
Rider points out, Der Rosenkavalier and Der Schwierige are examples of Hofmannsthal’s 
self-conscious construction of tradition through montage technique.343 After the demise 
of the existing traditional orders, Hofmannsthal assigns to the poet the responsibility of 
reinstating a new and binding symbolic order. He faces an irresolvable dilemma in his 
work, however. On the one hand, the author claims that the poet is organically linked to 
the people through the Urkraft of language.344 This idea works as long as the poet is 
conceived as the steward of language and his creativity is seen as the manifestation of the 
power of language itself. On the other hand, Hofmannsthal wants to conceive of the poet 
as someone who can construct new realities with language, in which case the poet’s 
language is no longer merely an expression of an already existing organic essence of the 
Volk, but instead it is a medium that the poet can manipulate and control. 
                                                
340 Twellmann, 218. 
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attracted Hofmannsthal to Josef Nadler’s literary history. Twellmann, 219. 
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In fact, however, Hofmannsthal was not quite willing to explicitly acknowledge 
the fact that poetic or literary language is not immune to unethical political manipulation.  
This reluctance will become apparent through a more focused examination of the 
different types of cultural leadership Hofmannsthal himself modeled through the 
Münchner Rede and Der Turm. In the existing scholarship, the focus has been primarily 
on the thematic connection between the Münchner Rede and Der Turm; what has, in 
contrast, received little attention is the question of why it is that Hofmannsthal expressed 
doubts about the viability of a poet’s political leadership in his drama but not in his public 
speeches. It may appear at first that the answer to this question is simple: As a public 
speaker, Hofmannsthal sought to inspire his audience and give them a sense of hope 
about the future, especially at a time when Germany and Austria were dealing with the 
devastating ramifications of their defeat in the First World War. Hofmannsthal felt that 
his speech must address the sense of cultural crisis that was a reality at the time. In a 
letter to Martin Buber from December 19th, 1926, Hofmannsthal writes: 
Halb durch Mißverständnisse ist eine Situation entstanden, in der ich es, ohne 
launisch oder schwierig zu erscheinen, nicht ablehnen kann, in München 
öffentlich zu sprechen. Man kann heute nicht über Literarisches sprechen, 
überhaupt nicht über “Specielles” dazu ist die Not und Unruhe zu groß. Also hab 
ich mir ein etwas weiträumiges Thema gewählt – zur Vorbereitung aber in alten 
Sachen herumgelesen, die mir durch ihre Verfasser nahe stehen, gelesen, so wie 
wenn ich mich mit diesen Abwesenden oder Todten unterhielte. Aus diesem 
Gemeinschaftsgefühl heraus will ich mir dann etwas aufzeichnen, das ich zu den 
Leuten rede – ohne jeden Wunsch das Individuelle oder Originale zu sagen – 
denn ein Wir scheint mir schöner als dieses zweifelhafte Ich.345  
 
As much as Hofmannsthal seems to have felt reluctant to accept the speaking 
engagement with the Munich Goethe-Gesellschaft, he appears to have felt a sense of duty 
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to deliver a speech that addresses an audience affected by the “Not und Unruhe” of the 
postwar period. Hofmannsthal felt that it would be inappropriate to speak on a narrow 
literary topic and instead was compelled to address in more general terms the big 
questions concerning the cultural and political future of a people.  
We can see in Hofmannsthal’s letter to Buber that his ambition was to 
communicate the sense that the Germans have a community of writers and thinkers. It is 
evident in his letter to Willy Haas, written on the same day as his letter to Buber, how 
difficult he found the task of distilling a sense of “we” out of the multiplicity of highly 
complex and disparate works he was reading in preparation for his speech: 
Wenn man sich aber auf das furchtbare Gebiet des Nicht-speziellen, des 
Allgemeinen, unseres Zustandes, unserer Anarchie begibt – was sich dann noch 
sagen läßt, dies durchzudenken, das unbegrenzte Thema einigermaßen 
abzugrenzen, in sich eine Fühlung herzustellen mit den wichtigsten Zeitgenossen 
(die keineswegs, das versteht sich von selbst, die bekanntesten sind – im 
Gegenteil) doch eine Art von wir in sich zu constituieren [sic] so viele ungeheuer 
schwierige u. complexe [sic] Dinge andeutend berühren ohne sich auf sie 
einzulassen freilich, aber andererseits ohne zu dilettieren [...] nein, das ist eine 
monströse Arbeit...346  
 
Hofmannsthal’s personal correspondence indicates that the author wanted to synthesize 
the plurality of voices into a unified voice in order to establish a sense of collective 
identity amongst the leading German cultural figures. Oswalt von Nostitz observes that 
Hofmannsthal approached this speech with a sense of pedagogical and political 
responsibility to promote a vision of a multi-dimensional German nation in which the 
political and intellectual-spiritual dimensions do not form an opposition, but instead a 
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unity.347 He argues that Hofmannsthal consciously distinguished between his role as a 
“Kulturpolitiker” and literary writer, and that for this reason the Münchner Rede needs to 
be understood in relation to the author’s cultural-political activism rather than simply in 
relation to his purely literary work.348 In particular, he insists that the theses presented in 
the speech cannot be simply interpreted as the meaning of Sigismund’s parting words at 
the end of the first version of Der Turm;349 he claims that Hofmannsthal consciously 
conceived of the speech as having a different function than the drama did, assigning a 
“Sonderstellung” to literary language, which he had disclaimed earlier: 
zwar nicht, um es in den elfenbeinernen Turm zu bannen, sondern weil er – darin 
ganz anders empfindend als Brecht und dessen Nachfolger – gerade die 
ungetrübte und unerschrockene, nicht durch politische und sonstige Tendenzen 
gehemmte Auseinandersetzung mit der Wirklichkeit als essentiell für die 
Entstehung seiner Dichtung ansah.350  
 
While Nostitz concedes that the antinomy between the function of literary and 
non-literary language should not be exaggerated, he ultimately does not find this 
distinction problematic. For him the difference between Hofmannsthal’s literary and non-
literary texts is primarily determined by the difference in intention that motivates his 
writing. He believes that Hofmannsthal’s speech was motivated by “didaktische oder 
auch kultur- und geistespolitische Intentionen,”351 while the drama was written out of a 
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sense of responsibility solely toward his creative vision: “Hier spricht nicht mehr ein an 
seine pädagogisch-politische Verantwortung gegenüber der ‘Nation’ Gebundener, 
sondern der nur seinem Ingenium verpflichtete Dichter, der auch vor dem Anblick der 
Gorgo nicht zurückscheut.”352  
Nostitz’s explanation here is rather forced, however, and does not reflect the fact 
that in practice, Hofmannsthal, as one of the founders of the Salzburger Festspiele, used 
literary works too for didactic and cultural-political ends. Moreover, his conclusion 
implicitly suggests that Hofmannsthal’s sense of pedagogical and political responsibility 
led him to hide from the audience of his public speech his true, unblinking vision of a 
frightening future. The question as to why Hofmannsthal might have felt the 
responsibility to suppress his doubts in his speech, and for that matter in the first version 
of Der Turm, ultimately remains unanswered by Nostitz. 
In contrast to Nostitz, Rey argues that the contradictory cultural-political visions 
presented in Der Turm and the Münchner Rede cannot be explained by merely pointing to 
the fact that Hofmannsthal wrote the former from the perspective of a playwright and the 
latter from the perspective of a publicist: “Aber der Widerspruch, der hier zwischen 
tragischem Bekenntnis und politischem Aufruf besteht, ist nicht nur begründet in der 
verschiedenen Perspektive des Dichters und des Publizisten.”353 According to Rey, the 
speech and the drama present two alternative historical outcomes that Hofmannsthal 
envisioned resulting from the European crisis, namely “Regeneration echter Kultur oder 
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Absturz in die Barbarei der Gewaltherrschaft.”354 Thus, Rey sees the contradictory 
historical visions as an expression of the author’s uncertainty about the future. 
Burckhardt’s recollection of Hofmannsthal’s anxiety about the power of his writing 
supports this interpretation: “Man kann in ein Klima, in eine Zeit geraten, die kein 
Gedeihen mehr zulassen. Es geht wie mit der Vegetation, mit der Fauna – ganze Reihen 
sterben aus. Das Wort, das gestern noch Zauberkraft hatte, fällt heute sinnlos zu 
Boden.”355 The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire had shaken Hofmannsthal to 
the core and he struggled to fight against a creeping sense of resignation, which 
expressed itself less in the form of an abstract language skepticism (as in “Ein Brief”), 
but rather as doubt over whether his words could still find resonance in a fundamentally 
new historical epoch.  
Rey finds that the darker tones in Hofmannsthal’s late work have been obscured 
by a strong tendency in the scholarship to portray the author’s oeuvre as following an 
organic, teleological development. This thesis can already be found in Josef Nadler’s 
essay entitled “Hofmannsthals Ausklang,” where he describes the author’s life and 
creative work as “organischen Ablauf […] von Stufe zu Stufe wachsend bis zu dem 
sicheren Weltbesitz seines letzten Dramas.”356 Within this all too tidy biographical 
narrative, Turm I is regarded as the culmination of Hofmannsthal’s entire work in a 
“sicheren Weltbesitz,” while Turm II tends to be ignored.357 Rey draws attention to the 
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fact that in fact Turm I already betrays signs of doubt about the vision of the non-violent 
and morally pure leadership with which the play ends. First, Sigismund does not entirely 
find his way from his tower of interiority into the world of reality. Hofmannsthal 
conspicuously leaves out any scenes of direct military confrontation between Sigismund 
and his enemy, Olivier. Instead, Sigismund’s confrontation with his foe is mediated by 
Olivier’s gypsy lover, against whose magic spell and attack with a poisoned knife he is 
defenseless. Rey concludes, “Das Ringen auf dem Schlachtfeld tritt zurück vor dem 
Ringen mit den Dämonen.”358 Thus, the real political danger, namely the threat of an 
inhumane dictatorship, represented by Olivier in Turm II, is obscured in Turm I as 
concrete, political confrontations are replaced with a dream-like struggle. Moreover, Rey 
rightly observes that the appearance of the “Kinderkönig,” who replaces Sigismund, the 
interim ruler, is an expression of eschatological hope. The fact that the drama jumps from 
a historical to a utopian temporal plane reflects Hofmannsthal’s struggle to envision how 
a new harmonious political order could be realized. 
The second ending of Der Turm presents a very bleak picture of a new order and a 
new model of political leadership. In Turm II the prince is a completely ineffectual 
political figure. His only defense against Olivier lies in his rejection of the here and now, 
which, however, leaves his people without hope of salvation from Olivier’s violent 
tyranny. But it is not just the political vision that is dark; Hofmannsthal’s understanding 
of the power of aesthetic media is almost nihilistic. While his poetological essays and 
cultural-political speeches promote the idea that art and poetic language possess the 
power to overcome the fragmentation of the world and restore a sense of wholeness to the 
                                                
358 Rey, 279. 
 163 
alienated modern individual, in the final act of Turm II, Hofmannsthal demonstrates that 
the most basic building block of art, the sign (be it linguistic, pictorial or auditory) is also 
the medium of everyday communication. For this reason there is no sign that is pure and 
immune to manipulation for social and political ends. The end of this version of the 
drama reflects this idea through the manner in which Olivier manipulates signs in order to 
solidify his rule. I argue that the existing interpretations have overlooked the fact that 
Olivier not only represents a political figure but can also be seen as an artist, inasmuch as 
he understands and wields the magic power of symbols. 
From Olivier’s perspective all signs can be manipulated in order to distort or 
create a new reality. He understands that Sigismund’s real power lies in the fact that the 
people still regard the prince as the physical embodiment of the symbol of legitimate 
political leadership. He takes advantage, therefore, of a fundamental problem of 
recognition that results from the physical and socio-political distance that lies between 
the people and the ruler. The common people’s familiarity with the prince’s face is based 
upon a poorly produced copperplate print that is in circulation amongst them. 359 For this 
reason Olivier is convinced that he can “discard” the real prince like a useless object and 
easily replace him with a double to serve as a puppet in order to legitimize his own rule. 
Olivier reveals his plan to Sigismund: 
Du wirst, wenn wir jetzt marschieren, auf einem Wagen fahren, und sie werden zu 
Tausenden herbeikommen und Heil rufen über dir, daß du deinen Vater vom 
Thron gejagt hast. Auf diese Weise wird das sprachlose Volk von uns durch eine 
Bilderschrift unterrichtet werden und die Herren werden Kopfunter in die Erde 
fahren.360 
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When Sigismund rejects Olivier’s “proposal,” Olivier does not try to force 
Sigismund into submission, but instead he tells his attendant to find Sigismund’s 
lookalike: 
OLIVIER: Prägt euch sein Gesicht ein. Notiert euch im Kopf die Maße, wie er  
gebaut ist, die Haarfarbe, alles. 
ARON: Auf dem flachen Land geht sein Bild um, ein schlechter Kupferstich, und  
sie zünden Kerzen davor an wie vor einem Heiligenbild. 
OLIVIER: Ebendarum. Ich brauche einen Kerl, ähnlich ihm zum Verwechseln und  
der mir pariert wie der Handschuh an meiner Hand. 
ARON: Was brauchst du noch eine Konterfei, wenn du ihn selber hast? 
OLIVIER: Er selber ist nicht verwendbar.361 
 
From Olivier’s Machiavellian perspective there is no such thing as an “inborn” right to 
rule. Olivier’s seizure of power thus marks the transition into the modern political era, in 
which the sovereign no longer represents divine will, but merely the secular will of the 
people. In other words, the will of the people is the new principle of legitimacy; this is an 
idea which evolves over the course of the nineteenth century and in Austria replaces the 
monarchical principle of legitimacy at the end of the First World War.362 The dissolution 
of the monarchy involves a shift in the conceptual understanding of political 
representation. As Twellmann explains, “Die Abhängigkeit des Herrschers von der 
Akzeptanz der Beherrschten, wird zur anerkannten Voraussetzung demokratischer 
Stellvertretung.”363 
Through the figure of Olivier, Hofmannsthal presents the darker side of the 
democratic power structure. First, he shows that the abuse of power can still take place in 
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the name of the people. Olivier claims, “Denn ich und einige, wir haben uns aufgeopfert 
und nehmen dem Volk die Last des Regiments ab, damit es nicht schwindlich werde.”364 
Hofmannsthal shows how the dictator can legitimize his rule by invoking the democratic 
principle. That is, he controls the people by maintaining that he is working in the service 
of those he rules.365 Second, through Olivier’s manipulation of the power of symbols, 
Hofmannsthal demonstrates that the religious dimension of politics is not simply 
eliminated through the secularization of political power. In the following exchange 
Sigismund questions Olivier’s claim to power: 
SIGISMUND mit Verachtung: Wer ist das, der dir Macht gegeben hat, daß du sie  
unter andere austeilst? 
OLIVIER: Siehst du dieses eiserne Ding da in meiner Hand? So wie dies in meiner  
Hand ist und schlägt, so bin ich selbst in der Hand der Fatalität. Das, was  
jetzt vor dir steht, das hast du noch nicht gekannt. Was du bis jetzt gekannt  
hast, waren jesuitische Praktiken und Hokuspokus. Was aber jetzt dasteht,  
das ist die Wirklichkeit.366  
 
When Olivier appears in the last act, he is dressed “ganz in Eisen und Leder […] 
eine kurze eiserne Keule in der Hand.”367 Olivier asserts that his power is entirely 
legitimized through the superior power of physical force and violence, relative to the 
religious and magical rituals on which monarchical power is based. However, brute 
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physical force alone is not enough to secure Olivier’s rule. He, too, depends upon the 
“Hokuspokus” of symbols because “das sprachlose Volk” still sees the physical king as 
evidence for the legitimacy of political leadership. As Twellmann explains, “Der 
Königskörper steht sichtbar für die Unität einer Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, die, selbst 
unsichtbar, erst in dieser Imago mit sich übereinkommt, die in ihrer Verkörperung sich 
selbst akklamiert und mit ihrem König ihre Einigkeit feiert.”368 Hofmannsthal shows how 
the magic power of symbols is indispensible for the stabilization of Olivier’s control of 
the people. The word “Hokuspokus” stems from a denunciatory reformulation of the 
magic words spoken during the Christian communion, “Hoc est corpus meum,” through 
which the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into Christ’s flesh and blood is 
performed.369 In the final act of the drama, the author depicts how modern political power 
that is supposed to be based on the will of the people still in fact depends on the residual 
power of the ceremonial religious rituals that were used to mark the pre-modern 
investiture of the king with divine power.  
In the end, no sign is safe from Olivier’s sinister manipulation. Not only does he 
plan to control the illiterate population through visual trickery, but he also leads 
Sigismund to his execution through auditory deception. As Olivier leaves Sigismund in 
his tower, he commands his sharpshooters to position themselves outside the prince’s 
window. Sigismund is attracted to the window by the sound of anonymous voices, 
presumably the people, calling to him: 
STIMMEN: außen Sigismund! Bleibe bei uns! Harre aus bei uns, verlasse uns  
nicht! 
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SIGISMUND: Ich bin allein und sehne mich verbunden zu sein. 
STIMMEN: Sigismund! Verlasse uns nicht! 
ANTON: Recht komödiantisch gebärden sich die. Das sind keine ehrlichen Leute. 
SIGISMUND: Ich will zum Fenster und mit meinen Gefreundeten reden, sie rufen  
mich. 
Er geht langsam gegen das Fenster.370 
 
In his longing to be connected to other human beings, Sigismund does not heed his 
servant Anton’s suspicion of the crowd outside, but instead steps toward the window to 
get closer to the voices. However, these voices are not the voices of the Volk, but rather 
of a mob in Olivier’s service, and when Sigismund finally appears before the window he 
is shot to death. As he dies, the prince commands Anton and his doctor, “Gebet Zeugnis, 
ich war da, wenngleich mich niemand gekannt hat.”371 This last command has a biblical 
ring, but unlike the figure of Jesus, the carpenter’s son, who lived and worked miracles 
amongst the people, there is little to say about Sigismund’s life and deeds. What would it 
mean for Anton and the doctor to pay witness to a life that never quite came into contact 
with the outside world?  
Sigismund’s Christ-like self-sacrifice is futile. No child king appears in this 
second ending; history no longer culminates in the fulfillment of a transcendent destiny. 
In this second ending of Der Turm, Hofmannsthal expresses in dramatic form fears and 
doubts that never surface in his Münchner Rede: What if, instead of an organic Volk, 
there are only anonymous crowds? What if the cultural leaders (the so-called seekers) are 
only driven by the will to power, and not by a genuine search for a unifying Geist? These 
doubts reflect Hofmannsthal’s political conservatism and the threat that democracy 
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represented to him. Clemens Pornschlegel explains that Hofmannsthal rejected “die 
Auflösung des Absoluten im prozeduralen Spiel öffentlicher Meinungen.”372 He finds 
that Hofmannsthal’s rejection of modern democratic rule, as expressed in the ideals of the 
French Revolution, is reflective of the apolitical conception of the nation in the German 
and Austrian cultural context, in which the idea of a unified national culture was 
accompanied by the suppression of its political realization.373 He maintains that the 
second ending of Der Turm reflects that Hofmannsthal found it unthinkable that the idea 
of the contrat social and free citoyens could result in anything other than a nihilistic, 
lawless “Gewaltherrschaft.”374 Thus, in Turm II Olivier’s claim to democratic governance 
is shown to be a mere pretense. Instead of a coherent people, Hofmannsthal presents a 
mob, and instead of the separation of law from power, he depicts a dictatorial seizure of 
power. 
 Twellmann argues that it is precisely because of Hofmannsthal’s conservatism 
that the author was able to illuminate in his drama the aesthetic and theological 
dimensions of modern politics, which are often overlooked in theories of democracy: 
Sein Festhalten an einer autoritären und absolutistischen Form der Herrschaft ist 
offenkundig; daß er diese mystifiziert hat als einen “Zusammenklang gehorsamen 
Herrschens und freien Gehorsam,” ebenso. Interessant ist nicht diese 
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Politikverständnis als solches, sondern die Perspektive auf den Übergang zur 
Demokratie, die es eröffnet: Hofmannsthals Blick für die Ästhetik des politischen 
hat ihn ein Moment der Volksherrschaft erkennen lassen, über das die Theorie der 
Demokratie hinwegsieht.375 
 
Twellmann thus finds that, as a witness of the belated political transition from Franz 
Josef’s monarchical rule to the first Austrian Republic, Hofmannsthal expresses in Der 
Turm the permanence of the theological dimension in modern politics.376  
Despite offering a more generous reading, what Twellmann’s interpretation shares 
with Pornschlegel’s is the assumption that Hofmannsthal’s definitive political position 
can be gleaned by focusing solely on the second version of Der Turm. Surprisingly little 
attempt has been made, however, to explain why Hofmannsthal felt compelled to produce 
two different endings for the play. I suggest a partial answer lies in Rey’s interpretation. 
He argues that even if Hofmannsthal appears to give up on the idea that Geist can be 
fulfilled in history through political action, this does not necessarily mean that the author 
completely abandons the eschatological hope expressed in Turm I. He finds that 
Sigismund continues to be carried by a messianic “Grundgefühl,”377 and the second 
version of the ending is marked by the simultaneity of “Weltverbundenheit und 
Weltentfremdung des dichterischen Geistes.”378  
In Rey’s portrait, then, Hofmannsthal emerges as being supremely ambivalent 
about Austria’s future, inasmuch as he will neither confirm nor reject the messianic hopes 
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that he explores in his writing. And yet, if one accepts Rey’s analysis, a troubling 
problem emerges. Rey’s interpretation seems convincing insofar as we only consider the 
evidence of Hofmannsthal’s drama, but a difficulty emerges when we try to reconcile 
Rey’s reading with Hofmannsthal’s political speech. There we encounter a much less 
ambiguous message. While doubts still emerge from Hofmannsthal’s words, the overall 
message in “Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation” is one of hope: 
Denn von Synthese aufsteigend zu Synthese, mit wahrhaft religioser [sic] 
Verantwortung beladen, nichts auslassend, nirgend zur Seite schlüpfend, nichts 
überspringend – muß ein so angespanntes Trachten, woanders der Genius der 
Nation es nicht im Stiche läßt, zu diesem Höchsten gelangen: daß der Geist Leben 
wird und Leben Geist, mit anderen Worten: zu der politischen Erfassung des 
Geistigen und der geistigen des Politischen, zur Bildung einer wahren Nation.379 
 
In a blend of Hegelian and religious language, Hofmannsthal presents the striving 
of the seekers as the gradual realization of the cultural and political destiny of the hidden 
German Kulturnation. How is it that this expression of certainty can be reconciled with 
the much more ambiguous message of Turm II? One explanation presents itself when we 
consider Hofmannsthal’s conception of the role of the cultural-political leader in the 
modern age as a seeker after truth who, through his quest, gives hope, meaning, and 
direction to the public at large. But if Hofmannsthal is playing this role in his political 
speech and yet is actually possessed of doubts he expresses in his play, is it not merely a 
false hope that he is offering to the people, and a dangerously elusive one at that? 
Through his invocation of a nebulous spirit, he promotes the chilling prospect of political 
action that must be resolute without knowing what it wants to achieve. Hofmannsthal’s 
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political speech leaves him open to the charge of being a false prophet, or at best a poseur. 




Hofmannsthal’s description of our existence as filled with and mediated by books 
may seem at first to be less relevant in our own day; books are actually piling up less and 
less as the physical storage of knowledge has shifted into the electronic realm. However, 
the culturally critical concerns that are raised in today’s discussions about the societal 
impact of our media culture resonate strongly with the anxieties that Hofmannsthal 
expressed about the culture of knowledge in his time. The problem of the knowability of 
the world in the face of an overabundance of information, stories, concepts, and news not 
only persists but is exacerbated in our internet age. Hofmannsthal’s metaphor for this 
problem, the image of an ever-increasing stack of books, no longer sufficiently captures 
the rapid proliferation of information in our time. In this age the producers of knowledge 
and culture do not constitute a separate social class unto themselves, as everyone can in 
principle be both producer and consumer of knowledge and of culture. With our instant 
access to a vast network of ideas and cultural products, it is extremely difficult to judge 
what might be worth knowing—while on the other hand, the very assumption that there 
might be some things more or less worth knowing than others already challenges to some 
extent the democratic principles upon which the internet is based.  
“In der Dichter und diese Zeit” Hofmannsthal grappled with the question of what 
the democratization of literature and knowledge meant and, as I have pointed out, found 
himself unable to entirely embrace this cultural trend. He was deeply troubled by the 
growing relativism of his age, which he saw as the root cause of the incoherence and 
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indeterminacy of his time; yet he also knew that it is futile and narrow-minded to 
inflexibly cling to tradition and to an already eroded old order. He saw himself as 
belonging to a generation of Spätgeborenen, who had inherited nothing but “hübsche 
Möbel” and “überfeine Nerven,”380 implying that for his generation the inherited 
traditions are meaningful almost exclusively in an ornamental sense, as without 
knowledge of the experiential dimension upon which these traditions are based, they have 
nothing but an aesthetic appeal. However, while Hofmannsthal is haunted by the sense 
that something valuable of the past has been lost and that his generation is therefore 
facing a crisis of meaning, he is also curious to investigate what replaces the old order 
and to know how meaning is being created and mediated through new symbols and a new 
generation of cultural producers.   
In exploring the production of meaning in the field of literature, Hofmannsthal, 
like Walter Benjamin, observes that in a firmly established literate age, poetic knowledge 
(which Benjamin calls wisdom381), transmitted through literature, has become greatly 
devalued. In a scientific age, knowledge based on lived experience or on the creative 
imagination of the literary author is considered to be illusory and unreal compared to the 
concreteness of information based on empirical facts. Thus, while Hofmannsthal notes 
that modern readers have an insatiable appetite for reading material, their relationship to 
what they read, regardless of whether it is a newspaper article or a novel, has become 
predominantly instrumental. Although Hofmannsthal is deeply troubled by this cultural 
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trend, he recognizes in the voracious consumption of books and print material an 
unsatisfied longing to connect to the world in a way that restores a sense of wholeness 
and does not merely add to the incoherent collection of disconnected bits of information. 
He believes that the mad speed of unreflective cultural consumption indicates an 
unconscious yearning for the kind of enchantment and sense of wonder that can only be 
transmitted through poetry.382  
For Hofmannsthal, poetic language is charged with the utopian potential to 
transgress the limits of the sayable and thereby resist instrumentalization. Poetic language 
resists explanation because it speaks in an enigmatic pictorial language that is meant to be 
irreducible. Hofmannsthal appealed to the image as a medium that would offer 
knowledge of the whole “all at once,” as opposed to technical language in which meaning 
emerges in a linear fashion. In effect what Hofmannsthal was seeking was the paradox of 
a language of symbols that could, so to speak, mediate immediacy.  
This desire for immediacy and wholeness may strike us today as naïve or even 
utopian, but in fact, our society is saturated with utopian aspirations for immediacy. In its 
contemporary incarnation these hopes are represented in the rather exaggerated claims 
that are made about the internet’s potential to forge a new global community. Web gurus 
laud the transformative potential of social media and the democratization of knowledge: 
numbers are evinced to show that, in sheer numbers, the Facebook community now 
surpasses the population of most nations; campaigns are launched online to bring African 
warlords to justice. For its proponents, the potential of the new internet-based 
communication networks apparently knows no bounds.  
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Underlying this phenomenon is a new relationship between the public and the 
symbolic order. Gone is the hierarchy between the producers and the consumers of 
knowledge and culture; instead, knowledge is said to be the direct reflection of the 
individual’s subjectivity: news is increasingly produced by the amateur journalist, who 
aggregates stories and packages them as opinion pieces; the role of the pundit is eclipsed 
by a proliferation of blogs, amateur publications and discussion threads; Youtube 
sensations spring up overnight and increasingly replace other forms of entertainment. All 
of this happens in a medium celebrated for its richness, which combines auditory and 
visual, text-based and image-based messages, creating an immersive experience meant to 
reproduce the quality of social presence.  
Critics of the media culture in the internet age echo the skepticism that 
Hofmannsthal expressed in the Chandos Letter about the ability of language to point 
outside of itself. From the skeptic’s perspective, the internet has become an echo 
chamber; rather than opening us up to different people around the world, it cuts us off. 
Online social groups that are completely built on choice no longer bring us into contact 
with a concrete community that challenges us to adapt to it. The risk is that we are 
actually trying to avoid otherness altogether, until the only voice one hears is one’s own. 
What is unique about Hofmannsthal’s analysis is that it is offered in a dramatic 
reconstruction that speaks to us at an affective level. In other words, he communicates the 
loss of poetry through poetry itself. 
Besides warning of the social fragmentation, atomization, and alienation entrained 
by increasingly popularized forms of communication, however, Hofmannsthal’s writings 
also alert us to a different but related danger—a risk that Hofmannsthal perhaps did not 
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see clearly enough himself. In an age such as ours, the temptation may arise to seek a 




Note on References to Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Works 
This dissertation refers to two editions of the collected works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal: 
the Gesammelte Werke in ten volumes, edited by Bernd Schoeller in consultation with 
Rudolf Hirsch and published by Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag in Frankfurt am Main from 
1979 through 1980; the other edition is the Kritische Ausgabe Sämtliche Werke, edited by 
Rudolf Hirsch and others, published by Fischer-Verlag from 1975 onward. For 
readability, full citations will be given once and subsequent references will be 
abbreviated as follows:  
GWD II = Gesammelte Werke: Dramen II: 1892-1905. 1979.  
GWD III = Gesammelte Werke: Dramen III: 1893-1927. 1979. 
GWE = Gesammelte Werke: Erfundene Gespräche und Briefe, Reisen. 1979. 
GWRA I = Gesammelte Werke: Reden und Aufsätze I: 1891-1913. 1979. 
GWRA II = Gesammelte Werke: Reden und Aufsätze II: 1914-1924. 1979. 
GWRA III = Gesammelte Werke: Reden und Aufsätze III: 1925-1929. 
Aufzeichnungen. 1980. (Aufzeichnungen were co-edited by Ingeborg Beyer-
Ahlert.) 
 
SW 2 = Kritische Ausgabe Sämtliche Werke 2: Gedichte. 1989.  
SW 31 = Kritische Ausgabe Sämtliche Werke 31: Erfundene Gespräche und 
Briefe. 1991.  
 
SW 33 = Kritische Ausgabe Sämtliche Werke 33: Reden und Aufsätze 2. 2009. 
 
Primary Texts 
Listed by year of first appearance with referenced edition. 
1920 “Beethoven.” In GWRA II. 
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1891  “Der Prophet.” In SW 2.  
1893  “Gabriele d’Annunzio.” In GWRA I.  
1894 “Juniabend im Volksgarten.” In GWE. 
1894 “Philosophie des Metaphorischen.” In GWRA I.  
1897 “Bildlicher Ausdruck.” In GWRA I.  
 
1902 “Über Charaktere im Roman und im Drama.” In GWE. 
 
1902 “Zu ‘Der Brief des letzten Contrarin’ Varianten und Notizen” In GWE. 
1903 “Das Gespräch über Gedichte.” In SW 31. 
 
1904 “Lafcadio Hearn.“ In SW 33.  
 
1905  “Der begrabene Gott.” In SW 33.  
1905 “Der Tisch mit den Büchern.” In SW 33.  
1906  “Der Dichter und diese Zeit.“ In SW 33. 
1906 “Unterhaltung über die Schriften von Gottfried Keller.” In GWE. 
1906 “Unterhaltung über den ‘Tasso’ von Goethe.” In GWE. 
1906 “Unterhaltung über ein neues Buch.” 1906. In GWE. 
1907 “Furcht: Ein Dialog.” In GWE.  
1907 “Die Briefe des Zurückgekehrten.” In GWE. 
1907 “Umrisse eines neuen Journalismus.” 1907. In SW 33. 
 
1917 “Preusse und Österreicher.” In GWRA II. 
1918 “Zur Krisis des Burgtheaters.” In GWRA II. 
1919 “Die Bedeutung unseres Kunstgewerbes für den Wiederaufbau.” In GWRA 
II. 
 
1920 “Idee einer durchaus selbständigen und dem Scheingeschmack der Epoche 
widerstrebenden Monatsschrift.” In GWRA II. 
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1921 “Drei kleine Betrachtungen.” In GWRA II. 
1922 “Wiener Brief I.” In GWRA II. 
1922 “Wiener Brief [II].” In GWRA II. 
1922 “Wiener Brief [III].” In GWRA II. 
1925 “Brief an einen Gleichaltrigen.” In GWE. 
1925 “Gemüt. Der Bedeutungswandel eines deutschen Wortes.” GWRA III.  
1925 “Der Schatten der Lebenden.” In GWRA III. 
1926 “Das Schrifttum als Geistiger Raum der Nation.” In GWRA III. 
1926 “Vermächtnis der Antike.” In GWRA III. 
1927  “Wert und Ehre deutscher Sprache.” In GWRA III. 
1927  Der Turm (final version). In GWD III. 
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